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Alia Sends Condolences to Egypt's Mubarak

AU1410195690 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Text] Comrade Ramiz Alia, president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, has sent the following telegram to Muhammad Husni Mubarak, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

We learned with sorrow of the news of the tragic death of Rif'at al-Mahjub, speaker of the National People's Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt. In the name of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, and in my own name, I express our sincere sympathies to you, Mr. President, to the friendly Egyptian people, and the family of the deceased.

Spokesman Denies Killing of Greek Defectors

NC1310165290 Athens ELEVTHEROTIPIA in Greek 13 Oct 90 p 4

[Text] The Albanian Embassy in Athens, with a delay of several days, yesterday denied press reports that two Albanians of Greek extraction were executed earlier this month.

The Albanian Embassy statement notes that the Albanian Foreign Ministry spokesman said yesterday that "these reports are totally fabricated and with a bad intention. According to relevant investigations, such an incident never happened. Sotirak Dino lives in Korce and works at the 'Nedori 8' sugar refinery, but there is no citizen in the area named Anton Pilo."

Swedish Foreign Ministry Delegation Arrives

AU1610145090 Tirana ATA in English 0915 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Tirana, October 16 (ATA)—A delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, headed by Torsten Orn, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, arrived on an official and friendly visit in our country on October 15.

The delegation was welcomed at the airport by Sokrat Plaka, deputy foreign minister of the PSR [People's Socialist Republic] of Albania, and other officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Attending was also Orjan Landelius, charge d'affaires a.i. [ad interim] of the Embassy of Sweden to the PSR of Albania.

On October 15 afternoon, negotiations were held between the Albanian delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Sokrat Plaka and the Swedish delegation headed by Torsten Orn, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs.

Both parties noted with pleasure that the friendly relations and cooperation between Albania and Sweden have developed positively. Both parties laid the stress on the further materialization and intensification of cooperation in various fields of mutual concern, particularly in the economic, industrial-technical one, for investments and the creation of joint enterprises in various sectors of economy, etc.

The Swedish delegation was informed of the democratization in Albania as an irreversible and long-term process, which is bringing about transformations in the political, economic domains, in the social relations at home and abroad, etc.

Opinions were exchanged on some questions of the current international situation, dwelling particularly on the process of European security and cooperation, the Balkan cooperation, etc.

SFRY Economic Cooperation Delegation Arrives

AU1610155190 Tirana ATA in English 0937 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Tirana, October 16 (ATA)—A Yugoslav Government economic delegation, headed by the member of the Executive Council of the SFR [Socialist Federal Republic] of Yugoslavia and head of the Yugoslav party at the Albanian-Yugoslav Joint Committee on Economic and Technical-Scientific Cooperation Nikola Gasovski, arrived in our country on October 15 to attend the proceedings of the second session of this committee. The leader of the Yugoslav delegation Nikola Gasovski was received by Farudin Hoxha, minister under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the Albanian Committee for Cooperation With Foreign Countries. Present was also Viktor Gaber, charge d'affaires a.i. [ad interim] of the Embassy of the SFR of Yugoslavia in the PSR [People's Socialist Republic] of Albania.

On October 15, the second session of the Albanian-Yugoslav Joint Committee for Economic and Technical-Scientific Cooperation started its proceedings in Tirana. The session discussed on the possibilities and roads of intensifying the economic cooperation between the two countries in the field of extracting and processing the minerals, energy, trade, transport, etc.

'Realistic' View of Democracy Urged

AU1710091390 Tirana DRITA in Albanian 7 Oct 90 pp 2-3, 16

[Fatos Nano article: "Long-standing academic coworker:" "Democratic Processes Increase the Role of the Intelligentsia"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The intensity and dynamism of current changes—not only in the world economy and in international political relations, but in domestic socioeconomic relations, in people's demands, cultural and psychological characteristics—not only exclude degeneration, apathy, lassitude, and lack of creativity in the economy and culture, but demand maturity, clarity of thought and action, and a maximum commitment to moving ahead fast, but without haste. The irreversible character of the thorough democratic processes in our country truly calls for the elimination of everything that does not stand up to the test of time and hinders progress. The basic aim is, as Lenin said, "the positive construction of a future," to create, affirm, and consolidate new material and spiritual conditions which will support the dynamism of our internal social development and ensure us a worthy place in the community of civilized nations.

It would be naive to think that, in solving our problems, ready-made and indisputable models exist which are successful for all countries, or that it is enough to look around you and blindly follow the fashionable recipes which are offered. It is equally absurd to appeal to historically outmoded models in the name of today's democracy. Models for future democracy and economic effectiveness must be created, because existing models are so full of the prejudices of the past. It is a fact, for instance, that those countries which lately chose the Western model are now undergoing the most acute economic and sociopolitical crises in their postwar history. Could, for example, the Anglo-Saxon model of a "free market economy" be adopted as a developmental alternative when it has been superseded in contemporary economics? In the industrialized countries, the market economy operates (with rising and falling cycles) not only with the help of accumulated wealth and infrastructure built long ago, but also with the help of powerful regulatory intervention by state and supra-state bodies in national and world markets. It is similarly well known that the Western concepts of political pluralism, human rights and freedoms, etc. were born and have developed in a polarized environment of social antagonisms in which "the freedom of one individual begins where that of another ends," while individuals have very different relationships with property and the state.

Nevertheless, I do not think that today's realities should be judged in terms of black and white, as happens in propaganda, and not only among us. Although cold war propaganda considers socialism "a total failure," it is a fact that the West has drawn its own lessons from the experiences of centralized management and the collective treatment of many economic processes and needs in the East, making the necessary reforms in the system of the free market economy (state subsidies, social security, etc.), to quell social revolt. From a scientific point of view, in the development of a socialist economy too, bridges with the market economy cannot be totally burned, and the laws of market will coexist for a long time alongside new social relations. The market is not an "invention of capitalism." As in the new economic mechanism, therefore, it must have a genuine influence on people's economic lives, strengthening the economic and financial role of the state, so that relations between producers and consumers do not develop spontaneously. This calls for a study of the experience of other countries in organizing the market and fiscal and customs controls, etc., because our economists and lawyers are not trained in these fields.

Here and in other fields, in accordance with our country's conditions, traditions, and the principles which our national history has taught us, we are searching for, working on, and affirming new and full solutions to harmonize people's interests and developmental structures which will meet the needs of our new phase and maintain our economic and political stability. In our society, there is no lack of pluralism of interests and of forces to pursue them, but there is no antagonism; for the sake of the former, we cannot recreate the latter! For our society, individual freedom ends where it encroaches on the country's freedom and independence, the power of the people, and the foundations of the socialist order. Do these limits not create a broad scope and stable conditions for the development of human rights? Also, to be realistic, democracy cannot fail to be conditioned by the level of material development and the economic maturity of the social order in every country; otherwise, it would not assume such different aspects for the majority of the world's population in undeveloped capitalist countries. Our society, freed from exploitation, allows its driving forces to unite on the shortest route to progress to overcome backwardness inherited from the past. This, however, cannot be achieved if economic theory and practice remain "frozen," or if social guarantees move faster than the economy and production.

The message of progress that comes from the recent party plenums is that affirmation and rejection, as a mechanism of development, demand innovation and a courageous stand in confronting mankind's values and paths of historical development. Our national and social values and achievements are being arrogantly attacked by reaction; therefore, we need wisdom to support and promote the processes of democratization in a measured way in the economy and elsewhere, and to meet the challenges of our present and future development. We are building a new society, whose vitality depends much on the superiority of socialist innovation compared with dogma, blind imitation, and politicized intellectual snobbery. I, therefore, think we have no need to be afraid of confrontation with anyone or of assuming the place that the times demand, at the forefront of progress. [passage omitted]

It is a fact that we took a qualitative leap forward in the 1980's in our economic ties with foreign partners, moving from mainly barter trade based on interstate agreements to more complex forms of relations in hard currency markets and in free competition. We can build on this leap, however, because the proportion of our national product traded abroad is still less than 10 percent, when the world average is 17 percent. Expanding and further processing sources of exports, improving their quality and adding to their value, and strengthening ties of cooperation and interdependency with foreign partners would further consolidate the country's independence and economic development. I think that this requires us to get to know and respect "the rules of the game" on the world market (which do not depend on us), and to introduce and respond with businesslike correctness to all forms of cooperation which are not accompanied by political conditions (though let us not politicize everything in contacts with foreign partners). As long as these latter express a serious business interest in cooperation with mutual profits, this will strengthen our conviction that Albania, just as it has its individuality and own role in Balkan politics, has and must assume its place in foreign markets not remaining on their margins. [passage omitted]

Anniversary of Enver Hoxha's Birth Commemorated

AU1610144790 Tirana ATA in English 0900 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Tirana, October 16—October 16 marks the 82nd anniversary of the birth of Enver Hoxha. Our people have commemorated and will commemorate him for ever, because in this way we pay homage to and respect this distinguished son who became a beacon of the people in the road for freedom and socialism, the newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT writes among others in its editorial of October 16.

Enver Hoxha is among the first who considered the need of the creation of the Communist Party as a main link to save the homeland and bring the people into light. At the head of a group of young revolutionaries, sons of the people, he founded the CPA [Communist Party of Albania], (today the PLA [Albanian Workers Party]), which is and remains one of the exemplary acts of his ideological and political courage. In the heroic years of the National Liberation War, the name of Enver became a banner of the struggle for freedom. The people saw in Enver the unflinching legendary commander of the Antifascist National Liberation Army, who claimed distinction for his wisdom and maturity, cool-headedness, and unshakeable conviction in the final victory.

For about half a century, the paper continues further on, he defined the ideas and led directly the whole all-sided revolutionizing and transforming process of the country. The name of Enver became a symbol of the very great efforts of the people to realize the dreams and aspirations of the generations for democracy, social progress and socialism. In all his activity, he thought of and worked for the people. Confident in this, he led them on the road of the industrialization of the country, the modernization of agriculture, the flourishing of the Albanian education and culture, art and science, etc. His mind and heart worked for the consolidation of the unity, as a powerful basis to continue the road the people have chosen themselves. In the present moments our society is passing, when it is engaged in the processes of a more profound democracy, the question of the unity is raised as a great capital question for the continuation of our road, the further prosperity of the country and the elevation of the well-being of the masses.

From the Marxist-Leninist point of view of Enver Hoxha, the constant revolutionization of the party and the power organs, the newspaper says further on, was considered of priority the struggle against the red-tape and liberalism in order to prevent the atrophy of the creative spirit of the masses. The development of the democracy of the masses, of the initiative, self-action and their control were for him the main roads for the consolidation of the homeland.

These teachings of great theoretical and practical values are relevant even today. They embody the rich historic experience of the party for the continuous revolutionization and democratization of the Albanian society, but at the same time are an encouragement and inspiration to translate into life the decisions of the last plenums of the party CC [Central Committee].

We commemorate this anniversary of the birth of our unforgettable leader, Comrade Enver Hoxha, at moments when our people led by the party and Comrade Ramiz Alia have got down to great work in promoting the processes for the further democratization of the country's life. Through a further consolidation of the freedom and independence of the homeland, through strengthening it economically, through further affirming the values of the present spiritual inheritance and creativeness of the people, the party and all the working masses of the people pay great homage to the life and deed of Enver Hoxha, the editorial concludes.

Wreaths Placed at Hoxha's Grave

AU1610151890 Tirana ATA in English 1310 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Tirana, October 16 (ATA)—On October 16, on the day of the 82nd anniversary of the birth of Comrade Enver Hoxha, the glorious founder of the party, the legendary commander of the Antifascist National Liberation War, the architect of the new socialist Albania, homage was paid and wreaths were laid on his grave in the martyrs' graves of the nation.

Thousands of inhabitants of the capital went to the martyrs' graves of the nation where they bowed with veneration and placed bouquets of flowers on the grave of the beloved and unforgettable leader Comrade Enver Hoxha.

At 1000 there came to pay homage Comrades Ramiz Alia, first secretary of the party Central Committee and president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, and other leaders of the party and state.

Comrade Ramiz Alia warmly greeted the inhabitants of the capital who had come to pay homage.

Comrade Ramiz Alia and Comrade Adil Carcani placed a wreath near the grave in the name of the party Central Committee with the inscription: "To the glorious leader of the party and people, Comrade Enver Hoxha".

In the name of the presidium of the People's Assembly, the wreath was put by its vice-presidents Rita Marko and Xhafer Spahiu and in the name of the Council of Ministers by Comrades Hekuran Isai and Niko Gjyzari. A wreath was also placed by Comrade Nexhmije Hoxha and his family.

Wreaths were also placed in the name of the General Council of the DFA [Democratic Front of Albania], the Ministry of People's Defence, the Party Committee and the Executive Committee of the People's Council of Tirana District.

Comrade Ramiz Alia and other party and state leaders kept silence and honoured with the fist up the unforgettable memory to the beloved leader of the party and people, Comrade Enver Hoxha.

Rugova, Others Invited to Tirana Literary Seminar

AU1610202990 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] An academic colloquium on Naim Frasheri and his times will be held in Tirana on 19-20 October 1990, organized by the Academy of Sciences of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. The academician Rexhep Qosja, the academician Idriz Ajeti, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, Professor Dr. Ali Aliu, and other distinguished students of the work of Naim Frasheri from Kosovo have been invited to this academic event, which will include several lectures and talks on the life and work of this poet and great personality of our national renaissance.

Lukanov Views Economic Problems, Indexation

AU1610142690 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 13 Oct 90

[Interview with Council of Ministers Chairman Andrey Lukanov by Valentin Stoev and Vikenti Marinov; place and date not given: "Indexation Is Only a Temporary Measure"]

[Text] [OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK] The government program does not indicate any specific deadlines for the stages of economic reform—a fact that is considered as its essential shortcoming.

[Lukanov] I am very glad to hear that the lack of timetables is our program's major shortcoming, because this can be easily corrected. We would really be pleased if this were the only reproach directed at us. I was expecting much more severe criticism. The program contains a policy of protection measures which we intend to apply within the current quarter of 1990. The government is planning to adopt a much more detailed and extensive timetable in case our program is approved by the Grand National Assembly. Nevertheless, I think that we can further specify the program as early as at this stage, and I am confident that our discussions with the relevant permanent parliamentary commissions will help us to overcome this shortcoming.

[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK] Last week you declared that indexation is a process that cannot be implemented outside the framework of the comprehensive economic reform, but only one day following your meeting with representatives of the two trade unions and the Union of Economic Leaders, the real scope of the indexation and its initial date were publicized. Was this an act of reassessment, or the result of pressure, and could we define it as a sign of inconsistency on the part of the government?

[Lukanov] I still insist on the fact that if indexation should be applied outside the framework of the reforms, it would become a source of disaster. It is true that we made some concessions on the occasion of our meeting with the trade unions. We agreed to pursue the consultations on the reform. It is our intention to discuss the government program with the trade unions and with representatives of business circles. In addition, we specified the deadlines for the beginning of indexation payments which coincide with putting the other reform measures into operation. We agreed that indexation will be temporarily applied within a short period and will be once more reassessed and reevaluated, after the Grand National Assembly has adopted the basic laws on economic reform. This is expected to take place some time after November 1990, but under all circumstances prior to the end of 1990, considering that a basically new system will be introduced as of 1 January 1991. This system will be closely linked to the establishment of a labor market and to the collective and individual contracts signed between workers and employers. Taking into consideration the agreement signed with the trade unions, we decided that the payments based on indexation should begin by the end of October and toward the beginning of November 1990.

I am still convinced that the other measures described in the government program should also be put into operation within the same period. We shall later resume the question of applying indexation. For the time being, we agreed that we should not obstruct the implementation of the agreement. Personally, I am satisfied with the talks, and I think that the decision in question should not be defined as the result of pressure, but rather as the result of discussions based on common sense.

Delegate Voices 'Disappointment' With Congress

AU1610144490 Sofia BTA in English 1325 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 16 Oct (BTA)—The months in which the fate of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) will be decided are numbered, Mr. Stoyan Khristov, a delegate to the latest socialist congress, considers. In his opinion the Socialists should give up their delusion that it is necessary to remain united at all costs. He states reflections and doubts in a release published by today's DUMA.

Mr. Khristov does not try to conceal his disappointment with the 39th congress of the BSP held in September. The congress did not live up to the delegates' expectations that an economic concept of the BSP would be formed and that it would be determined what type of national economy the BSP would seek to assert. Ignoring these problems makes it impossible to determine the social basis of the party, he points out.

The congress did not distance itself firmly and unambiguously from the people who had joined the BSP by chance, nor did it distance itself from the corrupted ones, Mr. Khristov writes. No names were mentioned. He says that the report presented by the chairman of the Committee on Party Ethics was just "old man's jabbering."

The delegates were disappointed in their hopes that they would discuss the work of the BSP parliamentary group and the one-party Socialist Government, although there was enough ground for doing it. "Thus the vicious practice of the time of totalitarianism when problems of vital importance were solved by a narrow elitist circle of leaders has been preserved," Khristov writes. "The Union of Democratic Forces and the president are increasingly taking the initiative when the country's most important problems are involved. The BSP is losing its positions with every passing hour and its members and supporters are worried by this fact," he says.

In his opinion the behaviour and the statements of the Socialist leader Aleksandur Lilov and DUMA's editor-in-chief Stefan Prodev exhaled "sadness and loneliness." Against the background of the incoherent speeches of the members of the "ideological movements" engaged in power struggle this had an oppressing effect, the author of the article says.

Mr. Khristov is dissatisfied with the fact that neither a decision was made by the congress nor a referendum was held on giving up the building of the BSP headquarters to meet public needs.

Inspection of Kozloduy Nuclear Reactor Begins

AU1610102490 Sofia BTA in English 2200 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 15 Oct (BTA)—In compliance with the agreement concluded by the Bulgarian Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency the Ossart mission starts working at unit five of the nuclear plant in Kozloduy as of today. Next year a large-scale Ossart mission will be carried out.

Now twelve experts of the agency from Germany, France, the United States, the Soviet Union and Hungary, will inspect the maintenance, the exploitation and repair works of the 1000-megawatt unit 5.

The experts will be ready with their report on Friday [19 October].

Human Rights Commission on Homeless Muslims

AU1610203390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] At its session today, the Permanent Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights and the Nationality Issue heard a statement by Nora Ananieva, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, on the execution of Council of Ministers Decree No. 29 of 4 April 1990.

Particular attention was paid to the housing problems of the Bulgarian citizens who returned from Turkey. Of the 1,638 families left homeless, the situation of 963 families has not yet been settled. Out of the 80 million leva allotted for credits, so far 30 of the municipalities throughout the country facing a difficult situation have received 13 million leva.

At its next session, the commission will adopt its view on the fulfillment of the decree.

The Permanent Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights and the Nationality Issue also heard Evtim Stoimenov, chief prosecutor of the Republic, regarding a statement issued by the close relatives of those who died in the airline disaster of 16 March 1978. The crash took place 16 minutes after the airliner took off on a flight from Sofia to Warsaw with seven crew members and 66 passengers. All those on board died, and forensic medical examination has proven that this was the aircraft which crashed. Evtim Stoimenov specially stressed this fact, because the relatives' doubts are connected precisely with the identity of the aircraft which crashed. The entire file is open for examination at the Chief Prosecutor's Office by all the close relatives of those who traveled on 16 March 1978 on the plane to Warsaw.

Foreign Envoys Briefed on Gulf Crisis Stance

AU1610175990 Sofia BTA in English 1721 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 16 Oct (BTA)—Ambassador Ivan Garvalov, chief of the United Nations and Disarmament Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, received, separately and in this order, representatives of the embassies of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the USSR, the United States, the UK, China and France.

Ambassador Garvalov set forth Bulgaria's overall position on the Persian Gulf crisis and told the diplomats about the measures taken by this country at the Committee on Sanctions of the UN Security Council. Particular attention was paid to the strict observance by Bulgaria of the Security Council-imposed comprehensive sanctions against Iraq and the ensuing serious economic consequences.

In this connection, profound concern was expressed over the fate of the 694 Bulgarian citizens who are still in Iraq. Bulgaria expects urgent support from the permanent members of the UN Security Council in the consideration of the matters it has raised at the Committee on Sanctions, viz. the need for assistance to mitigate the grave effects of the Gulf Crisis and granting permission to deliver food for the Bulgarian citizens in Iraq.

Traffic Jams Increasing at Romanian Danube Border

AU1610121390 Sofia BTA in English 1030 GMT 16 Oct 90

["Danube Bridge Is Jammed"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 16 Oct (BTA)—For two days now the situation at the Bulgaro-Romanian Danube Bridge Checkpoint near Ruse and Giurgiu has been strained.

The stream of trucks and cars can hardly make a progress along Danube Bridge. Yesterday there a two-kilometer-long line of trucks, motor cars and buses was formed in the territory of Bulgaria. Most of the trucks have Turkish registration plates their number has grown of late as a result of the specific agreements between Turkey and Yugoslavia.

Incoming and outgoing tourists say it takes more than 24 hours to cross the bridge.

"There are objective causes for the limited traffic capacity of Danube Bridge," Mr. Kamen Velikov, chief of the Bulgarian Border Checkpoint said. Both incoming and outgoing traffic is to be handled and let pass into Bulgaria or Romania. But this is not the main cause. The Romanian customs officers are slow, their work is not rhythmic; the reason for this is said to be the strict examinations they are carrying out.

Yesterday there the chiefs of the border checkpoints in Ruse and Giurgiu had a meeting. According to the agreement reached, the progress of the traffic going to Romania has been suspended by the Bulgarian authorities for a certain period of time. But although the time limit has been later extended, a lot of cars are still in the territory of Bulgaria, waiting for their turn to come.

In 1979 a project was made for increasing the traffic capacity of the Bulgarian check-point. It also envisages a parking lot and new roadways to service incoming and outgoing traffic.

Delays Said Not Intentional

AU1610203090 Sofia BTA in English 1841 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Ruse, 16 Oct (BTA)—The Bulgarian ambassador in Bucharest has been assured by the chief of the Romanian border checkpoint in Giurgiu that the delayed clearance of the cars waiting to cross the border was not a deliberate act on the part of the Romanian immigration officers but was due to the increased number of transit passengers and to the new customs restrictions introduced in Romania on October 1. Compared to the like period last year, 2.5 times more motor vehicles have passed through Ruse since the beginning of 1990, which impedes the clearance procedures. This flow is expected to intensify.

The Romanian border authorities assured the Bulgarian ambassador that the handling capacities of the checkpoint will be extended when additional car parks will go into operation. At the same time, Bulgaria is planning urgent measures to streamline the organization of work at the Bulgarian crossing point on the Danube bridge.

BSP's Lilov Receives CPSU's Aleksandr Vlasov

AU1610182390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Today Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], met Aleksandr Vlasov, member of the CPSU Central Committee, who is on a short working visit to Bulgaria.

They exchanged information on the changes being carried out in the two parties and on the processes underway in the two countries. The mutual wish was expressed to further deepen and improve relations between the two parties.

Scheduled Varna-Istanbul Bus Service Begins

AU1610144190 Sofia BTA in English 1332 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Varna, 16 Oct (BTA)—A regular bus service between Istanbul and Varna opened today as a joint operation of the Bulgarian Druzhba Travel Agency and the Turkish Sampiyon carriers. Three times a week a Mercedes bus will run the service. A one-way ticket costs 22 U.S. dollars.

The first and, for the time being, only passenger arrived from Istanbul this morning. The operators, however, rely on the expanding business contacts and on the opportunities for a tourist exchange between the two countries.

Lilov Receives, Briefs PRC Ambassador Li

AU1510201790 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] On 15 October Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], received Li Fenglin, PRC ambassador to Bulgaria. The Chinese diplomat was thoroughly briefed on the processes underway in the country and the BSP possitions, and on the results of the 39th BSP Congress.

Diplomatic Relations Established With Qatar

AU1610175890 Sofia BTA in English 1719 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Sofia, 16 Oct (BTA)—The Government of the State of Qatar and the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria decided to establish diplomatic relations at ambassador level from the date on which this joint announcement is made.

The sides express their conviction that the establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors will contribute to the encouragement of world peace and to the promotion of the noble principles of the Nonaligned Movement. Qatar and Bulgaria reaffirm furthermore their desire to build their cultural ties in compliance with the UN Charter, as well as on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, equality, respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs.

Havel Removes Vacek From Defense Minister Post

LD1710125790 Prague CTK in English 1136 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 17 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel today recalled Army General Miroslav Vacek from the post of defence minister and decided that Federal Premier Marian Calfa be temporarily in charge of the ministry.

Vaclav Havel appreciated the fact that in his function Miroslav Vacek prevented any misuse of the Army against people and that he launched the process of its fundamental restructuring.

Under the previous regime (before November 1989) Vacek was chief of staff of the Czechoslovak Army and first deputy of the then Defence Minister Milan Vaclavik.

Havel Adviser Says Army Must Not Be Apolitical

AU1710134990 Prague CTK in English 2008 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 15 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's Adviser Jiri Krizan stressed at an assembly of commanders of the Czechoslovak Army here today that a number of substantial changes have been carried out in the Army, especially structural ones.

He pointed out that important steps have been taken on the road towards democratization and humanization of the Army.

In another part of his speech, Jiri Krizan said that the Army should not be apolitical if it is to guarantee and protect a sovereign, free, and democratic state.

Noting that almost 10,000 career soldiers, including a high percentage of young officers, have left the Army, the presidential adviser said that not only dissatisfaction with social conditions should be blamed for this.

The assembly was also addressed by Czechoslovak Defense Minister Army General Miroslav Vacek who spoke about the main principles of the Army's development by the year 2005 and chief points of the Czechoslovak military doctrine which is now being drafted.

Free Legion Has Evidence of 1989 Army Action

AU1610152790 Prague CTK in English 1630 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 14 (CTK)—On Friday [12 October] documents were handed over to the Commission of the Czechoslovak President entrusted with the investigation of Army activities in November 1989 proving that in the middle of November 1989, following instructions of the Communist Party Central Committee, the Czechoslovak Army Command prepared an action of some of its sections against democratic forces.

This information was provided to CTK today by Vlastimil Hanke, chief staff member of the Free Legion Association. According to the documents Armed Forces should have taken control over Czechoslovak Radio and Television.

The Free Legion Chief Staff will provide concrete data to the mass media after the Commission of the Czechoslovak President informs the public.

Defense Minister on Rumors of 1989 Army Move

LD1710014190 Prague CTK in English 2104 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 16 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Defence Minister Army General Miroslav Vacek told Czechoslovak parliament committees here today that he is ready to answer some questions concerning the recently published information that documents have appeared proving that the Army command did prepare a move against democratic forces last November, but cannot do it without breaking the moratorium imposed by the Czechoslovak president's commission on publication of any information on the matter.

Minister Vacek was present at a meeting of the Defence and Security Committees of the two houses of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly.

He said that his ministry dissociates itself from what was published on alleged preparations for an Army operation against the demonstrations in November 1989 which ultimately led to the fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. To investigate all the rumours, a commission was set up by the Czechoslovak president in September. A moratorium was imposed on any information until it completes its work.

Minister Vacek said that since 1970 emergency security measures were introduced, though the Army has never been used. For the last time, it was deployed in suppressing some demonstrations on the occasion of the first anniversary of the 1968 Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia, i.e. in 1969.

The minister did admit that the Army has problems, especially of the personnel nature. The most important task in this field now is to stabilize career soldiers, which means to give them social certainties. (Almost 10,000 career soldiers, including a high percentage of young officers, have left the Army recently.)

General Vacek reaffirmed that parliament deputies will be allowed to be present at screening of officers.

He also told the parliament committees that the Czechoslovak Army is preparing a unit of some 400 men for deployment in UN international units.

People's Party Plenary Session Conducts Election

AU1710093090 Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech 15 Oct 90 p 1

["re"-signed report: "In Good Quality, Constructively, and Competently; The Central Committee of the Czechoslovak People's Party Had a Session"]

[Excerpt] The newly elected Central Committee of the Czechoslovak People's Party [CSL] held a plenary session in the "Charitas" Palace in Prague on the eve of the first anniversary of the meeting of the CSL's current of revival in the Savarin coffee house (14 October 1989). The session was preceded by the first meeting of the new CSL Central Committee Presidium [elected at the CSL Congress on 29 and 30 September] and it was to approve the conclusions of this meeting. CSL members were waiting, in particular, for the election of the second CSL deputy chairman and for the appointment of a new CSL general secretary to replace J. Cerny, LLD, who has terminated his activity because his contract of employment expired by agreement on 30 September 1990, the date of the CSL congress.

After the establishment of an electoral and a drafting commission, CSL Chairman Engineer J. Lux delivered a short speech: "Our party has neither fallen apart nor has it split. Its congress was an expression of profound party and political responsibility. We are a Christian party and the values of Christian morals and ethics unite us and also make us different from the others. It is necessary to put an end to the internal division into young and old members, pre-November [1989] and post-November members, into Bartoncikites [supporters of former CSL Chairman Bartoncik] and Sacherites [supporters of his internal party critic Richard Sacher]. We are all CSL members," Engineer J. Lux stressed. He characterized the CSL as a conservative right-of-center party. As regards the party's attitude to the president and the Castle, he expressed the opinion that we recognize the authority of the president of the republic and want to support him, provided that he, too, will comply with the nonpartisan nature of the presidential office. The CSL's attitude to the Civic Forum is open because this movement is undergoing a process of internal polarization and is only searching for its identity. As long as the Civic Forum conducts a dialogue with the CSL on an equal footing, we will cooperate with it even on government level. Should this dialogue be interrupted or should it become one-sidedly aggressive, the CSL will have no reason to stay in the Czech Government."

Subsequently, the CSL Central Committee plenum elected on the recommendation of the CSL Central Committee Presidium another two deputy CSL chairmen by show of hands. Engineer Jaroslav Mensik became full-time deputy party chairman and Dr. Engineer Jiri Karas deputy party chairman who is not relieved of his other duties. A brief debate evolved about the person of the CSL secretary general. It was wound up on the understanding that the CSL chairman would announce at the next CSL Central Committee session whom he appoints to this post. [passage omitted]

[On the same day, on page 1, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE carries a 400-word "Resolution of the CSL Central Committee" adopted at the above session. The resolution lists the composition of various party commissions approved by the plenum. It also notes that the plenum "approved" J. Srb as chairman of the CSL Central Auditing Commission and V. Elis as CSL press spokesman and head of the CSL Press, Information, and Public Relations Department. On the same day, on page 1, LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE publishes a 200-word "CSL Central Committee Statement on the Political Situation."]

Havel Confers With Government Officials on CSCE

AU1610153090 Prague CTK in English 1805 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 14 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel invited today representatives of the Czechoslovak federation and the national republics for consultations which were held at Lany Castle near Prague.

According to CTK information they discussed preparation of the CSCE summit in Paris, Czechoslovakia's further procedure in the framework of the Warsaw Pact, preparation of the Fundamental Constitutional Charter on Human Rights and Freedoms and a Draft Constitutional Bill on the Return of Communist Property to the People of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

The meeting was attended by Federal Premier Marian Calfa, Chairwoman of the Czech National Council (parliament) Dagmar Buresova, Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar, Federal Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, Federal Deputy Premier Pavel Rychetsky, Chancellor Karl Schwarzenberg and advisers to the Czechoslovak President Jiri Krizan and Alexander Vondra.

Government Spokesman Reacts to Pithart Criticism

AU1610133990 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 12 Oct 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Who Did More?"]

[Text] Zbynek Fiala, the press spokesman for the CSFR Government, told CTK that at its session yesterday the CSFR Government became acquainted with Czech Premier P. Pithart's speech at the 9 October 1990 plenum of the Czech National Council. Within the framework of this speech, the words were uttered that "neither the Slovak nor the Federal Government did anything for the success of the Kromeriz meeting."

The CSFR Government does not deny the positive role played by the Czech Government in finalizing the original draft of the law on the so-called small privatization and its constructive share in preparations for the Kromeriz meeting. It considers it necessary to stress, however, that representatives of all three governments, as well as experts delegated by the three governments, took a full-fledged and equal part in drafting the law's outline as well as in its final wording. At the same time, the CSFR Government notes that the governments of the two republics often emphasize questions concerning [the division of spheres of] competence at the expense of solutions to practical questions of the economic reform.

Farmers Criticize Government; Strike Possible

AU1710091190

[Editorial Report] Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 15 October on pages 1 and 3, under the headline "Gentlemen, Your Accomplishments Leave Something to Be Desired," publishes a 1,400- word report by Jozef Sedlak on the meeting of chairmen of all agricultural cooperatives, secretaries of the district farmers' cooperative unions, directors of the state farms, and representatives of the agricultural workers' trade union with the representatives of the governments of the Slovak, and Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, which took place on 13 October. According to the report, Vladimir Dlouhy, federal minister of the economy, asked for another two-week postponement before the economic regulations for next year are made public. Further, the report comments on "the controlled dissatisfaction, with which the almost 1,000 agrarians accepted the apology for the delays in the implementation of the agricultural reform offered by Miroslav Adamec, deputy federal minister of the economy."

The discussion was, according to the report, rather tempestuous, and the particpants were extremely critical of Michal Dzatko, Slovak Republic minister of agriculture and food, demanding his resignation. Moreover, the report notes: "It was probably the first time that the government representatives were subjected to such a heavy fire of justified criticism on an open stage."

The statement issued by the participants demands, among other things, that "the increases in the cost of agricultural inputs above certain limits be subsidized" and that "the principles of the agricultural reform be discussed in the presence of Slovak farmers." They also announced that "in the event that their demands are not met, they will call a warning strike on 30 October and, if necessary, it may be followed by a general strike.

Bank Official on Capital Market Legislation

AU1610133390 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 12 Oct 90 p 2

[Marcela Doleckova article: "Capital Market in the CSFR About To Be Opened; Which Czechoslovak Enterprise Will Deserve To Be Listed on the Stock Exchange?"]

[Text] The privatization of large state enterprises on the one hand and the flow of foreign capital to Czechoslovakia on the other require a functioning capital market. At its last session in Bratislava the Financial Council decided that the urgently needed laws on the capital market would be worked out at federal level. The coordinator of this work is the Federal Ministry of Finance, which cooperates with the Czechoslovak State Bank. Miroslav Kucera, director of a Czechoslovak State Bank department, was also our source of information.

The laws on the stock exchange, which will soon be submitted to the Federal Assembly, will comprise its organizational form and the principles of its founding, management, and operation. The stock exchange will most probably take the form of a specific joint-stock company, whose shareholders will be commercial banks and, most probably, also brokerage firms, including private ones.

It is foreseen that state securities and the shares of joint-stock companies will be traded on the stock exchange. Only enterprises which are solid, without debts, and whose account books have been balanced for a number of years will be listed on the stock exchange. It is a custom in many countries for an enterprise to be subjected to a very rigid scrutiny by specialized auditing firms before it is listed on the stock exchange. The New York Stock Exchange, for example, demands that an enterprise be at least 15 years old and that it operate at a profit for a number of years. The example of Hungary illustrates how difficult it is to be quoted on the stock exchange: Several years after the opening of the Hungarian capital market, the shares of only one enterprise—the Ibusz travel agency—are quoted there. Let me say as a consolation for enterprises that do not yet have a chance of being listed that their shares, too, will be traded, but this will take place outside the stock exchange platform.

Only Czechoslovak legal subjects will be allowed to participate in trading on the future Czechoslovak stock exchange. This is why leading Western brokerage firms (such as Merill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, etc.) have already started establishing banking contacts here. They would evidently like to enter the Czechoslovak capital market by establishing a joint venture with a Czechoslovak partner, most probably one of the commercial banks.

Because we lack experience in the operation of a stock exchange, it is foreseen that both traders and administrative staff will be trained on Western capital markets. Many of them have already offered us their hospitality in the form of truly gratuitous assistance. Naturally, they do so in the hope of grooming future commercial partners.

In view of the situation of our enterprise sphere and the economy as a whole, we cannot expect that as soon as parliament passes the relevant stock exchange laws our capital market will flourish and reach enormous trading volumes. We must start somewhere, however, because the capital market is a tested and integral part of a functioning market economy. The capital market gives credibility to all items traded on it. When an enterprise is listed on the Czechoslovak stock exchange, it will mean that it is a solid enterprise, a Czechoslovak enterprise.

New Czech Communist Party Chairman Interviewed

AU1710085090 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 15 Oct 90 p 2

[Interview with Jiri Svoboda, newly elected chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, by Vaclav Pergl in Olomouc "immediately after his election"; date not given: "Four Questions for the New Chairman"]

[Text] [Pergl] Is it not a big leap from being a film director to the career of a professional politician?

[Svoboda] The profession of a film director is very closely tied up with the guidance of a relatively incoherent team of strong personalities. I would not therefore regard it as such an enormous leap, even though I would not like to be the director of the theater of the absurd.

[Pergl] What will be the first thing you will tackle in your new post?

[Svoboda] The reconstruction of the center into an efficient information and coordinating structure and the formation of a certain awareness among party members about what should be the main thing now. It is a fact that there is a certain helplessness in the activity of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia primary organizations and clubs. I believe that it must focus on regional and socioeconomic issues. Communists should not discuss these issues just among themselves but with the people who live and work around them. Let us be very receptive to our surroundings. A political party becomes a full-blooded political subject only when it protects the interests of its voters and sympathizers and we need to know these interests very accurately.

[Pergl] What is your opinion on the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's assets?

[Svoboda] The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is a political party. If it is a good political party, a party enjoying support, and if it turns in need to its members, I am convinced that everyone will make a contribution to allow it to operate as a political party. If it is a bad political party, no property and no party- owned businesses will help it. For a long time already, I have been of the opinion that the Communist Party should renounce all its assets acquired at the expense of the state budget for the benefit of ecological programs, rehabilitations [of victims of the communist regime], the youth movement, etc. It would repay its debt to society about which people speak.

[Pergl] RUDE PRAVO is a frequent subject of debates. What is your opinion on it?

[Svoboda] Zdenek Porybny and his editorial team have done a gigantic job since November. They have transformed a scandalous gutter paper into a newspaper that is being read not only by members of the Communist Party. RUDE PRAVO is being read today as a left-wing pole of the perception of social reality [sentence as published]. Some members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia are complaining that it pays scant attention to internal party matters. But the Communist Party has to build different mechanisms for that.

[Pergl] Thank you for the interview.

Press Views Outcome of Civic Forum Assembly

AU1610162590

[Editorial Report] Several Czech newspapers on 15 October comment on the course and outcome of the Civic Forum Assembly, which was held in Prague on 13 October. Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 15 October publishes an interview with Vaclav Klaus, whom the assembly elected to the post of Civic Forum chairman.

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 15 October on page 1 carries an 800-word Jiri Hanak commentary entitled "End to the Old Days." Hanak says that the election of Vaclav Klaus does not merely mean a personal change in the Civic Forum leadership but heralds "changes in the political life of our society. I even dare express the opinion that Saturday's change in Civic Forum's leadership is comparable in significance to events such as the parliamentary elections or the election of the president."

According to Hanak, the election of Klaus also means a defeat for some influential political forces and names: "The election of Vaclav Klaus is a defeat for Czech Premier Petr Pithart; the election of Vaclav Klaus means a failure of the Castle's idea of Civic Forum; and, third, the election of Vaclav Klaus is also a defeat for forces with 'socialist leanings' within Civic Forum, particularly for their economic experts."

Hanak continues: "By being minister of finance and Civic Forum chairman, Vaclav Klaus concentrates enormous power in his hands and his position on the political scene becomes ineradicable for a long time. We can safely expect two consequences of this combination: The economic reform will cease to be a 'reform' and will turn into what it should be—the transition to a market economy. The other result will be that Civic Forum will lose its incoherent, vague, and protoplasmic form and has the chance to become a modern party, a functional instrument for the assertion of goals, which, hopefully, will finally be defined in a clear way. We can expect, with a probability that borders on certainty, that it will be a right-of-center party."

Hanak believes that the election of Klaus was an "act of self-preservation in the eleventh hour" because the "murky and intransparent personalities" who have led the movement until now "did not bode well" for the movement and threatened to squander all the capital which Civic Forum won in the parliamentary elections.

At the same time, Hanak sees a certain risk in the "enormous concentration of power" in the hands of Vaclav Klaus because "power corrupts and the greater the power, the greater this danger becomes," no matter how well-intentioned the person in power may be. He therefore calls for an "effective system of checks and balances" that could "curb" this power.

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 15 October on pages 1 and 2 carries a 1,000-word Tomas Marek report on the Civic Forum Assembly entitled "Path Toward a Right-Wing Party." Marek views the assembly as a defeat for the movement's "centrist current," which proceeds from the traditions of Civic Forum as a non-ideological civic movement, and a victory for its "strengthening liberal right-wing current," which is believed to have the backing of most Civic Forum supporters. According to Marek, the election of Klaus "clearly indicated the further course of the movement towards a right-wing political organization with a clear economic program."

On the same day, on page 2, MLADA FRONTA DNES carries a 600-word Jiri Tvrznik commentary on the assembly. Tvrznik says that the assembly confirmed the "unsustainability" of the present situation when Civic Forum is an "almost helpless and politically shapeless organization that is incapable of action." The group around Vaclav Klaus, Pavel Rychetsky, and Vladimir Dlouhy, which asserted itself at the assembly, wants Civic Forum to be structured like a political party, which should enhance discipline within the movement and its coherence. Tvrznik believes that the election of Vaclav Klaus "indicates a fundamental transformation of Civic Forum into a program-guided [programova] political organization of the liberal- conservative type, inclined toward cooperation with right-wing oriented political currents."

A similar view is expressed in a 500-word "em"-signed report on the assembly, published by Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech on 15 October on page 1. The SVOBODNE SLOVO correspondent says that Civic Forum assembly marked the "formation of a clearly defined political organization" with a "firm leadership and rules." He points out that Klaus enjoys the support of the recently formed Interparliamentary Club of the Democratic Right, "which could indicate a new platform for Civic Forum's future internal unity."

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 15 October on page 2 carries a 700-word interview with Vaclav Klaus, conducted by LIDOVE NOVINY correspondents Jana Smidova and Jaroslav Weiss "immediately" after his election as Civic Forum chairman. Klaus says that he was surprised by the election because until the session started he had not even considered the possibility of being put forward as a candidate. He declares that he intends to stay in his ministerial post because his main goal is to "bring the economic reform to the finishing line." Asked about his response to the "objections to your personal character traits and features" which were reportedly raised by some speakers at the assembly, Klaus says that he is a man who has certain personal views and who stands by them, which naturally provokes conflicts. He believes that, in voting for him, the delegates gave "significant" support to his concept of a radical economic reform.

Bohemians, Moravians Criticize Mohorita Speech

AU1610131990 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 12 Oct 90 p 2

[Statement issued by the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Central Committee Executive Committee in response to remarks by V. Mohorita; place and date not given]

[Text] On 10 October 1990 the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] Central Committee Executive Committee considered the situation that has arisen in connection with the deliberate use of quotations taken from a speech delivered by V. Mohorita, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee first secretary, at the fifth KSCM Central Committee session.

It stated that the KSCM has already acknowledged the idea of national understanding in its policy documents and has entered into a government established on this basis. We were not the first to say that the period of national understanding has come to an end.

It was not us who came up with one of the slogans: "Let us discard the velvet, ladies and gentlemen, let us wipe the floor with them or they will wipe the floor with us."

If from the critical reaction to V. Mohorita's speech we are to assume that the idea of national understanding still has the support of the majority of the public, then we consider ourselves to be bound to this idea. We would like our political partners to once again support the idea of national understanding.

The KSCM Central Committee Executive Committee is of the opinion that terms such as "hard and noncompromising struggle" should not form part of the vocabulary of political parties and movements or of political and constitutional officials. On the contrary, we are in favor of every compromise that is to the benefit of the people of this country. However, we are not giving up our right to form an opposition, a right which we consider to be an inseparable attribute of democracy and an achievement of the democratic movement following 17 November. Therefore, we consider ourselves to be a democratic opposition which feels fully bound by the Constitution and laws of our country and also by the democratic rules of political life. Within this framework—as in all democratic countries— we will make use of our right to our own opinion on any issue and to express it in any way, including by voting in the parliaments.

This also applies to such an important issue as economic reform. By the way they have voted so far, our deputies have expressed their support for the majority of laws oriented toward economic reform. However, we are not the only people to have a differing view of the method of implementing it, its pace, and—first and foremost—its social impact. We stake our claim to the right to convince the public about our point of view just as we recognize the right of our political partners to convince society that our anxieties about the method of implementing the greatest economic transformations in our modern history are unnecessary.

This statement is also contained in the documents submitted to the first KSCM congress.

CPSL Session Reveals Party Differentiation

AU1710085490 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
15 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Peter Holka and Martin Krno report: "Differentiation is Intensifying"]

[Text] Bratislava (From our own editors)—Members of the Communist Party of Slovakia [CPSL] Central Committee held their final session yesterday prior to the party's regular congress. They discussed the current internal political situation and other congress materials. A document called "CPSL Policy During the Transition to a Multi-Sector Economy" was predominant among them on account of its perception and perspective.

In his opening speech Peter Weiss, CPSL Central Committee Executive Committee chairman, emphasized that if we really want to become a new party, we have to abandon the old terminology and adopt a new political language. He also reacted to the statements made by Vasil Mohorita which have provided a pretext for another anticommunist offensive. The governing movements, particularly the Civic Forum, have got themselves into a profound internal crisis and want to get back on their feet by shooting at a common enemy. The campaign that has been unleashed may be qualified as the deliberate manipulation of public opinion and as a relapse into Stalinism in Civic Forum activity. Apropos the V. Mohorita incident, several commentators have stated that a modern politician should know what to do following a fundamental political error.

When evaluating the CPSL district conferences, which have just come to an end, P. Weiss stated that in the majority of cases they acknowledged the continuation of the party's renewal in a socialist direction. Unfortunately, the conferences dealt more with the so-called grand policies and less with local problems. He also outlined his ideas for the party organization's new structure and for alternative party elections. For example, a proposal will be put forward for the election of a 21-member central executive committee by a secret ballot at the congress; the districts will delegate two members to the council of district organization representatives with the right to recall them and so on. The federal council should have 24 members and have equal representation with the CPSL and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. The council's chairmanship should rotate on a time basis.

Apart from comments on the submitted documents, observations concerning the party's nature and unity as well as the possibility of it splitting at the congress or shortly after it were predominant in the debate. It was apparent that differences of opinion on this problem are in many ways antagonistic and incompatible. The fact is that fundamental differentiation, which manifested itself at yesterday's session, is taking place within the party. On one side, attempts are being made to renew the party with the remnants of Stalinism; on the other side, a stream is dominant which wants to establish a completely new party by taking into consideration the historical experiences of the communist movement as well as knowledge from other socialist and social democratic groups.

A resolution was adopted at the end of the session. The CPSL Central Committee approved the following with comments:

A report on party activity since the extraordinary CPSL congress.

CPSL policy during the transition to a multi-sector economy.

A report on the outcome of a discussion on the party and a draft resolution.

The CPSL Central Committee's point of view on the adoption of a law on a state language.

Suggestions for candidates in working organs at the CPSL congress.

The CPSL Central Committee also set the CPSL Central Committee Executive Committee the task of finalizing the materials submitted on the comments and of submitting them to the regular congress.

CPSL Issues 'Anticommunist Hysteria' Statement

AU1610095590 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
12 Oct 90 pp 1, 4

[Statement by the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee "on the Current Anticommunist Campaign"; place and date not given: "Who Will Benefit From It?"]

[Text] The Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee follows with concern the new round of anticommunist hysteria that has been launched by some mass communication media and certain political forces in the last couple of days. The pretext used was the statement by V. Mohorita, first secretary of the Communist

Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee, at the fifth meeting of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Central Committee. We are of the opinion that the use of strong words is improper in the present complex domestic political situation and that all leading political representatives should formulate their positions clearly and unambiguously. At the same time, however, we consider it politically unfair, to say the least, if far-reaching conclusions are drawn on the basis of statements that have been torn out of context and if these conclusions are then used as a basis for spreading unwarranted propaganda and demagogy.

The Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee believes that our party's appearance on the political scene after November [1989] and now must be judged by its real political acts and not by some improper or inaccurate formulations used by one of its officials.

We are convinced that our conduct in the last few months has been in harmony with the principles of democracy. Ever since our extraordinary congress we have been striving sincerely and before the public's eyes through concrete deeds to live up to our commitment, which is to contribute with democratic means to the creation of an atmosphere of national understanding and social consensus. We note that the calls for confrontation, the start of the second phase of the revolution, and the escalation of the power struggle, which constitute one of the main sources of the present growth of social tension, did not originate within our ranks. We declare that the Communist Party of Slovakia continues to be ready to participate as a constructive political force in the solution of accumulated social problems.

The Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee is convinced that our society needs stability, peace, and an atmosphere of mutual understanding more than ever before. The attempts of certain political forces to disrupt them give rise to the questions: Who benefits from this situation and which goals does he pursue? Is this not a tactical maneuver designed to lead the public's attention astray, away from the methods of solving other vitally important social problems? Is this not an attempt to discredit the Communist Party before the upcoming communal elections? Is it not the aim [of this anticommunist campaign] to expose to pressure those senior economic executives who are members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and who command prestige among their fellow workers? Is this not just the preparation of the ground for the expropriation of our party's assets?

The Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee realizes with full responsibility that the basic issue that must be given priority is the problem of economic and social stability. It is on this that the activity and creative potential of all our citizens must be focused. Diverting attention from this issue is politically irresponsible.

We are convinced that the way out from the present critical situation lies in a radical economic reform. In harmony with the principles of our electoral program we cannot, however, give our consent to the submitted government scenario of economic reform because it is lacking in concept and in a comprehensive solution to the reform's social impact on the population. By agreeing with the scenario we would betray our voters, members, and sympathizers, who expect us to defend the interests of the man of labor.

Slovak Nationalist Organization Releases Statement

AU1610130690

[Editorial Report] Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 12 October on page 3 carries a 750-word statement by the Slovak National Heritage Foundation [Matica Slovenska] Presidium entitled "Defense of the Nation's Rights." The statement reacts to criticism of the "nationwide rally" for the enactment of Slovak as the official language in Slovakia, which the Slovak National Heritage Foundation staged in Bratislava on 5 October.

The statement asserts that the rally took a "calm and dignified course" and rejects the charge that it "stirred up passions." While the Slovak National Heritage Foundation, as the organizer of the Bratislava rally, cannot take responsibility for "all slogans, exclamations, and views presented at this rally," it also suggests that the cause of the "extremist demands" voiced there should be sought in the "dilatory, obstructive, and manipulative approach to the adoption of the law on the Slovak language."

The statement goes on to say that the Slovak National Heritage Foundation's program is not to suppress minority rights but to defend the rights of "threatened and discriminated against" Slovaks in the southern part of the country "where they have found themselves in the position of a subtenant in his own house."

In conclusion, the statement takes issue with Federal Premier Calfa's recent statements on the minority problem. It says: "We have read in one daily the peculiar views expressed by Federal Premier Marian Calfa in an interview for the [Hungarian-language Slovak] daily UJ SZO, to the effect that 'it will be better to entrust the matter of Slovak Hungarians to the care of Prague.' The Slovak National Heritage Foundation resolutely protests against this denial of the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic. It is convinced that the Slovak Republic Government is capable of solving the issue of ethnic minorities' coexistence with the Slovak nation in a democratic and humane way. We believe that it is precisely this form of patronizing from Prague which stirs up passions and extreme views."

Havel Meets Representatives of Polish Minority

AU1710135390 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 16 Oct 90 p 3

[Unattributed report in "Domestic News" column]

[Text] On Monday [15 October] at Prague Castle, Vaclav Havel, president of the Republic, received a delegation of the Council of Poles in the CSFR led by its chairman Tadeusz Wantula. The representatives of the Polish minority, living mostly in the Tesin area [East of Ostrava], spoke during the meeting, among other things, about the problem of closed borders, which restrains contacts with their relatives living in Poland. They also pointed out the complex situation in education as a result of closing down small schools in the areas along the border.

Trade Agreement Signed, Finalized With Poland

AU1610181990 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 15 Oct 90 p 4

[Unattributed CTK report in the "Facts, Events" column]

[Text] On Friday [12 October] in Warsaw, a new trade and payment agreement between Czechoslovakia and Poland was initialed by representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Trade of both countries. The intergovernment agreement, which is to be signed in November, closes an era of mutual trade regulated by the CEMA principles—so-called ruble clearing—and starts a new system of business based on the principle of convertible currencies.

German General, Deputy Defense Minister Meet

LD1610163990 Prague CTK in English 1525 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Prague Oct 16 (CTK)—European security dominated talks between general inspector of the Bundeswehr Admiral Dieter Wellershof and first Czechoslovak Deputy Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Anton Slimak which opened here today.

They told each other about the situation in the German and Czechoslovak armies and spoke about democratization and humanization of military service.

Admiral Wellershof arrived for a three-day official visit to Czechoslovakia earlier today.

Calfa Comments on Reform, Relations With FRG

AU1610155690 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 16 Oct 90 p 6

[Berthold Kohler report: "Understanding for the Common Cause Has Disappeared"]

[Text] Prague, 15 October—Absolute priority must be given to the implementation of economic reforms in the CSFR. In an interview with this newspaper, CSFR Prime Minister Calfa expressed his conviction in this respect. The restructuring of the economy is the basis and key for the new way the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks will be shaped. The economy knows no borders and removes dividing lines. The prime minister, who leads a coalition government of the Civic Forum, the "Public Against Violence" Movement, and the Christian Democratic Movement, rejected the criticism from the population, which has mounted over the past few weeks, that the pace of the reforms, in particular of privatization, is too slow. While on the one hand any slowdown would be a tragedy, on the other, the necessary steps cannot be taken more quickly, either, Calfa said. The command economy, which had been built up over 40 years, cannot be completely changed within 10 months. After the war the FRG needed four years to develop stable economic structures with massive help from abroad.

Calfa deplored the fact that until recently while the CSFR had received a lot of political support from Western countries it had received no economic aid. Only now are the "right" economic partners such as Volkswagen and Siemens turning up and showing serious interest in cooperation. However, the premier admitted that the development of conditions for cooperation—investment agreements, laws on joint ventures, and the transfer of profit—was too slow. He also expressed understanding for the fact that the enterprises in the West needed time to acquaint themselves with the new situation in his country.

The CSFR is interested in continuing the profound and traditional relations with the FRG and the GDR, now with the united Germany. The economic changes on the territory of the former GDR are causing some difficulties for his country, which had close economic relations with East Germany. Thus, agriculture, for instance, is 100-percent dependent on combine harvesters from the former GDR (which, like all deliveries from the GDR, became considerably more expensive after monetary union). Now negotiations are being held with the Germans on the future conditions for trade and on how problems could be solved. The process of unification and the restructuring of industry in the former GDR could also help the Czech and Slovak enterprises to reorganize themselves, "perhaps more quickly than they could do it alone."

Calfa pointed out that the "small" privatization of trade and service companies, which is planned as a first step, is supposed not only to improve economic efficiency but also to destroy the "old structures" in the middle echelon of leadership. "There are still a lot of people in leading economic positions who do not like the current development," said the prime minister, who left the Communist Party in January and ran in the elections on the ticket of the Slovak "Public Against Violence" movement. However, it is only a matter of time before these groups of people are replaced as a result of privatization. The local elections at the end of November will drive away the followers of the former regime from their remaining political functions in the districts and regions; as a political force the communists do not play any role in the CSFR anymore.

Concerning the rising nationalism in Slovakia, Calfa said that the nationalist aspirations are making economic reforms more difficult. There are forces in Slovakia which make national self-assertion the central issue of their policy. In the background there is the question of an independent Slovak state. There have been various efforts to take Slovakia out of the federation, such as the proposal to make the validity of federal laws in Slovakia dependent on the approval of the Slovak National Council. "The people will find out that solving the national question does not simultaneously mean solving the economic difficulties," said Calfa, who was born in Eastern Slovakia and who received more votes than any other Slovak politician at the parliamentary elections. The relationship between Czechs and Slovaks is a "very, very sensitive" issue, which has to be clarified "carefully, diplomatically, and patiently." Strong words do not help, Calfa said.

Calfa expressed the conviction that the nationalists in Slovakia have the support of only about one-third of the population. The leading Slovak representatives, the government, parliament, and 70 percent of the Slovaks are on the side of the federation, which will be shown in a potential referendum. In Eastern Slovakia, where Slovaks, Hungarians, and Germans live together, people are less sensitive concerning national questions than in western Slovakia and in Bratislava. The premier expects the first changes in the distribution of power between the federation and the two republics, which are supposed to strengthen the latter, by the end of this year. The new distribution of power is to be completed within two years, when the new constitutions will have been completed.

"Paradoxically," criticism of his person—which has sometimes been very harsh over the past weeks—comes from two opposite political directions, Calfa explained. On the one hand, there is the attempt to punish him for his behavior during and after the revolution. On the other hand, the criticism comes from the "not new" conviction that former communists must not stay in leading offices. There are certain indications of "professionally prepared manipulations," Calfa said, referring to the "political machinations" and the "hatred," which entered politics after the elections. "The enthusiasm and the general understanding that we have to solve the current problems together have disappeared," the head of government said. "Before the elections, governing was simpler and more pleasant." The people forget "very, very quickly." Many Czechs and Slovaks return from vacations abroad, which would have been impossible a year ago, and then claim that nothing has happened.

Calfa does not think that the capability of action of his government, which has to deal with a great many details ("The German Government is dealing with the unification of two countries; I have to deal with the working conditions of crane drivers in Eastern Slovak mining enterprises") is in danger at the moment. The quarrels within his government (in particular about the economic reforms) are a "natural" phenomenon in a coalition, they are concerned with businesslike matters, and have always been settled so far. In Calfa's view, the signs of disintegration within the Civic Forum, the strongest force of the government alliance, do not harbor any danger for the majority of the government in parliament. It is a particularity of the current transitional period that the majorities in the Federal Assembly are not formed along the lines of party policy principles but via the "businesslike consideration of the questions that have to be solved." Anyway, the Civic Forum is not a cohesive political force and, in the future, it will have to define itself in more precise political terms, said Calfa, who, in contrast to the leaders of the Communist Party in Bohemia and Moravia, has completely done away with the rhetorics of the old days. "As in the economy, in politics, too, we will return to the tested institutions: the political parties. It has become obvious that here, too, there cannot be a third way," said the 44-year-old lawyer, who is considered an experienced and pragmatic expert for administration.

Asked whether it is conceivable that the expelled Germans from the Sudeten region might be taken into consideration within the framework of returning nationalized property to its former owners, Calfa answered that "for many reasons" the government "would prefer not to go back" to before 1948. There have already been negotiations and contracts on the "historical" property of well-known families. There is no reason to broach these questions again. "A very sensitive matter is the property of the expelled people," who include not only Germans but also Poles and Hungarians. If this issue were under discussion, one would also have to solve the question of Czechoslovak property in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the question of common compensation for World War II would have to be broached. The whole matter is complicated; the CSFR does not have the strength to solve it. It is also believed that this is not necessary now. For the economic reforms it is sufficient to go back to 1948, Calfa said.

In foreign policy his country is faced with the second stage on the "path back to Europe." It is now time to implement the steps which the CSFR announced during the first half year after the revolution. His government is interested in a direct route to the EC, has shown interest in a complete change of the Warsaw Pact, and wants to participate in a new European security system. The CSFR intends to join all international treaties which safeguard the democratic rights of its citizens. Now the country is about to adjust to the international economic conditions and the national economy has to open up to the outside. He has not illusions that this will be a simple thing. Prices are rising everywhere, in particular the development on the crude oil markets is "not rosey," Calfa said. "The starting conditions for the CSFR are becoming worse and worse."

Five New Border Crossing Points to FRG Opened

AU1610180990 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 15 Oct 90 p 4

[Unattributed CTK report: "New Border Crossings"]

[Text] The establishment of new border crossing points and the expansion of traffic on some existing border crossing points between the CSFR and the FRG has been agreed upon at a meeting in Bamberg involving experts from both countries. On 1 November five crossing points—which, to date, have been reserved for pedestrians, cyclists, and mopeds—will also be open to cars and motorcycles. The border crossing points are at As-Selb, Svaty Kriz-Waldsassen, Broumov-Mahring, Liskova-Waldmunchen, and Vseruby-Eschkalm. On the same date and following the completion of preparatory work on Czechoslovak territory, these crossing points will also be open to buses and local trucks. Gradually they will come into continuous operation and may be used by citizens of all states.

Seven new crossing points will be established in 1991 and 1992. A joint commission of experts, which will submit specific proposals before the end of 1990, is to prepare the opening of more crossing points on the border with Saxony.

Both sides have agreed that negotiations should be initiated as quickly as possible on the joint clearance of road, rail, and river traffic crossing the borders as well as on an agreement pertaining to small-scale border contacts.

Reportage on Dienstbier Visit to Germany

WA1610175590

For reportage on the visit by Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier to Germany, including reports on his talks with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher please see the Germany section of the 16 October West Europe DAILY REPORT.

Vietnamese in CSFR Found Coordinating Center

AU1710080290 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 15 Oct p 2

["sob"-signed report: "Center for the Vietnamese"]

[Text] On Saturday [13 October] representatives of the Vietnamese who work or study in Czechoslovakia founded a coordinating center. The conference was organized by the publishers of three Vietnamese samizdat papers. The Vietnamese, of whom there are 30,000 in Czechoslovakia, according to one of them, do not feel excessive trust in their embassy. Conflicts between Czechoslovak citizens and Vietnamese, which culminated in the Partizanske events, were also discussed. A. Sabatova from the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted expressed the opinion that elimination of the information and factual isolation, in which the Vietnamese in the CSFR live, would be a great help.

Further Reportage on Second-Round Local Elections

Preliminary Results Given

LD1610125790 Budapest MTI in English 1000 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, October 15 [date as received] (MTI)—The National Electoral Committee announced the preliminary results from the local elections in parliament on Monday [15 October].

On the basis of the cumulative figures for the two rounds, of the 7,868,286 eligible voters, 3,162,228 (40.18 per cent) went to the polls in the first round on September 30th and 1,427,360 (28.94 per cent) in the second round on October 14.

Voters had to complete different ballot papers.

Election of mayors:

The mayors of small towns with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants—2,930 in number—were elected directly. The voting was successful in 2,911 small towns, and with by-elections to be held in 19 at a later date.

Of the elected mayors, 2,412 (82.9 per cent) were independent candidates.

The rest of the elected mayors:
108 (3.7 per cent) Independent Smallholders' Party;
68 (2.3 per cent) Hungarian Democratic Forum;
56 (1.9 per cent) Alliance of Free Democrats;
52 (1.8 per cent) Christian Democratic People's Party

The result for other parties and socio-political organizations fell short of one per cent.

Five mayors were elected as independent candidates for national and ethnic minorities.

The election of local representatives in small towns with fewer than 10,000 residents by direct ballot:

The local government was elected in 2,923 small towns, and by- elections will have to be organized in seven.

Of the total 20,478 local councillors, 14,578 (71.2 per cent) are independent. The break-down of the remaining mandates by parties and socio-political organizations is as follows:

1,279 (6.2 per cent) Independent Smallholders' Party;
890 (4.3 per cent) Hungarian Democratic Forum;
810 (4.0 per cent) Alliance of Free Democrats;
568 (2.8 per cent) Christian Democratic People's Party;
272 (1.3 per cent) Agrarian Federation;
229 (1.1 per cent) Hungarian Socialist Party

The results for the other parties and socio-political organizations remained below one per cent.

The local councillors were elected as independent candidates for national and ethnic minorities.

Two-vote elections:

The representatives of towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants were elected partly in individual constituencies, and partly on lists. The total number of mandates is 4,062.

The number of local councillors elected in individual constituencies is 2,105.

The break-down by nomination:
361 (17.2 per cent) Alliance of Free Demockats;
356 (16.9 per cent) Free Democrats - Young Democrats;
314 (14.9 per cent) Independent;
252 (12.0 per cent) Hungarian Democratic Forum;
176 (8.4 per cent) Federation of Young Democrats;
126 (6.0 per cent) Independent Smallholders' Party;
119 (5.7 per cent) Christian Democratic People's Party;
54 (2.6 per cent) Hungarian Socialist Party;
52 (2.5 per cent) Democratic Forum - Christian Democrats;
51 (2.4 per cent) Democratic Forum - Smallholders - Christian Democrats
44 (2.1 per cent) Democratic Forum - Smallholders

The other parties and social organizations scored less than one per cent.

Newly-elected local governments can start operation in 3,073 towns, with a total staff of 27,448.

Final Budapest Results Announced

LD1610182590 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1700 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] The official final result of Sunday's [14 October] elections in the capital has been established. Peter Szorenyi reports from the Election Committee news conference:

[Szorenyi] The Alliance of Free Democrats won the Budapest local government elections. Members of the Municipal Election Committee essentially confirmed this; this is the final result. According to their information, not a single mandate's fate has been changed; however, one complaint has been made to the committee, so it is possible that the election result of the 19th district might be annulled. According to the experts, however, this cannot influence the results.

Defense Minister Addresses National Assembly

LD1610123990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0917 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Speech by Defense Minister Lajos Fur at National Assembly session in Budapest—live]

[Text] Esteemed National Assembly. The house is hearing, not for the first time, that government views a radical transformation of defense policy—the working out of a defense doctrine on national bases—to be an indispensable part of the change of system. Thanks to the measured progress of work, I can submit to the Esteemed House the bill to amend the Law on Defense, the bill which serves to alter the duration of conscripts' service. The reduction in the size of the armed forces and the streamlining of training make it possible—while our democraic world outlook and the changing European circumstances make it necessary—for the duration of conscripts' service to decrease from 18 months to 12 months. For this reason, the current bill, with the exception of a few technical modifications, deals solely with the duration of military service and its consequences.

According to the law that has been in force until now, the duration of military service for conscripts has generally been 18 months, while that of students who have completed university and college has been 12 months. So the law, for reasons of safeguarding, sets the entire duration of military service; furthermore, the duration of conscripts' service also directly affects the duration of reservists' service, as set by law. Accordingly, those liable for service who had been conscripts for 18 months were obligated while they were eligible for military service—that is, until they were 55—to do an extra 10 months, while those who had been conscripts for 12 months were obligated to serve as reservists for 16 months.

According to the bill submitted now, the durations of conscripts' and reservists' service, which vary according to category, are set in a uniform manner. This is made possible by the streamlining of military training and of training for reservist officers and sub-officers. In the future everyone liable for military service will be obligated to serve 12 months as conscripts, and 10 months as reservists. The combined duration of this service will be six months shorter than it was up to now.

It is generally known that the duration of armed military service, as set by law, determines the duration of unarmed and civilian service. The explanation for this is that the Law on Defense regards every form of obligation to serve the homeland to be of equal value, and where possible, it sets the same regulations for their fulfillment. The principle stemming from general legal equality also justifies that if the rights and obligations of those fulfilling armed and unarmed military service, as well as those fulfilling civilian service, considerably differ from one another—as do the physical and psychological burdens which fall on them—then this difference should also be expressed by the regulations pertaining to the manner of performing the service. That is also the reason why, although the overall duration of service is the same in the individual forms of service, the duration of continuous service nonetheless varies. According to the regulations which now are in force—as opposed to the duration of general service which amounts to 18 months—those fulfilling unarmed military service have performed, and do perform, their obligations as conscripts for 24 months. On the other hand, their military service obligation as reservists only amounts to four months. Those performing civilian service do their entire service continuously.

The current bill maintains the structure that has been described. Thus, the duration of unarmed military service is 15 months, in addition to which there is seven months military service as reservists. The duration of civilian service is 22 months, which is performed continuously by those undertaking this kind of service. In connection with those ideas, several modification proposals were made in the course of the committee debate on the bill. The decisive majority of modification proposals are aimed at reducing the burdens of civilian service as compared to the current legal regulations.

Esteemed House, the new Defense Ministry leadership highly values the humanitarian considerations which justify these modification proposals. It, however, considers it necessary to note that the equality of citizens also means an equality of obligations. For this reason, the Defense Ministry does not wish to draw a distinction between citizens who are liable for military service. Thus, as long as the circumstances surrounding the performance of armed military service and the burdens falling on those doing service do not change considerably, the Defense Ministry cannot agree to a reduction in the burdens of those doing civilian service and those doing unarmed military service.

It is worthwhile to mention the modification proposal that is intended to determine the manner of fulfilling civilian service, similar to the fulfillment of military service.

Accordingly, there would be a part of civilian service which would have to be performed continuously, similar to that of the conscripts. There would also be a part which would be performed by the person eligible for military service at a later time—at an older age—in one or two installments. The modification proposal cannot be supported on the basis of legal or safeguarding considerations, or with regard to international experience. No matter how surprising it may sound, the principle of legal equality also runs against the proposal. As I have said, one of the basic ideas of the law is that all citizens eligible for military service must fulfill their military obligation, no matter in what form, and this must be judged according to the same criteria. The recognition of one's freedom of conviction, on the basis of conscience, cannot mean that one who is liable to military service can be exempted from fulfilling his obligations to serve the homeland. In other words, those who fulfill their obligations to defend the homeland cannot end up in a more disadvantageous situation than those whose conscience bans the bearing of arms.

It is not necessary to prove separately that one who fulfills armed service must endure more physical burdens—in terms of living conditions, which put a person to the test—and intellectual burdens—which are necessarily concomitant with military service—than those who remain in the family circle and are not torn away from their original place of residence; the circle of friends who can retain their previous way of life and customs while fulfilling civilian service. In our judgement, the essential difference in this must continue to be expressed by the fact that civilian service is performed continuously.

Rationality, however, appears to argue against adopting the proposal. The characteristics of military service assign the need to perform sevice in several stints, because the citizen who is eligible for military service—until he exceeds the age of eligibility—must remain prepared, if necessary, to defend the homeland with arms. The military expertise obtained at the age of 20-23, however, necessarily becomes obsolete over time. For this reason, it is indispensable that at a later period of life, they should fullfill reserve service away from their families and work. This is scarcely as advantageous as might appear at first glance. Such considerations, however, do not justify the performance of civilian service in several stints. There is no rational justification for a person whose conscience does not allow armed service to do civilian service as a mature person, involving an increase in the family's material burdens and through interrupting professional work, at a later age. In my view, the disadvantages in stipulating this kind of obligation for those performing civilian service could be at least the same as the seeming advantages. Finally, an important argument is that not one European democratic state or state outside of Europe has a legal system which recognizes the performance of civilian service in increments. They do not recognize this because the viewpoints I have just outlined have been considered in those countries.

Taking all this into consideration, Esteemed House, the government and the new Defense Ministry leadership feel we can safely recommend that the National Assembly adopt the contents of the current bill. For this reason, taking into account the modifications accepted during the committee debate and supported by us, I recommend that the bill be adopted in whole and in part. Allow me to add a modest wish to this recommendation: that the Esteemed House should never have to deal with a defense bill which is worse. [applause]

Antall Comments on Elections Before U.S. Speech

LD1610214790 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1830 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Interview with Prime Minister Antall by unidentified reporter in New York; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] [passage omitted] Mr. Prime Minister. You are giving a lecture today at the Council of Foreign Relations, which has some influence on the shaping of U.S. foreign policy, to strengthen the real picture of our country. I cannot imagine you will evade the results of the local elections.

[Antall] I will speak about every issue; I will not evade anything. This is not, however, the question of primary importance. This session today will be dominated by Hungary's place in today's world policy, the future of Hungary, and our position on these issues.

[Reporter] When they ask how you evaluate the local elections, as this is the latest, the most topical event...?

[Antall interrupts] Obviously the only way to evaluate the local elections is to say that the government coalition dropped back in votes; one can hardly say that it is a victory. It is obvious that the opposition has become stronger. It is the duty of every coalition party, and also the government, to analyze and examine the reasons behind this. I add that in a transitional period, when the government must tackle rather difficult and unpopular tasks, this can be regarded as natural, even if we are not happy about it. At the same time, I am convinced that the political parties of the opposition, which will now take part in the government and local administration, in some towns, and in the territory of some countries, will be confronted with real problems. They will have to solve those questions. They will now approach these issues not only from a critical position—from the point of view of an opposition—but they will also take responsibility for them. This is not, however, the only question that arises. I think that the newly evolved situation also makes it possible for the political parties to displace the ideological issues and approach the tasks ahead in a realistic. Moreover, I may say—in a pragmatic way—that debates, which do not necessarily advance things, will emphasize real questions. [passage omitted]

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Romanian Note

LD1610125690 Budapest MTI in English 1016 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Budapest, October 15 (MTI)—On Sunday the Romanian news agency ROMPRES made public the Romanian Foreign ministry's response to the October 15th verbal note of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

The Romanian note calls into question the Hungarian Government's intention to rid [bilateral relations of] tensions and to normalise relations. It terms the Hungarian critical remarks as groundless accusations, and reprehends the government for "incorrect approach and impermissible arrogance" with unusually sharp rhetoric.

In an interview with MTI's correspondent on Monday, Foreign [Ministry] spokesman Janos Herman said that they had found the Romanian reply shocking and incomprehensible. He added that the complete text of the Hungarian verbal note would now be revealed to the domestic and international public for comparison with the Romanian answer. "I feel such a comparison will speak for itself," he said. Finally, he stated that after further careful study of the Romanian reply note, they would react to it in an appropriate form.

The October 5th [date as received] verbal note of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry to the Romanian Foreign Ministry says:

[The Foreign] Ministry of the Republic of Hungary expresses its respect to the Romanian Embassy in Budapest. Which it begs to inform of the following:

The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Hungary [word indistinct] its satisfaction over the [word indistinct] Hungarian-Romanian foreign ministerial meeting took place in New York, where Foreign Minister Nastase expressed the Romanian Government's intention to develop bilateral relations. It hopes that this intention will shortly be backed by concrete action on the part of Romania. The Hungarian side believes that relations could be normalised in the long run if Romania, beyond its declared intention, consistently put into practice the accepted European principles, not only with regard to its international sphere of activity, but with respect to its internal political practices as well, fully complying with the commitments it had voluntarily accepted under various international documents.

The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Hungary would like to repeatedly recall that even so far it has used all the means at its disposal to promote bilateral co-operation. On the other hand, it feels compelled to draw the attention of Romania's relevant personalities—with deep regret and not on the first occasion—to the adverse, disturbing, hatred-provoking and lasting occurrences which point in an entirely different direction from the said Hungarian practice, as well as from the official Romanian declarations, which are mainly present in press and publishing activities, but are also appearing from time to time in the statements by Romanian public figures and political personalities, parties and organisations.

It has to be noted with deep regret and concern that—as has been recently admitted in Romania too, e.g. the Romanian Writers Union's statement on the expulsion of Mr Eugen Barbu—the Romanian side tolerates the legal operation of fascist and chauvinist persons and organisations, which can thus act unpunished, fuelling xenophobia and inciting anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic and anti-gipsy feelings. And all this is becoming daily practice in certain spheres of Romanian society at a time when Romania is aspiring to catch up with Europe which left behind the period of nationalism a long time ago. It suffices referring to the unqualifiable Geneva allegations of Mr Gelu Voican Voiculescu concerning which the Hungarian side has sufficient evidence, or to the instigating, revolting and fascist-like documents of "ROMANIA MARE".

The essence of Romanian political thinking is elucidated by the 35th issue of "LUMEA AZI" of August 30th, 1990, in which the author accuses present-day Hungarian foreign policy of pursuing, among other things, a Stalinist practice, and harbouring imperial nostalgia and revisionist ambitions, and ascribes a biased meaning to the statements by Hungarian political leaders. Romanian newspapers (e.g. the August series of articles in "TINERETUL LIBER," or the cynic contribution of Mr Ion Coja to the October 3rd issue of "AZI" represent and propagate the same mentality. Anachronistically, the September 29th-30th issue of "ADEVARUL" uses even the court trial of the last foreign minister of the dictatorial regime to back up these thoughts, to justify the current anti- Hungarian manifestations.

The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Hungary is aware that the freedom of expression cannot be influenced by direct means, yet, it is at a loss to understand that the Romanian side has so far been unable to find the ways and means of dissociating itself from the extremist Romanian occurrences and standing up with all rigour of the law against forces inciting racial, religious and ethnic hatred. All this is particularly alarming also because information of the Hungarian side suggests that these evil forces active in Romania are preparing to use the October 6th events dedicated to the martyrs of our war of independence, the October 23rd programmes of the National Day of the Republic of Hungary and other anniversaries to incite anti-Hungarian sentiments and provoke serious conflicts. We hold it necessary to emphatically draw the attention of the Romanian side to do everything in its power to halt these forces and prevent the planned actions. Failing this, all responsibility will lie with the Romanian side.

The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Hungary takes the opportunity to assure the Romanian Embassy in Budapest of its high esteem.

Jeszenszky Interviewed on Diplomacy, Democracy

AU1610105290 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 13 Oct 90 p 7

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Miklos Blaho and Janos Tisovszky; place and date not given: "Diplomacy and Democracy"; first paragraph is MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] The 45th United Nations General Assembly, and the related series of parallel negotiations, as well as the CSCE conference of foreign ministers which also took place in New York, all gave the new Hungary its best opportunity so far to convey its efforts and goals. The General Assembly also gave Hungary's foreign policy immediate experience and feedback. Geza Jeszenszky represented Hungary at the United Nations General Assembly, and we asked him about the negotiations.

[Jeszenszky] Hungary's presence had a symbolic importance, and it is no coincidence that I began by thanking the United Nations for the assistance it has provided for Hungary to help our nation survive. For example, in 1963, the United Nations played an extremely important role in the introduction of an amnesty in Hungary; during this amnesty, Arpad Goncz, along with many others, was let out of prison. Until then, the Hungarian issue had been kept on the agenda, but it was a deal: If the United Nations took the issue off the agenda, the Kadar government could take its place in the international organization. This started the process that was to finish in 1989-1990. This had to be said out loud, particularly because previous governments considered this to be a crime on the part of the United Nations.

Apart from the publication of the new government's three-year program, this was the most important stand taken on Hungarian foreign policy. As far as I could tell, it was received very favorably. I am not only talking about the speech at the United Nations General Assembly, but also about the CSCE meeting of 35 European states, which was made up of a series of discussions. Each country had to give a brief summary of its policy on Europe. This was also very well received, and Hungary proved that, as expected, its foreign policy was reliable. In New York, we confirmed the principles which we advocate. At the same time, I think that we placed appropriate emphasis on our views on international issues, ranging from European events to the Gulf crisis, and including Hungary's disagreement with the U.N. Resolution that condemns Zionism. I think that it is important to mention this issue now, because it was not given enough coverage in the news: "Apart from the parties directly affected by the (Arab-Israeli) conflict, we, the representatives of the member states, could also help eliminate the factors which prevent mutual understanding. We consider the General Assembly Resolution No. 3379 1975, which equals Zionism with racial hatred, to be such a factor; furthermore, my government distances itself from this Resolution, as well as from the products of a fallen, confrontational period. We are convinced that a liberation from the ideological shackles of the past could initiate positive developments, not only in Europe, but also on other continents in the world."

Moreover, we also mentioned the basis of our policy on Hungarian national minorities; we stressed that we base our policy on the general concept of human rights, and on the respect of human rights. National minority rights have reached the stage that general human rights had reached when some countries advocated human rights, and other countries distanced themselves from these rights, complaining about interference. European public opinion and political factors are currently guaranteed to support national minority rights. I was able to add a principle to this debate, namely that Western European and North American political practice is as patient and liberal as Hungarian political practice is already liberal; liberalism is also a determining trend in Hungary, and not the privilege of one party. The national minority bill that we are drafting will be liberal in the best sense of the term. In other words, I try to convey to my Western colleagues that the proposals we make in the codex on national minorities do not constitute a special additional law which will cause problems; they merely consecrate a practice which has existed for a long time in the West. More precisely, they aim to implement this practice in the Central and Eastern areas of Europe. In fact, this is nothing new, and we did not even invent these ideas. The Council of Europe has very strict admittance criteria, which it also applied to Hungary, so we can build on these criteria; they constitute a model for us.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Superpower relations are undergoing significant changes. During the negotiations in New York, or at any other meetings, were any clues given as to Hungary's position in these changing superpower relations?

[Jeszenszky] No exact answer can yet be given to that question because superpower relations are definitely changing, but we cannot tell which direction they are moving in. In any case, a superpower agreement—rather, several agreements—can definitely be outlined; there is a Soviet-German and a Soviet-U.S. agreement. In fact, the latter is good in itself, and it shows that the former is not a Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, given that the Soviet- U.S. agreement counterbalances the Soviet-German agreement. A Soviet-U.S. agreement is also being outlined in Vienna. Hungary's role is not insignificant in this area; it is very important for a small country, if it is "commissioned" in some way, to act as a go-between.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] The Hungarian diplomacy is seeking both new ways and a balance not only in Europe but also in the world at large. Success, however, also depends on the readiness to accept such Hungarian efforts, for example, in our contacts with Anglo-Saxon countries or countries in Southern Europe.

[Jeszenszky] My impressions are very good. If one can trust the words, I can report on most advantageous developments in all our areas of contact and all the countries and groups of countries with which we have bilateral relations. For example, the Portuguese foreign minister told us about their experience with privatization and about the areas inwhich we should use caution; as I see it, all this is close to our intentions. The Spanish foreign minister spoke warmly about his talks in Hungary, which were not conducted on the basis of party slogans. Although there is a socialist party government in Spain, this does not mean that we should feel less sympathy toward each other; furthermore, the strength of our relations with France showed quite firmly in recent months. As for our relations with Britain, all I can say is that I visited Great Britain at the beginning of September and I also held bilateral talks with Foreign Secretary Hurd in New York. One of the results of the latter meeting is that, while previously I experienced some reservations from the British concerning the issue of a conference on national minorities, Hurd has now altered his opinion and has spoken in favor of such a conference with certain conditions which are quite acceptable, like the inviolability of present borders. As for U.S. relations, the current visit by the Hungarian prime minister will show the degree of understanding. Along with these contacts, of course, Japan or South Korea is also in our sphere of interest; we have also taken up contacts with Teheran, and we are negotiating on resuming diplomatic contacts with Saudi Arabia. Thus, all I can say is that we are in the offensive toward the world at large. Hungarian foreign policy has prepared the ground, and the economy must now profit from this.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Investors, however, want security. Good bilateral relations are important, just like the general evaluation of our region abroad and the chances foreigners see of a possible increase in local tensions. You mentioned that Hungary's primary effort is to settle the national minority issues which represent the basis of possible conflicts in the framework of some sort of a collective security system, like the CSCE process. Some security policy experts, however, think that such a comprehensive system is useful only as long as it is not challenged by the very bilateral conflicts.

[Jeszenszky] The CSCE takes such tensions into account. The establishment of a conflict-managing center is one of the major steps of systematically dealing with this problem. I hope that there will be no confrontation, but if confrontations emerge, these conflicts will be, at most, economic, although the aforementioned center is also fit to deal with political or even military conflicts. There are old institutions, however, like the International Court in The Hague. This institution had a weak role in recent decades because half of Europe did not accept it, especially in matters of bilateral conflict. In a Europe with understanding among various states concerning principles and programs, it is much more difficult not to accept the rulings of the International Court in The Hague in specific debates. In addition, we are also considering setting up observer centers to verify the fairness of elections and other human rights issues. Multilateral diplomacy, therefore, has a wide range of possibilities; of course, bilateral negotiations are also needed. We, therefore, want to sign agreements with our neighboring countries and we want to replace the obsolete friendship and mutual assistance agreements with new and real friendship agreements. We would like to sign such agreements with all our neighbors, and the preparation of such agreements is on the agenda of our activities.

As for the danger of conflicts, I tried to tell several of my partners—including one of our Eastern neighbors—that, looking at it realistically, no one can seriously think that Hungary could threaten any country in the region. On the one hand, we comply with the European principles also adopted by the Council of Europe; this represents an obligation which excludes the possibility of Hungary being a factor which would upset peace in the region. On the other hand, one simply has to consider the balance of forces, look at the map, and read the statistics about the various countries in the region to see that Hungary can threaten no one in the region; no one can seriously consider such a possibility. A government which allows such ideas to spread in public opinion, ideas that Hungary is threatening other countries in the region, needs to dissipate these fears. Hungary needs security, and the present system of military alliances has failed to guarantee this. Something else would be better than the current system in any case. Irrespective of the future security system in Europe, our very membership in the Council of Europe represents some kind of moral and additional shield. Our economic relations with other countries are also strengthening this shield. Hungary's security, therefore, can be fully guaranteed in a Europe which is now taking shape.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Not only in Hungary, but also generally, economic relations have become increasingly decisive in the security policy. At the same time, in the wake of democratization, this security policy is also a sort of "multiplayers' act" in Hungary. This is a policy in which not only the coordination of the activity of various ministries is of key importance—ministries which are conducting an independent policy and building foreign relations—but also the coordination among the many players (advisers, ministries, parliamentary committees, deputies, and parties) for the benefit of the often-voiced foreign policy consensus.

[Jeszenszky] A law stipulates that the Foreign Ministry is in charge of foreign policy coordination. In a multiparty system, some deviations can occur and people can also advance on different paths. If things occur which threaten the guideline stipulated by the government, and for which the government is responsible, it is the task of the Foreign Ministry to deal with that matter. This is relatively simple within the coalition. Obviously, this is more difficult with the opposition, but there is hope because, basically—on the level of declarations and party programs—there is no essential conflict between the government and the opposition. The consensus was built on this, and not on the practice. The opposition can also direct Hungarian foreign policy. To a certain extent, this is the prevailing practice here within the Foreign Ministry because I do not know, I am not even curious, know how many people from the previous 80-90 percent membership in the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] joined the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]. I am sure that there are more MSZP members and sympathizers than members and sympathizers of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] in this ministry. I think that, however, on the basis of the ministry's activity, this staff represents this foreign policy guideline quite adequately and loyally mostly because this guideline is in harmony with the program and goals of the opposition parties. The government represents the Hungarian national interests in all honesty, and it is the responsibility of the opposition to show the degree of its partnership or opposition to this.

[MAGYAR NENZET] In other words, the Natonal Assembly can and should supervise the foreign policy represented by the government?

[Jeszenszky] Of course, and we will also take practical steps for this in the near future. We will propose that the Hungarian National Assembly hold a debate on Hungarian foreign policy.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] It seems that the firm, more critical, and tougher political position in Soviet-Hungarian relations—as compared with the more uncertain and more cautious economic relations—contradicts the aforementioned government-level foreign policy coordination.

[Jeszenszky] If we consider the responsible government-level statements, I do not see any differences. I would like to quote a passage from my UN General Assembly speech which I believe is worth noting when discussing Hungarian-Soviet relations: "The changes which have taken place in the Soviet Union greatly contributed to the changes in Central and Eastern European countries. In 1945, our eastern neighbor decisively contributed to

Hungary's liberation from foreign occupation and from the rule of the puppet regime that served the interests of this foreign occupation. The promise of freedom at the time, however, turned into a regime which increasingly displayed Orwellian characteristics. Only recently has the Soviet leadership become our trustworthy partner in efforts to truly liberate the Hungarian people and put an end to any foreign military presence, so our nation can finally fully exercise its right to self-determination."

[MAGYAR NEMZET] In other words, you believe there is coordination within the government? This issue has emerged in connection with Soviet-Hungarian relations precisely because bilateral negotiations are being held on a variety of levels, and all this without satisfactory foreign trade relations, for example. In the meantime, some new PRAVDA articles make us conclude that, on certain issues, the Soviet Union can feel hurt politically.

[Jeszenszky] Pluralism has also emerged in the Soviet Union. There are different trends there too, and they confront each other. Furthermore, one newspaper article reflects one trend, while the other reflects another trend. There might be occasional mistakes in coordination, but it is certain that we correct these mistakes very quickly within the government, if this is necessary at all. I think that our major problem is that it is difficult to predict the direction of processes in the Soviet Union.

Reportage on Jeszenszky Visit to Germany

WA1610175190

For reportage on the visit by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky to Germany, including reports on his talks with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher please see the Germany section of the 16 October West Europe DAILY REPORT.

Walesa Holds First Campaign News Conference

LD1610220490 Warsaw PAP in English 1953 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Gdansk, Oct. 16—Lech Walesa held his first, since the start of his presidential campaign, press conference here today.

The majority of questions focused on Walesa's presidential programme. Head of Walesa's campaign headquarters Jacek Merkel stressed that Walesa's programme is being prepared in a direct dialogue with society, it does not have a closed formula, it is supplemented and "adjusted to the dynamism of the surrounding world. In Poznan, for example, Walesa talked about foreign policy, in Katowice he will refer to economic and ecological problems, in Krakow (he will speak) about culture and the intelligentsia."

Merkel also said that Walesa is supported by numerous parties, often of opposing orientations. Let everybody express his support under his own banner. For this reason, the headquarters fulfills only coordinating and technical functions. In all likelihood we will formally file for the registration of Walesa as a candidate next week, said Merkel.

Lech Walesa assessed that he had already collected about half a million signatures, although he was not sure of the exact number.

Questions about my programme make me laugh, because they come from a world which for a long time had a well functioning system, said Walesa and added: "In Poland, there is no system whatsoever, thus a president must make efforts to start the creation of a system. The major direction is market economy and that which has proved itself in the world, and opening of possibilities for the creation of a new system, a new Poland."

Walesa went on to say: "I did not want to, but I have to be president, I must lead Polish reforms to the end and Poland to Europe. One cannot count on stability while drowning, when no one knows what is ahead of us. I suffered the most from people for defending the current government and the situation and for hushing and calming down, for example the shipyard, in the past year."

Referring to the contents of the past August 31 talk with Tadeusz Mazowiecki, disclosed by the prime minister, during which the latter proposed to Walesa an agreement, the Solidarity leader said: "I had hope for objectivism and not for a quick drawing of conclusions about who sought an agreement and who did not want to make it."

Asked whether he has a ready candidate for the post of prime minister, Walesa said that he has several possible staff solutions for the transition stage before (parliamentary) elections, including the retention of Tadeusz Mazowiecki in office or his departure.

Replying to a question about a possible second round of elections, Walesa said: "I have my pride, I will act with pride and as a patriot. We are all responsible for what is taking place now and in the future."

Walesa also spoke in favour of a new constitution meeting the demands of the present epoch. He also very shortly defined the image of the future president saying: The president will be respected in the world if a strong, firmly standing Poland is respected. This must be done.

Farmers Solidarity Council Supports Walesa

LD1610173690 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] An extraordinary meeting of the National Council of Farmers Solidarity has ended. Union participation in the presidential elections was discussed. Following a second ballot, Senator Gabriel Janowski, chairman of the union, failed to receive the support of the council.

A letter was sent to Lech Walesa expressing support for his candidacy for president of the republic, and inviting him to visit the Farmers Solidarity at a convenient time for him.

Mazowiecki Electoral Nomination Papers Deposited

LD1610155290 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1400 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] The documents that are indispensible for the registration of Tadeusz Mazoweiecki as candidate for president were received at noon today by the State Electoral Commission [PKW]. The documents were received by Judge Andrzej Deptula. They will now be checked. Tadeusz Mazowiecki has gathered 141,000 signatures. The documents include his written agreement to be a candidate. The official registration is to ensue tomorrow.

The formal moving of the registration of the candidacy of Lech Walesa will ensue next week, Jacek Merkel, head of his electoral staff told journalists in Gdansk. He added: We want to give everyone who gives their signature the conviction that they have significance in this campaign. That is why we are not hurrying with the first 100,000. Lech Walesa said that he is convinced that he already has around 500,000 of these signatures.

Peasant Party Leader Cited on Election Prospects

PM1710090990 Lodz GLOS PORANNY in Polish 24 Sep 90 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Polish Peasant Party Chairman Roman Bartoszcze by Henryk Sroczynski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Sroczynski] Which election timetable does the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] favor?

[Bartoszcze] We do not have a precise timetable for the elections and I do not know if we will draw such a timetable up at all. However, we have joined in politicians' campaign for bringing forward the election date. And we are also taking part in the election contest.

[Sroczynski] As we know, the PSL is currently drawing up its own national economic program.

[Bartoszcze] Indeed. It will constitute one of the components of our election campaign. In my opinion, the PSL should also prepare local economic programs. The program adopted here in Warsaw should be complemented at local level by individual local programs.

[Sroczynski] What is your view on the role and function of president within the state system?

[Bartoszcze] These are important considerations which need to be discussed. After all, we have been fighting and campaigning for a system of parliamentary democracy for a long time. It seems to me—this is my personal opinion—that we should work out a model for the Presidency which is geared specifically and exclusively to conditions applicable in Poland. I believe that this particular question remains open.

[Sroczynski] Will the PSL nominate its own presidential candidate?

[Bartoszcze] We have not talked about that yet.

[Sroczynski] Who would represent a position closer to your own, PSL stand: Lech Walesa or Tadeusz Mazowiecki?

[Bartoszcze] The PSL visualizes a candidate able to unite all Poles and provide a platform for a reconstruction of the entire economic system—a reconstruction in which the overwhelming majority of the population will participate.

[Sroczynski] Will the PSL activists enter the election campaign independently, or will they enter into alliance with some other party or parties?

[Bartoszcze] We are preparing to fight the election campaign on our own. Nevertheless, it is not unthinkable that we could modify our stand depending on the development of the situation on the political stage, which we are watching closely all the while. Thus, everything depends on how the configuration of forces in Poland eventually develops. It may prove necessary to create a certain kind of joint electoral bloc. But for the moment the general assumption is that we enter the election campaign independently.

[Sroczynski] Do you not believe that the parliamentary election campaign could provoke bitter conflicts, even of a personal nature?

[Bartoszcze] Without any doubt it will. We take the position that an election campaign can never constitute a personal contest. It can only involve a "war" between different programs. Consequently, when we talk about an election campaign, it is important that enough time is left before the actual election date to allow the formation of political parties and associations capable of presenting their own programs. Society must be offered a choice of programs.

[Sroczynski] But many small political groups are unable to draw up their own individual programs. Instead, they will probably come up with a number of slogans and promises....

[Bartoszcze] These are also acceptable components of any election campaign. The main requirement is the preservation of political culture with respect to all aspects of the election.

[Sroczynski] What is your view on the future political structure of the Sejm?

[Bartoszcze] It is essential to introduce an appropriate "threshold" rule in the electoral law to ensure the creation of a political platform within the Sejm which would allow both the Sejm and the government the freedom of being able to realize their tasks unhindered throughout the full term of office. I am afraid that a situation might develop which could give rise to a precedent for calling early elections in the future.

[Sroczynski] Does the PSL stand a chance of becoming the ruling party?

[Bartoszcze] This question can be answered only in one way: No one has yet discovered a better method of finding this out than elections. Consequently, the PSL will find itself the winner in the election in direct proportion to how well it can organize itself not only in Warsaw but also throughout Poland and to how well it can present its own local and regional programs to the electorate. If the election results are favorable to us, the PSL will not refuse to take on the responsibility for running the state.

[Sroczynski] This would mean that a PSL representative would take over the prime minister's portfolio and set up a new government, would it not?

[Bartoszcze] If we were entrusted with the task of forming the government, we certainly would not be guided by political criteria in our choice of candidates. We would first and foremost be guided by the candidates' expert and specialized capacity to do the job.

[Sroczynski] Would the PSL then form a coalition with other parties?

[Bartoszcze] It would all depend on the election results.

Interior Minister Kozlowski Holds News Conference

AU1610153890 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11 Oct 90 pp 1,2

[Ewa Szemplinska report: "Codename 'Iron'"]

[Text] "When I assumed office in the Interior Ministry at the beginning of March, the ministry employed about

8,000 people, and there were 130 people in the ministerial leadership," said Interior Minister Krzysztof Kozlowski at a news conference. "Today there are 1,130 jobs in the ministry. By the end of July, over 100 people had left the leadership. The Office for the Protection of the State [UOP] is already organized and capable of carrying out investigations. The UOP has already commenced investigations into the case of Grzegorz Przemyk and Miroslaw Milewski."

The minister forestalled questions about the extent of UOP involvement in counterintelligence work by saying that the UOP is engaged in combating terrorism and drug trafficking, and also carries out analyses of Polish political life. "We realize society's great sensitivity to this issue," he said. "We do not carry out any operations, nevertheless we have to know who is involved in political life and to what extent, and we have to intervene in case of danger or when there are attempts to use violence for political ends." In a nutshell, the minister promised that interference would be kept to a sensible minimum.

He also stressed that no one is being bugged for political purposes, but said that when there are investigations into organized crime (e.g. Polish-Soviet gangs and other groups engaged in handling amphetamines and stolen cars), the ministry may apply to the Chief Prosecutor's Office for permission to install bugging devices. In any case, this is only one of few pieces of technology that can be applied, because criminal gangs are far better equipped with modern communications equipment and good cars than the ministry.

Minister Kozlowski also reported that former Interior Ministry officers have been relieved of their service weapons which used to be "rented" at the rate of 300 zlotys a year, and also discussed contacts with Western police forces and the training of Polish policemen in France, England, and the United States, among other places.

The main topic of the news conference was the latest arrests and the connections between the Milewski case and the killing of Father Jerzy Popieluszko, in other words the arrest of the killers, Wladyslaw Ciaston and Zenon Platek. Concerning this latter topic, Andrzej Milczanowski, chief of the UOP, referred the journalists to Prosecutor Aleksander Herzog, explaining that this investigation is the Prosecutor's Office's own idea, and the UOP is merely carrying out instructions. However, as far as the Milewski case is concerned, K. Kozlowski lifted the veil of secrecy only slightly, without revealing the names of the six former intelligence officers who were arrested together with Milewski.

A. Milczanowski explained that the criminal operation involving the intelligence officials headed by Milewski took place between 1968 and 1971. This operation was codenamed "Iron," and involved opening up in the West firms engaged in illegal profiteering, insurance frauds, and also common crime, as a result of which at least 65 kg of gold and jewelry disappeared. With the help of people heading the intelligence service, this booty was brought to Poland.

In 1984, General Czeslaw Kiszczak ordered the preparation of an Interior Ministry internal report in this matter. He said so in a recent television interview. For this purpose, a commission headed by Generals Pozoga and Czubinski was appointed, and the report recommended that the case be handed over to the Prosecutor's Office. However, the Politburo of the Polish United Workers Party decided to hush the matter up, and party sanctions were the only punishment given to the accomplices. UOP employees discovered the "Iron" operation themselves (the 1984 report was heavily censored), and no one in the former Interior Ministry leadership told the new ministry leadership about it. Milczanowski also refused to divulge any further details. He merely said, in reply to a question from DPA's Renate Marsch, that Vienna was not the center of the gang's operation.

As far as the Kodak explosions in Warsaw are concerned, investigations have shown that these were "amateur" bombs made from materials used in mining. Leszek Lamparski, chief of police, said that the motive might have been purely economic, because Kodak has monopolized the photographic market in Warsaw, apart from which its services are good." So this could have been an attempt to exact revenge on the competition. Fortunately this method is not widespread. However there is a dangerous increase in false alarms about bombs. Fourteen percents of all the fire brigade's call-outs are false alarms.

At the end of the conference, Maciej Wierzynski from Radio Free Europe returned to the subject of the UOP's observations of Polish political life and the possible dangers from it. "Who are you afraid of?" he asked Minister Kozlowski. "I am afraid in case there is a need to be afraid later," was the minister's reply.

OKP's Geremek Views Political Reform Timetable

PM1610103190 Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 21 Sep 90 p 2

[Interview with Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Citizens Parliamentary Club (OKP) by correspondents Leslaw Maleszka and Jerzy Sadecki in Warsaw on 20 September]

[Text] [GAZETA KRAKOWSKA] What is your opinion of Deputy Roman Bartoszcze's Sejm address and the decision to move the Polish Peasants Party [PSL] to the opposition side?

[Geremek] I do not understand Deputy Bartoszcze's position.... We have had a number of differences and problems with the PSL Parliamentary Club before, but somehow we always managed to come to an understanding. What will happen now? I do not know. It will depend on the PSL's interpretation of being in opposition.

[GAZETA KRAKOWSKA] The parliamentary debate has not fulfilled our hopes so far and has failed to bring the conclusions that might have been expected. The question of the presidential election seems to be a foregone conclusion. Debating the Sejm elections now is a matter of pure rhetoric.

[Geremek] If we were to appraise the present state of the Sejm's decisionmaking capacity according to the relevant part of the debate so far, we could form the impression that it is the Sejm's intention to establish itself as a perpetual parliament, with personal membership conferred for life and preferably hereditary.... But we have already seen times when it seemed that the deliberations of this very parliament would remain unresolved, and yet a resolution was eventually reached.

[GAZETA KRAKOWSKA] Do you think that this will be the case this time, too?

[Geremek] Let us just take a look at the balance of the Sejm's decisions. There are only a few negative ones. In my opinion, an example of a negative decision could be the Political Parties Act. Nevertheless, sound and wise decisions were definitely in the majority. Consequently, I think that an election timetable will eventually be drawn up in which there will be room for a presidential election within the next couple of months and a parliamentary election within the three to four months following the presidential election. In this way, within the first quarter of next year the Sejm should make its last correct decision: to dissolve itself.

[GAZETA KRAKOWSKA] The OKP twice rejected the Club Presidium's recommendation to set a date for the parliamentary election.

[Geremek] The recommendation was put forward not by the OKP Presidium, but by two individual deputies. It was rejected by 40 votes to 18, and then 28 to 12, whereas our club has 250 members. Therefore the rejection did not express the club's decision.

[GAZETA KRAKOWSKA] Deputies' proposals have been submitted to the Sejm for debate. What is the government's attitude to these proposals?

[Geremek] During the meeting hosted by the primate, Cardinal Glemp, the government declared that it would accept all solutions approved by the Sejm and that it would comply with the Sejm's expectations.

[GAZETA KRAKOWSKA] Professor, we have a truly paradoxical situation here: On the one hand there is Lech Walesa, who has declared his wish to run for president and already launched his election campaign. There is also Prime Minister Mazowiecki, whose hands are tied because he is being charged with being wholly responsible for the country's condition. And there are today's declarations by Deputies Cimoszewicz and Bartoszcze.

[Geremek] The creation of an alliance within which Deputies Cimoszewicz and Bartoszcze appear side by side is a fact which gives cause for reflection. I find this alliance disquieting, because I believe that it goes against nature....

[GAZETA KRAKOWSKA] Against nature?

[Geremek] Yes. This is because there are no natural reasons for an alliance between people hailing from Solidarity and those who represent a post-communist coalition.

Balcerowicz on Economic Processes, Elections

AU1610134390 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, by Piotr Aleksandrowicz; place and date not given: "Politicians and the Economy"]

[Excerpts] [Aleksandrowicz] There will be an intense political contest over the next six months at least. What do you think will be the effects of this on economic processes and on government economic decisions?

[Balcerowicz] We do not know yet whether the political contest will be a struggle to win votes without any regard to the economic consequences, or whether it will be a serious debate that will duly consider the effect of political conduct on the economy.

Right now we have a confluence of several circumstances. First, there is a clear sign of economic revival, with an inflation rate lower than we expected. The second circumstance is the effect of very unfavorable foreign events—the situation in the Persian Gulf, which has pushed up the price of oil; the changes to trade with the USSR; and the loss of exports to the former GDR. And the third circumstance is the election campaign in Poland.

To these external challenges we must reply with greater determination; we must mobilize the whole country in order to complete the implementation of the economic program. Let us hope the political figures in our lives will not treat the economy as an easy way to win votes. [passage omitted]

[Aleksandrowicz] People have grown accustomed to the new reality, but one cannot expect a rapid improvement to the standard of living. What can an economic politician like you say in such a situation?

[Balcerowicz] The presidential and parliamentary elections will be decided by people who are tired of the tribulations of daily life, but who are also intelligent. They realize that we are faced with the chance of shaping our collective life, including economic life, without any restrictions. On the other hand, they understand that at the outset there was an extremely difficult economic situation, recently exacerbated by very unfavorable foreign circumstances. In these conditions, we are implementing a reform program at an exceptional scale. Of course people would like to earn incomes with greater purchasing power today; they are living in a time of reduced inflation, an absence of lines in front of shops, and a stable and convertible zloty.

But first it is necessary to finish building the new economic system. If we make progress along this road and make use of the entrepreneurial capabilities of Poles, then one can expect a clear, permanent, and increasing improvement to the economic situation. This improvement may start in the middle of next year. In some spheres, such as housing construction and telecommunications, the whole of 1991 should be much better.

[Aleksandrowicz] That does not sound very effective from the voter's point of view.

[Balcerowicz] It would be irresponsible to make easy promises that would shatter when confronted with reality. Taking into account the situation we started with, I think the prospects of a gradual but clear improvement to the standard of living are not bad.

Defense Minister Greets Launch of New Daily

AU1610204390 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 12-14 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by Vice Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, minister of national defense]

[Text] What do I wish POLSKA ZBROJNA on its launch? A good readership base, which I hope will not consist entirely of servicemen. The paper should be alert to social problems and because of this attribute should become sought after. I also hope—given our military reality—that we will all bear in mind that it should become self-financing.

Naturally, it cannot be a biased publication that only publishes so-called accepted truths. It must be a newspaper that is open to discussion and debate. It must contain a measure of criticism, without which all discussion quickly becomes dry. POLSKA ZBROJNA should strive to become a forum for the exchange of views—not exclusively within military circles—on military affairs. It must become a vehicle for debating the role of the Armed Forces in the defense system of the nation, what one expects from these forces, and the appropriate conditions that will allow them to perform their objectives. The newspaper should also carry information showing how other branches of the national economy are contributing to the state defense effort.

A public exchange of views on these issues based on fact will enable me and many other people to become familiar with differing views and increase the likelihood of opting for the right solution. It will also raise the important issue of the defense of Poland in the public's consciousness. These are my wishes to the editorial team and above all to the readership, which I, too, am part of.

Interior Ministry Report on Poor Public Order

AU1610154890 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 Oct 90 pp 1, 2

[Ewa Szemplinska report: "From Destruction to Construction of Order"]

[Text] Security and the public order are in a bad state. That is the conclusion provided by an Interior Ministry report sent to the Council of Ministers. In 1990 there have been more organized crimes, road blockades, strikes, and sit-ins in public buildings than last year, not to mention such things as political disturbances, fights between skinheads, and environmental demonstrations. Whereas the total number of such events in the first months of last year was 106, this year the figure so far is 116.

Road safety has decreased, says the report. Six percent more people died in road accidents this year than last year, and Poland still figures high in the list of European countries with the greatest number of road collisions.

Crime reached an "unheard of level" this year, says the report. In 1990 there have been 517,000 crimes, compared to 368,000 during the same period last year. The crime growth indicator this year is 67.8 percent higher than last year. The crime growth indicator for burglaries of private property has increased by 117.8 percent and the indicator for burglaries of public property by 182.3 percent. The fact that the situation is similar in all the ex-communist countries is no consolation. The crime situation is critical in Warsaw Voivodship, where 14 percent of all crime has been registered, as well as in the most densely populated and most highly industrialized voivodships where over half the population lives. It is "safer" in rural areas and in less urbanized voivodships (this year there have been 73,000 recorded crimes in Warsaw Voivodship, but only 3,000 in Lomza and Chelm Voivodships).

Economic offenses account for 80 percent of all crime this year, compared to 73 percent last year. Burglaries are on the increase, whereby increasing use is being made of firearms and gas weapons. The Interior Ministry is demanding an amendment to the 1961 law on firearms and ammunition, and has announced restrictions on sales of gas weapons and means of disabling people.

The success rate in solving crime has fallen by 23.1 percent. According to the report, "one can say that in Warsaw, crime-solving activity is virtually paralyzed." This is not only because crime has risen, but also because the police have been reorganized. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the police are unable to come to grips with the situation. Their work is made more difficult by the fact that not only are there more habitual offenders responsible for crimes these days, but more and more people with no previous criminal records are committing crimes. Also, more and more young people are turning to crime. Although these phenomena can be explained by the economic crisis in general (drastic impoverishment and employment and by temporary difficulties), the report says that "no major improvement can be expected in the next few years" because crimes against property, the increased use of violence, and the increasing youthfulness of offenders are world trends.

Another problem making the work of the police more difficult is the poor standard of equipment and the need to find other work methods because of more lax legislation and restrictions on the powers of the peacekeeping forces.

Because of increased border traffic (38.2 percent more people and 49.8 percent more vehicles crossed Poland's borders in 1990 than in 1989), the Border Defense Force has to man all customs posts, cooperate with the immigration and customs services of neighboring countries, stop keeping records of Poles leaving the country, deploy officers from other areas at border crossings with heavy traffic, and increase the number of full-time posts. Because these are emergency solutions and it is not always Poland that is responsible for the difficulties (for example, the USSR is ruthless and sluggish with its border controls on the Polish border), the report recommends more border crossings.

Other offenses are committed on the border apart from customs offenses. There are illegal attempts to cross the border by children, people with passports that do not belong to them, and third country nationals (up to 20 September, 117 Asian and African citizens and 18 Romanians were caught trying to enter the GDR from Poland). People are also being smuggled into the West. There are operational groups engaged in counteracting the smuggling of gas weapons, gold, works of art, and even amphetamines.

Internal Minister Interviewed on Police Reforms

*AU1610110690 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
10 Oct 90 p 2*

[Interview with Internal Affairs Minister Krzysztof Kozlowski by Jozef Szewczyk; place and date not given: "A Large Leap"]

[Text] [Szewczyk] Whose man are you? In Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government you are the person responsible for public safety and the maintenance of order in the state. In both areas, the situation is so critical that one could be led to believe that you are doing everything to give Lech Walesa a political advantage.

[Kozlowski] I do not understand....

[Szewczyk] Criminal activity is increasing, there are muggings, and attacks. As a result, Walesa is able to criticize the government and call for acceleration....

[Kozlowski] But changing a president or a minister or making whatever political changes will not make us feel any more secure. The causes are deeper than the mere personnel or organizational structure of the police. The police in Poland and throughout the world have the task of minimizing the results of factors that lie outside its competence. If we have an increase in criminal activity—in Poland this has occurred—then it is also as a result of economic and other factors. The police can do nothing about these things. Similarly, take the case of unemployment or our increasing openness with the whole of Europe. Increased tourist exchange with the West also means an increase in criminal activity linked to, for example, drug trafficking and stolen vehicles. Increased tourism with the East has meant the appearance of very dangerous criminal networks.

I am not defending the police, but I want to stress that it has to cope with these elements, many of which are new to us. We are simply not trained to counter these sorts of activity.

[Szewczyk] Your enemies and the opponents of police reforms say that even the Hitlerite Germans did not disband the Polish police or the cooperatives. However, the dissolution of the Citizens' Militia [MO] and the Security Service [SB], the adoption of new laws on and the vetting of the police, has had a bad effect on police morale. The present philosophy of the policeman is as follows: "If I am to shoot at the robber I must first be sure that I am not risking my career by doing so. Until the policeman feels sure that he has the support of his superiors, he will continue to arrive on the scene of a crime that one minute too late.

[Kozlowski] There is an inconsistency in what you are saying. The SB was indeed dissolved whereas the MO was reorganized into the present police force. It is the former employees of the SB that had to undergo vetting if they wanted to transfer to the police or the Office of the Protection of the State [UOP]. Policemen were not vetted.

[Szewczyk] Unless they were employed in the political division.

[Kozlowski] This was a very small group of people. But here, we have another problem and I must clear it up. In summer, there the MO underwent a personnel review and despite the several thousand posts vacant, some 3,000 policemen were indeed dismissed. This however, was not vetting.

[Szewczyk] In letters that our paper has received, these people are saying that this was pure "Solidarity" revenge.

[Kozlowski] We could not allow the MO to automatically become the police, without any visible changes. Much needed to be done and a lot was done. We changed the whole leadership and we got rid of those 3,000 people who, for the main part, were incompetent, corrupt, and who over many years gave the police a bad name.

Could mistakes or personal antagonisms have crept into this process? I suppose they could have, but where we felt there was a good reason to doubt the decision to dismiss or in those places where we found that a very large number of functionaries were dismissed, for example, in Wyszkow, I ordered a formal enquiry. Apart from a few isolated exceptions, most decisions to dismiss were well founded. In the last few years, the militia had attracted masses of dubious people into its ranks. It had become a "refuge" for many people who could not find work elsewhere.

[Szewczyk] And did we really need new laws, vetting, and the politicization of the whole issue?

[Kozlowski] No, of course not. The personnel review was carried out by voivodship commanders and had nothing to do with the vetting of the SB.

[Szewczyk] In many instances the issue seems to have been confused....

[Kozlowski] The personnel review took place at the same time as the vetting of the SB. Further, the law prescribed verification of all personnel who were employed by the SB in July 1989 and in those cases where an SB functionary subsequently transferred to the MO. These people were also vetted. No vetting was carried out of people who had a purely militia service background.

[Szewczyk] I am familiar with personnel reviews in the MO and not just in its political division.

[Kozlowski] Please bear in mind that the MO was part of the Internal Ministry structure. In certain cases, a simple classification of whether somebody worked for the MO or the SB was simply not possible. For example, in the ministry's personnel division, some people had MO and some had SB identity cards.

[Szewczyk] Was it really worth all this trouble? Does the vetting of whole professional groups not do more harm than good?

[Kozlowski] I cannot answer that question. I was confronted by the legislation, which made it mandatory. Speaking personally, and as a minister of internal affairs, I would not have ordered it. But I would not have taken on all those who received a negative assessment, and as regards those who got through the process, I had the option to reinstate or not. A settling of accounts, the passing a retrospective opinions—for this was the end result of the whole vetting process—does not interest me. I am not here to administer justice. If I do not have any evidence before me, my only criterion is whether the person is needed by the police or not.

[Szewczyk] I commend your impartiality. I know, however, that it was the trade unions that decided who would be nominated for the posts of voivodship commanders.

[Kozlowski] Naturally, as regards nominations in the voivodship command structure, individual nominations were consulted beforehand. My opinion was that we should not appoint anyone against the wishes of the local population.

[Szewczyk] These consultations were rather one-handed.

[Kozlowski] Whom was I supposed to ask? We had no local authorities. The only people whom I could ask were the trade unionists. I could have asked the voivodes, local deputies, and senators, but who else was there?

[Szewczyk] The "Solidarity" regions nominated the candidates.

[Kozlowski] I only received several nominations from the "Solidarity" regions. Some of them did not take part at all. I cannot recall a single case where a region tried to impose its nominee.

[Szewczyk] What about Wroclaw?

[Kozlowski] I rejected that nomination! I found it inappropriate. I did not want to take the risk of appointing a civilian to the post of voivodship police head. But this was an exception, a rather exceptional case.

I wanted politics kept out of these nominations. I did not ask the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN], the Polish Socialist Party, or the Polish Peasant Party, because I did not think it appropriate for parties to be involved in the nomination of the voivodship police head.

[Szewczyk] It was the people who switched allegiances in time and who threw in the towel who got the top posts and began to build their careers. Are such qualities going to prove sufficient for such high posts in the police?

[Kozlowski] I can only repeat, that we replaced the old generation with a younger one. In over 20 voivodships, the police commanders are mainly captains, majors—and in Legnica there is even a lieutenant. They have taken the place of generals and colonels. Our former police commanders were very old.

The personnel review also included the top command posts in the Police Command Center and the voivodship, regional, and station command structures. This means thousands of nominations. I am aware that among this number there is bound to be a small percentage of errors. In a few months it will become quite apparent who has made the grade and who has not. If it appears that mistakes have crept in, we shall put them right, just as we did in Warsaw.

Whether they compromised their principles or not does not interest me. How they perform, is the most important thing. Here, we finally come full circle in this interview. The whole object of these reforms is to produce people who work in the police and who want and are able to efficiently perform their duties and who can obtain the cooperation of the general public. At that point, our criminals will start to have a bad time.

[Szewczyk] Have you heard the latest joke about policemen and how they beat people with their batons?

[Kozlowski] No....

[Szewczyk] With the sign of the cross.

[Kozlowski] You will next say that instead of catching criminals policemen are now allowed to attend church services.

[Szewczyk] That is their private matter.

[Kozlowski] If the police are to be part of society and not just an isolated section of it, they must have the right to do this.

I was recently in Krakow and attended the blessing of a police standard. The crowd was applauding. This happened on Wawel Hill, the very place where in the past we often fought running battles with the militia. It is good that these very places are now becoming places of reconciliation.

[Szewczyk] For several months Poland has been an ideal place for penetration by foreign intelligence agencies. There are many more spies. How many have you caught?

[Kozlowski] Be that as it may, but our own intelligence, counter intelligence, and police services have not been inactive. All the pious hopes to close down everything, throw everyone out, and start all over again, were childish. We could dispense with the SB's services, but our own counterintelligence services kept on working. Poland has indeed become a place of increased interest to foreign intelligence services. This stems from an increased interest in Poland and from a general interest in Eastern Europe.

Getting over the right picture to the West can be a good thing for us, because the Eastern and Western media give a distorted picture of Poland in their reporting. For our Eastern neighbor, we are a country that desecrates graves and destroys monuments. For the West we are a country of anti-Semitism and an appalling crime rate in Warsaw that discourages anyone from contemplating travel to Poland. All these distortions find their way into feelings and opinions about Poland. In this sense, I regard any intelligence service that keeps its government circles informed about how things really are in Poland as a positive thing.

I do not want to say that foreign intelligence services are needed by Poland, but I would not wish to create an atmosphere of drama. An intelligence service that informs, is really more beneficial than harmful. An intelligence service that is aggressive, that wants to destabilize and interfere, must be regarded as dangerous. It must be neutralized and its network liquidated.

I am often attacked for the open presence of the KGB representative in Poland. I would defend this, because we already have an official permanent representative of the French police service, and we are setting up Interpol's Warsaw office, in order to exchange information. Should any intelligence service want to play a provocative role and incite groups to action, we shall consider this to be hostile activity and act accordingly.

[Szewczyk] Despite assurances that the UOP will not be involved in the surveillance of Polish citizens, there are instances where SB files on certain people were destroyed and new one's opened on the same people in the UOP. Have many such files been opened?

[Kozlowski] The UOP is only active in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence. It will not intervene in social and political life and does not intend to monitor trade unions, associations, or political parties. It will respond to concrete objectives which are classed as hostile or which could pose a threat. Apart from counteracting the work of the classic intelligence services we also aim at combating narcotics' trafficking and extremist groups that may seek to use force in Poland. If we find evidence that leads to political parties, then that is their hard luck. This does not come from the desire to control parties. There are many concepts of our task in Poland.

[Szewczyk] What is your explanation for the existence of rifle clubs in the KPN?

[Kozlowski] The KPN has said that these are educational and cultural clubs. Any military connotations are in the name.

I wish to add that I shall not allow the development of a situation—prevalent in the past—when everyone and everything was subject to surveillance. Attempts to do this were complete failures. The police is only the police and it must use police methods. When it comes upon a lead, it will want to extend its enquiries further. If we find anything worth investigating then we shall investigate it, but without applying police preventative measures in our political life. My view is that sociopolitical life carries no threat in itself and does not require police control. We shall confine ourselves to looking on with interest, that is to say, use overt intelligence gathering from newspapers, programs, and statements.

[Szewczyk] The wave of terrorism is growing, bombs explode, there are bloody clashes between gangs. How well is the police prepared for this?

[Kozlowski] It is very unprepared. It must be trained to cope with these challenges.

[Szewczyk] When will your ministry run out of vacant posts?

[Kozlowski] I hope it takes some time, because too much haste only creates organizational blunders.

[Szewczyk] Perhaps you can afford to take things in a leisurely fashion, but what about the citizen who is being robbed daily?

[Kozlowski] It really depends on whether we have the right applicants for the police force. We cannot afford to pay as much as we would like. Mr. Balcerowicz has forbidden it.

[Szewczyk] A state where policemen earn more than teachers has been called a police state.

[Kozlowski] I would not argue with this, but I fully realize that for the poor money we are able to offer, it is very difficult to attract young, healthy, well educated persons who would be ready to respond to the call of duty at any time of day and night and willing to put themselves in highly dangerous situations. Additionally, a teacher enjoys some kind of prestige in the community....

[Szewczyk] How will you break this vicious circle, namely, vetting, no money, loss of prestige, and the low profile of the police in the community because of these factors?

[Kozlowski] That is exactly why we had the reforms. No police force in the world is able to catch a thief without receiving public assistance. You can see it in any detective film or book.

[Szewczyk] You talk of books and films created by people who did not see their starting point—as our writers and filmmakers did—as the call for struggle against authority and the police.

[Kozlowski] Crime also exists in very rich countries where the police have the latest technology to fight against it. In Poland, we have also made good progress, but we lie somewhere in the middle of the European police performance table.

Skubiszewski Returns From Visit to USSR

LD1610203590 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1800 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Statement by Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, upon his return from seven-day visit to the Soviet Union, at the Warsaw airport on 16 October—recorded]

For the first time, we visited not only the Soviet Government, that of the USSR, but also made an official visit to the three republics. This was a concrete application of our concept of our policy toward our eastern neighbors—a kind of dualism. Relations with the center, relations with the republics. Here, naturally, there must be mutual willingness as far as the republics are concerned. On the part of the republics this is very strong. We signed two declarations with the Ukrainian and Russian Republics. Later, we will sign a declaration with the Belorussian Republic because the government there wants to pass it in their parliament. This, after all, happened in the Russian Republic.

So we have some mutual principles on which our relations will be based. So far, in relations with the republics, there were no such documents. We will now have to implement them.

The first component of my visit was my meeting with Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. We spoke of various international and bilateral issues. I was also received by President Gorbachev. The essence of a visit is not just an exchange of views, but to move various matters forward, and I judge that this took place equally in the political, economic, and humanitarian spheres.

Much unease—and justified unease—was called forth by the fact that the already organized exhumation of the graves in Kharkov, where we judge the murdered Polish officers from the camp in Starobielsk to be buried, was suspended. The USSR General Prosecutor's Office, which has taken over this case from the Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office—hence the delays—has promised that it will arrange the matter with us by 15 November, and decide a new deadline for the exhumation and further investigative and later judicial activities.

We spoke on the freedom of travel for Poles in the USSR on the basis of the entry of their Polish nationality into the Soviet identity documents, and of teaching of the Polish language, and Polish publications.

I received the decision from President Gorbachev that he will issue an instruction for talks to commence immediately on our mutual indebtedness. We agreed with Minister Shevardnadze that it is necessary to sign a new Polish-Soviet treaty on cooperation and good-neighborliness. In the economic sphere we succeeded in accelerating—precisely thanks to my visit—the signing of an agreement. In exchange for our food surpluses, we will receive gas. Of course I also talked about oil. This issue is being deferred because quite simply, the entire balance of oil extraction for the coming year is not known, but this should be clear in the middle of November, when Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz will visit Moscow. Then, I trust, we will attain more concrete data as to what the export of crude oil from the USSR to Poland will be.

Ledworowski Satisfied With USSR Economic Talks

LD1610194790 Warsaw PAP in English 1757 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 16—Polish Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Cooperation Dariusz Ledworowski, returning to Warsaw from the Soviet Union with an official Polish delegation, told PAP that he is satisfied over the economic arrangements arrived at during the visit.

The visit initiated work on agreements on economic cooperation between Poland and the Belorussian, Russian and Ukrainian Republics. It is planned that they will be signed in November of this year. The agreements will be of a new type, signed between sovereign states, they should be treated as documents outlining conditions of trade between enterprises from various sectors, said Minister Ledworowski.

The most important issue in economic relations with the USSR is the securing of deliveries of basic raw materials to Poland, including oil and natural gas. One should expect lower amounts of oil than this year's deliveries but not low enough to disturb a normal functioning of

Poland's economy. Deliveries of natural gas at 8.5-9 billion cubic metres will meet our demands.

In return, Poland will deliver to the USSR additional supplies of foodstuffs and cigarettes. I expect that an agreement on economic cooperation between Poland and the USSR will be signed during the next several weeks.

Ledworowski also told newsmen that Poland's debt in respect to the Soviet Union remains an open issue. It was agreed, and President Gorbachev gave appropriate instructions to his advisers, that sides are to prepare several possible solutions to this problem keeping in mind such variables as Poland's favourable trade balance with the Soviet Union, which may exceed 4 billion rubles by the end of 1990, the spreading of the repayment of the debt over a period of five years, the switch to hard currency settlements and the unfavourable situation for Polish enterprises in the first period of the functioning of the new system of trade settlements.

Slovak Premier Sums Up Talks at Press Conference

LD1210002390 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Text] Today is the second day of the visit of Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar to Poland. The results of today's talks were summed up at a press conference early this evening by Premier Meciar as follows:

[Begin Meciar recording] The trip to Poland is the first visit of the Slovak Government abroad. We attach great significance to it because we assume that in the coming period the relations between Slovakia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland will have exceptional significance for stability in Europe and for our mutual development. That is why we discussed questions which have a strategic significance; for example, deliveries of raw materials, possibilities of building an oil pipeline, a possible gas pipeline to Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other places, and a possibility of building integrated systems of oil distribution from the north of Europe for the needs of the two republics. We have agreed that a commission be set up [words indistinct]

We have discussed the issue of building transport systems which will simplify the transit through Slovakia. We will jointly—possibly with the participation of other states—complete a motorway connection across Slovakia, from Poland towards Vienna and Budapest. We also talked about the possibility of electrification of [word indistinct] railway routes. We also discussed air transport between Bratislava and Warsaw, as well as the possible opening of further border crossings, and possibly building communications from either side.

As to the living environment, we agreed on the need for better protection of the Tatras, a solution to the problems in the territorial regions of Pieniny and East Slovakia, to creating joint commissions, and to possibly having government plenipotentiary for the sphere of the Tatras, because it is our joint property. If we do not protect it, it will not last very long.

We also discussed the experiences of the Polish reforms, Slovak reforms, positives and negatives of given approaches, methods of privatization, procedures in privatization, and [word indistinct] people.

We envisage concluding an agreement within a month's time on cooperation in education and science. At the moment there are talks on possibilities of cooperation in the sphere of culture, an exchange of theater companies, an exchange of artists, publishing activities, the cooperation of radio and television, and visits of artists.

As to small-scale border contacts, we explained our mutual viewpoints. We promised that we will interpret the viewpoint of Poland to our federal organs [words indistinct]. We will exert initiative so that this problem might be solved bilaterally. [end recording]

Dienstbier Comments on Relations With CSFR

AU1610135990 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 13-14 Oct 90 p 1,7

[Interview with CSFR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, by Janusz Durmala; place and date not given: "We Are Seeking New Solutions"]

[Text] [Durmala] Following the political changes, the countries of Central Europe are taking their first steps toward Western Europe. It looks as if Czechoslovakia wants to go its own way exceptionally fast. Do you agree, and what achievements and obstacles do you see along this road?

[Dienstbier] There is only one road one can take toward today's modern, democratic, and prosperous Western Europe, and that is via a democratic rule of law, a law-governed state, and an efficient market economy. The similarity between our past and present fortunes compels us to make a common effort based on cooperation, tolerance, and understanding, without any unnecessary misunderstandings. Nevertheless we must realize that it is easier to quench our thirst than it is to change the ways of the world. But we realize that only a democratic Czechoslovakia, with an efficient market economy and able to compete with the West, can be an interesting partner. The return to Europe should be the crowning point of changes, not a temporary phenomenon or a side product of this process.

[Durmala] In Bratislava in the spring there was a meeting between three presidents and prime ministers, and six foreign ministers, which was President Vaclav Havel's idea. What is the practical possibility of implementing the ideas that were voiced at that meeting?

[Dienstbier] I think we shall shortly succeed in putting together in Warsaw the text of a joint declaration that will give birth to many concrete tasks and proposals. Permanent tripartite conferences at deputy foreign minister level or meetings of working groups could be the practical expression of joint political interests. We do not want to create any extra institutions to burden the European process of integration. All we want is to carry out assessments together and reach decisions that lie in the joint interests of Central Europe.

[Durmala] Let us move on to our Polish-Czechoslovak relations. What do you think of them?

[Dienstbier] The new situation in Europe has given Czechoslovak-Polish relations a new direction. In Warsaw, Prague, and Bratislava, as in Moscow, Bonn, or Paris, it is no longer a secret that the present political leaderships of Poland and Czechoslovakia are joined by friendly contacts and a certain spiritual relationship. At the meeting of presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers, we jointly said that there is a historic opportunity to provide new substance to our central part of Europe.

We also said that there are many bilateral issues that are still open, including administrative barriers to mutual contacts between our citizens, the question of balancing out the 1958 territorial gains, and the decades of neglect to the environment of the border areas.

There is still a low level of joint production and specialization in general trade. The settlement of trade accounts will change because accounts will now be conducted in foreign currency. Right now experts are working on a solution to problems that is advantageous to all sides.

[Durmala] Are we Poles and Slovaks not turning our backs on each other? Evidence of that is our border, which the press describes as the last "iron curtain" in Europe. We know you want to have this border opened up. When could that happen?

[Dienstbier] In tourist traffic, including the so-called cross-border traffic, especially in the border areas, we are dealing with not just the problem of crossing the border, but also economic issues. I mean the unstable rate of exchange between the zloty and the koruna, and the effects of this. We are encountering minor misunderstandings, psychological aversion, and also deliberate misinformation. The Czechoslovak side has annulled the previous state leadership's decision to suspend cross-border traffic and tourist exchange with Poland. For political reasons, the communists were not interested in removing the causes that led to this state of affairs.

Political interests do not always have to coincide with economic ones, and do not always do so. And that is the problem. Together, Poland and Czechoslovakia must remove all the economic obstacles. Consolidating or merely tolerating the present state of affairs is political schizophrenia. Let us hope that cross-border traffic will be renewed on 1 November 1990.

European Development Bank Official Pays Visit

Jaruzelski Receives Attali

LD1610231190 Warsaw PAP in English 2146 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 16—Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski received today Jacques Attali, president designate of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

We hope that tight cooperation between Poland and the bank will help us combat difficulties resulting from switching to a market economy. One of our basic problems is related to foreign debt, Jaruzelski told Attali.

It is too early to speak about our expectations concerning cooperation with this bank, Jaruzelski told PAP. However, its establishment is undoubtedly a great chance to promote qualitatively new economic and financial relations in the countries of central and eastern Europe, especially in Poland. I am convinced that the visit by Jacques Attali will well serve Polish issues, he added.

We discussed the most important European problems and steps to be taken by Poland with a view to finding its permament place in the Europe of tomorrow—united, democratic and market-oriented, Attali said.

Meets With Mazowiecki on Economy

LD1610231490 Warsaw PAP in English 2223 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Warsaw, Oct. 16—I firmly believe that the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development will make a contribution to solving our problems, especially in the fields of telecommunications, restructuring fo the system of social insurances, privatisation and, I am particularly anxious about this, ecology, Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki told PAP after his meeting with the bank's president designate Jacques Attali. I am personally deeply concerned about taking an international large-scale ecological initiative in the region of Silesia, he added.

I am of the opinion that, given our assistance, this part of Europe will switch to a market economy, perhaps not fully meeting our expectations, still in this decade, Attali stated. To this end, it is necessary to work out a special strategy for our bank, the only European institution handling the task of aiding former socialist countries in the period of transition to market, he said.

Iliescu Congratulates Gorbachev on Nobel Prize

AU1610115990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1010 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 16/10/1990—Romania's President Ion Iliescu sent a congratulatory telegram to the president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mikhail Gorbachev, on the award of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1990.

The award of that high international distinction proves the international community's great appreciation for your prodigious activity devoted to the democratic changes in the USSR, the Soviet society's progress and welfare, as well as for your remarkable contribution to the full assertion of a new policy of understanding collaboration and peace in Europe and the world over, reads the telegram sent by the Romanian head of state.

Council of Europe Turning More in Nation's Favor

AU1610143290 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 3 Oct 90 p 6

[Gheorghe Cercelescu article: "Romania Shocks the Council of Europe"]

[Text] At the beginning of this week Romania twice found itself the focus of attention of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The first time was on Monday [1 October] afternoon, as the situation in Romania and our country's request to be granted the status of special guest were being discussed. Of course, there would be a lot to say about the addresses of the 14 speakers. One could even draw some general conclusions, but that would be premature and risky to some extent.

Nevertheless, there is one thing that may be said without fear of being wrong: Although it was known from the outset that the "gates" of Europe would not be allowed to open for Romania this time, at the end of the debates the prevailing opinion was that had our country's application been submitted to a vote, it would have met the necessary majority. As some feared such unpleasant surprises, the discussion of the proposed amendments to the resolution draft (among which two requested that Romania be immediately granted the status of special guest to the Council of Europe) was postponed for 24 hours, and the voting itself never took place due to a skillful technical maneuver. It had been rescheduled for Tuesday [2 October] afternoon, although it was known that many members of Parliament would be missing. This is what happened, so the vote had to be rescheduled for the January 1991 session of the Parliamentary Assembly.

Until then, a delegation of the Committee for Relations With Member Countries of the Council of Europe will visit Romania once more, with the declared aim of better acquainting itself with the reality in our country. Yet, it is not information that the Council of Europe is lacking. If only the Romanians knew as much about Romania as the people around here do! The problem is completely different: More and more Western European members of Parliament analyze the situation in Romania lucidly, have understanding for the hardships experienced by the country, show sympathy for the efforts our people are making to solve the problems they are facing, and sincerely believe that our people should be helped. Of course, these people are not overlooking the mistakes that have been made, or are still being made, in our country, but they think that their origin resides in the fact that the road from dictatorship—such as the one that existed in Romania—to a lawful, free and democratic country is neither smooth, nor lacking in hardships and states of tension. On the contrary, this road is rougher than that of any other Eastern European country. Under such circumstances, attempts to perpetuate questions in connection with the events in Tirgu-Mures last spring and those in Bucharest last summer, or regarding our election campaign and elections, lose their former acuity which they used to cast an unfavorable light upon Romania.

In Strasbourg, the balance is turning more and more in our favor, and a great merit for this trend devolves on the Romanian parliamentary delegation, which made a good impression at the headquarters of the Council of Europe. As it seems, no one had expected that people representing such contrasting political colors like Mr. Ionel Sandulescu, Mr. Ion Ratiu, Mr. Francisc Baranyi, or Mr. Liviu Muresan, who are always ready to unsparingly fight each other in the Romanian Parliament on international problems or other topics, could now come and speak with the same voice in front of the Council of Europe on a problem of our country in international affairs. The fact that each delegation member was able to rise above the interests of his own party to serve the interests of our whole people brought about a genuine shock at the Palace of Europe in Strasbourg, and it proved that there is a real possibility in Romania to find a national consensus on the major problems of the country. This may be more important than being granted the status of special guest of the Council of Europe at the current session.

Canadian Atomic Energy President Pays Visit

Roman Meets Energy Official

AU1510191290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1828 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 15/10/1990—Prime Minister Petre Roman received on Monday, October 15, Robert Ferchat, president of the Administration Board of the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.

They discussed aspects of the Romanian-Canadian collaboration in nuclear energy and inspected possibilities that the Canadian firms speed up the works and the new organization in the building site of the Cernavoda atomic power plant, referring also to the parties' liabilities as regarded the observance of the mutually established terms, as some arrears could be noted in that respect. Analyzed were also questions regarding the instruction in Canada of the technicians for the operation of the station, the assessment of the quality of the fuel, of the heavy water, etc.

The interview was attended by Anton Vatasescu, minister secretary of state for industrial and commercial activity, and Saul Grey, Canada's ambassador in Bucharest.

Iliescu Meets Energy Official

AU1510201290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1848 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 15/10/1990—Romania's President Ion Iliescu received on October 15 Robert Ferchat, president of the Administration Board of the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.

During the interview, they discussed the stage, quality and prospects of completing the building works of the Cernavoda atomic power station assessed as a model of Romanian-Canadian collaboration in a peak domain of technology. The necessity was also pointed out of speeding up the delayed works, so that the first reactor of the station should supply the national economy with energy the soonest. Concrete aspects of the collaboration between the two parties, including the training of the technicians and the securing of high quality of all equipment for that important project were also discussed.

Saul Grey, Canada's ambassador in Bucharest, attended.

IAEA Experts Discuss Cernavoda Plant

AU1210185990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1805 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 12/10/1990—The experts of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] who had been asked to examine over September 21-October 12 the safety of the nuclear plant under construction at Cernavoda met on Friday for a press conference with Romanian and foreign journalists.

Mr. Ferdinand Franzen, head of the IAEA mission to Romania, specified on the occasion that, in a year, another mission was to come to Romania to verify the progress made, to make further suggestions and give new recommendations for the starting of the plant at Cernavoda.

The mission's main conclusions are written in a press communique which underscores, inter alia, that the Cernavoda project has the advantage of using well-advanced Western technology in keeping with international standards. The situation compares favourably with the situation in other East European countries. Romania has also appropriate nuclear safety regulations. But the project has the disadvantage of having been undertaken by a developing country with limited industrial and material resources and an inefficient and centralised bureaucracy.

The IAEA team proposed several measures to improve management of the project, showing that improvements should be made to meet international standards. That would be a great task for the Romanian Government and industry.

Communique on Environmental Dispute With Bulgaria

AU1710131490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0936 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 17/10/1990—A communique relayed to ROMPRES news agency from Mr. Valeriu Eugen' Pop, minister of the environment, in connection with the ecologic controversies in the Giurgiu-Ruse zone reads:

In Giurgiu and Ruse there is a special situation due to the existence both in Romania and in Bulgaria of sources of pollution of the air in particular. The controversies on the effects of the pollution sources in Giurgiu on the town of Ruse started some eight years ago.

Under the new circumstances after the revolution, the Romanian side tried to solve them during the meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries, Petre Roman and Andrey Lukanov, of 4 July when a recourse to international experts was agreed upon.

Consequently, over July-August, Romania closed the chemical combine in Giurgiu for overhauling and repair operations to cut the emission of noxes under the admissible limits.

At the beginning of September the chemical combine started operating the measurements made by the Romanian side showing no excess of noxes above the acceptable limits.

Despite the insistence of the Romanian side the Bulgarian experts refused to take part in both the checking of the overhauled equipment before being put into operation, and in the measurements made in Romania of the concentration of the main emissions of noxes. According to data supplied by Bulgarian experts in connection with the measurements made in the Ruse area the concentration does not exceed the admissible limits.

In this context we are surprised by the assessments made in the Bulgarian press in connection with the excess concentration beyond admissible limits.

To show the inhabitants of Ruse the real situation the Ministry of the Environment extended to the Bulgarian authorities, through the Romanian Embassy in Sofia, the invitation that a representative group of Bulgarian citizens visit the town of Giurgiu.

Likewise, the pollution in the Turnu Magurele-Nikopol area signalled by the Bulgarian press is a new element not notified through the official channel agreed upon between the mayorships of the two towns.

In connection with this aspect the Ministry of the Environment ordered that its territorial office make systematic measurements of the quality of the air in the respective area.

As a special problem we find ourselves compelled to notify the great danger posed by the operation of the 440 MW generators of the nuclear power plant at Kozlodui, similar to those that caused the disaster at Chernobyl, located on the Bulgarian bank of the Danube, vis-a-vis the town of Bechet.

In connection with the operation of that nuclear power plant the Romanian side requested an expertise by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Moreover, Romania is concerned with the growing risk of locating other large nuclear plant in Bulgaria in the close vicinity of the Romanian territory.

In consideration of the complex character of the problems concerning environmental protection in the border zones the population should be correctly informed and responsible measures should be taken by both sides to eliminate the causes and the risk regarding the location of new plants.

We wish that these problems be solved in a spirit of cooperation on the basis of unanimously acceptable accords and conventions.

Anti-Hungarian Organization Examined

AU1010142390 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 Oct 90 p 2

[Tibor Bogdan report: "Magyarized Romanians?—The Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania Wants a Return to 1947"]

[Text] Hungarians in Romania were probably somewhat surprised to hear that they were, in fact, Magyarized Romanians. This slightly odd statement—to put it mildly—was made by the Democratic Association of Magyarized Romanians.

According to information from this association founded in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures], there is a majority group of 1.7 million citizens who have been Magyarized through force.... That happens to be exactly the official number of Hungarians in Romania; the figures, of course, are no coincidence. This new nationalist organization, which joined the Vatra Romaneaca immediately after its foundation—the program of the association was drawn up by a certain Mr. Meszaros and a Mr. Racoti—simply wants to prove that there actually are no Hungarians living in Romania, but merely a minority of Magyarized Romanians who form a majority.... Perhaps this nonsense sounds a little bit complicated to a Hungarian reader but the Vatra's logic knows no limits.

According to the statement of the association, over the years, Hungarians have oppressed Romanians and they have forced them to change their names and religion; this tendency was not even toned down during the Ceausescu dictatorship. Magyarized Romanians feel absolutely no affiliation toward Hungarians, and that is why they also completely dissociate themselves from the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ], which, they stress, cannot represent them under any circumstances. On the other hand, Magyarized Romanians expect substantial support from Parliament, and they have submitted a proposal to the house, asking it to elaborate a law in order to "compensate, once and for all, for the damage done to the Romanian people over the course of history."

The increasingly strong attacks from extremist, chauvinist forces prompted the RMDSZ to vehemently protest against anti-Hungarian propaganda at its meeting in Kolozsvar [Cluj] on 5 October, and to come out in support of the fundamental rights of the largest minority in Europe. In order to solve the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania, the RMDSZ sees it as essential to restore the international institutions that functioned until 1947. One of the main demands of the RMDSZ is the elaboration of a law on national minorities—promised already in January 1990—in the spirit of the 1918 Gyulafehervar [Alba Iulia] proclamation, and in the spirit of a united and democratic Europe.

French Foreign Trade Minister Arrives

AU1610143790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1155 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 16/10/1990—Tuesday, 16 October, the French minister of foreign trade, Jean-Maire Rauch, arrived in Romania for a short visit. At the Otopeni Airport, the French minister stated to a ROMPRES writer: "It is mostly humanitarian visit. I am the mayor of Metz which wanted to sent aid to creches and hospitals, to the Romanian children. Several trucks have arrived and the supplies are to be distributed today. I am here also to contact the minister in charge of economic affairs, the minister of foreign trade, the minister of tourism to talk about bilateral economic ties and see which is the current state of the Romanian economy."

Japanese Economic Delegation Visits Bucharest

AU1410185990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1728 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 14/10/1990—Mr. Masaya Miyoshi, director-general of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations—Keidanren, arrived in Bucharest on Sunday as head of a delegation of that organization. He stated that they had come to see the changes in our country, to listen to the opinions of both political leaders and the staff in enterprises regarding the introduction of the market economy mechanism.

He also mentioned that they intended to exchange opinions with decision-makers in connection with the measures to be taken for the promotion of the economic relations, in the investments field included. He considered that the means should be found for a new development of the economic relations between Romania and Japan.

Roman, Vatasescu Meet Businessmen

AU1510191090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1830 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 15/10/1990—On Monday, October 15, Anton Vatasescu, state minister for industry and trade, met with a group of businessmen from Japan, led by Masaya Miyoshi, general manager of Keidanren organization and Shoichi Tanaka, vice president of the Japanese-Romanian Economic Council.

Romania's Prime Minister Petre Roman was glad to greet the Japanese delegation. In his address he emphasizes that Romania is definitely open to foreign partners, adding that this is a crucial moment, a starting point for his country. "Given the dynamism characterizing Japanese companies and the human and material potentialities of both parties, we are confident that we shall be able to have very reliable joint achievements," the Romanian prime minister said in conclusion.

On the occasion, the Romanian-Japanese relations and the existing Romanian possibilities of boosting them were reviewed, special attention being paid to the necessity for certain branches of Romanian economy to be modernized and re-equipped such as machine building, electronics, metallurgy etc.

In the end, Masaya Miyoshi, general manager of Keidanren organization told the press that following the talks with Romania's president and prime minister, with the state minister for industry and trade it became clear that Romania and its economy were faced with difficulties concerning their development and the passage to the market economy. Romanian authorities voiced their determination to do their best to favour a good economic development, by passing from the centralized economy to the market economy and by learning from the experience of other countries. Masaya Miyoshi expressed his confidence Romania would be able to cope with the difficulties facing her and would switch to such an economy that will favour development. The general manager of Keidanren organization concluded by saying that as far as the Japanese industry and its private sector are concerned they will try hard to help Romanian industry, Romania respectively to fulfil the tasks she set herself.

Iliescu Receives Business Delegation

AU1510201590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1930 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 15/10/1990—Romania's President Ion Iliescu met at the Cotroceni Palace on October 15 with the delegation of the economic organizations federation of Japan (Keidanren), headed by Masaya Miyoshi, director-general of the federation, and Shoichi Tanaka, vice-president of the Japanese-Romanian Economic Council.

The interview was attended by Aurel Ghibutiu, president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania, president of the Romanian-Japanese Economic Council, and other Romanian officials, as well as Kiyoshi Furukawa, Japan's ambassador in Bucharest.

The guests expressed the Japanese companies' interest in getting to know the economic and political realities in Romania in view of giving the relations between the two countries a new course. Assessing the steps taken for democratization so far, they expressed Japan's wish to help the Romanian economy recover. They said they were ready to share their experience to Romania and Romania's geopolitical position was very important to them, so they wanted the bilateral relations to grow.

President Ion Iliescu presented the deep-going changes in the Romanian society, Romania's interest in expanding the collaboration with Japan in order to promote modernization of the Romanian industry.

It was stressed that the improvement of Romania's legislation opened a favourable framework for the diversification of the forms of collaboration with Japan and other countries for the penetration of the foreign capital and the encouragement of investments in the Romanian economy.

Roman Addresses Japanese Journalists on Currency

OW1510225290 Tokyo KYODO in English 1507 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, Oct. 15 (KYODO)—Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman and Deputy Prime Minister Anton Vatasescu said Monday the country will cut the official exchange rate of its currency, the leu, to 35 lei to the U.S. dollar in the near future.

The country will also liberalize prices on November 1, they added.

The decisions were made in accordance with a policy shift to boost foreign investment in the country, they told Japanese reporters here with a Japanese economic mission to Eastern Europe.

The officials also called on Japan to invest more in their country, and to extend 20 million U.S. dollars in grants as quickly as possible to help Romania with damage caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

At a separate to press conference, Romania President Ion Iliescu stressed that the political and economic liberalization of the country is rapidly progressing and will never be reversed.

Romania is in a situation now similar to Japan's just after World War II, the president said, stressing that Romania is hoping for further economic cooperation from Japan.

Foreign Minister Nastase Ends Visit to Beijing

AU1710120490 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1100 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Text] Our country's foreign minister, Mr. Adrian Nastase, returned this morning from his official visit to China at the invitation of that country's foreign minister, Qian Qichen.

In his statement made at the airport for our radio station, the minister described his very good impressions about this visit and expressed satisfaction at the contacts he had made. He also expressed satisfaction at the opportunity to discuss, at the highest level and in a substantial way, bilateral relations, ways to improve trade and cultural exchanges, and to establish an effective dialogue at the level of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and between executives.

He said that he was very honored at being received by the PRC president and termed his talks with the Chinese foreign minister as particularly useful. The two sides also agreed on a memorandun which provides for ways and means to expand bilateral relations at both the political and economic level.

In connection with the latter aspect, Mr. Adrian Nastase talked about his particularly interesting visit to the southern part of China—particularly the economic zone of Shenzhen—in which one can note the tremendous changes and economic developments in the past 10 years in China. This is an area which may be of particular interest for us regarding a model of achieving foreign investments and of rapidly building projects by importing modern technologies. It was agreed—and this was an idea of the Chinese side—to send a team of Romanian experts to this special economic zone to pursue this model which may be of interest for us in our efforts to modernize some of our economic units.

Senate Discusses National Arms, Other Issues

AU1610200090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1836 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 16/10/1990—In Tuesday's, October 16 meeting of Romania's Senate, several speakers brought to the attention of specialized bodies and of the Senate, the necessity for the national arms to be established up to December 1, Romania's National Day. A senator proposed a law initiative concerning the issue handed to the Senate and the proposal was passed. It was announced that the Heraldry National Commission had already made a project that would be submitted to the Senate the next week in the presence of experts specially invited. Considering the significance of Romania's National Day, the Senate requested the Ministry of Culture to coordinate the festivities .o be held on that occasion.

At another item on the agenda, the senators asked for the market prices to be correlated with the funds granted from the state budget to school and high school refectories. Other issues in the focus were the difficulties facing Galati's metallurgical plant, the state of confusion persisting in the training system, the real damages owed by the state to people whose houses had been demolished, the selling of nationalized houses. The senators posed questions to ministries and departments on the poor conditions of railway transport. The position of discredited prosecution officers who try and bar the democratization process, the criteria for selecting cultural and press attaches to Romania's embassies and the course of the inquiry on the Romanian foreign trade enterprises that brought serious damage to the national economy.

After debates, another 67 articles of the commercial societies bill were voted with certain amendments, 184 articles of the total 223 having been validated so far.

Deputies' Assembly Discusses Unemployment Bill

AU1510200090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1845 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 15/10/1990—Session in plenum resumed on October 15 afternoon of the Assembly of Deputies of Romania's Parliament, to discuss the bill of unemployment benefit and professional reintegration of the unemployed.

The bill provides for social security for manpower through the institutionalization of a complex of measures that ensures the necessary material means for able-bodied persons who are temporarily unemployed or, as the case may be, their skilling or reskilling. It comprises provisions on the definition of unemployment, the establishment of terms to be complied with for the granting of the unemployment benefit, of the amount of the unemployment benefit, the means of paying it. The heads of the parliamentary groups in the Assembly of Deputies unanimously sustained the necessity of passing the bill.

The bill was then discussed and endorsed by articles.

The Assembly of Deputies resumes session on October 15 [as received] morning in Standing Commissions.

National Peasants, Liberal Parties' Communique

AU1610090590 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 7 Oct 90 p 3

["Communique" of National Peasants (Christian Democratic) Party; place and date not given]

[Text] Nine months after the 1989 December revolution, Romanian society is going through a time of profound and general crisis owing to a constant deterioration of the economy—a fact that constituted the driving force of our revolution: freedom, dignity, justice.

Bearing in mind that:

1. The democracy promoted by the political power in Romania is only a rhetorical notion;

2. Basic human rights are not known and are not respected;

3. Tension between ethnic, social, and professional groups is maintained and fanned;

4. The principles of separating state powers are not respected;

5. Neocommunist administrative structures obstruct the transition to the market economy;

6. The Romanian people's moral and cultural values are extensively degraded;

7. The exodus of the intelligentsia to foreign countries is increasing and the participation of the Romanians in the Diaspora in building a democratic Romania is not encouraged;

8. A continuing deterioration of Romania's image in the world is noted;

9. Lies, disinformation, and tendentious information in the mass media are perpetuated.

We view it as a profoundly patriotic duty of honor of all democratic forces—irrespective of political formation—to regroup within a representative antitotalitarian forum.

The Antitotalitarian Democratic Forum, Bucharest, Sector 4, is open to all political and apolitical formations, to leagues and associations, societies and individual people sharing genuine democratic principles, while each of them preserves its identity.

The Antitotalitarian Democratic Forum in Bucharest, Sector 4, will operate on the basis of the following principles:

1. Its basic nonviolent idea of action is any kind of antitotalitarianism and antiextremism;

2. The democratization of the whole of social life by fully observing basic human rights and by creating the legal framework for genuine pluralism;

3. Observance of the individual and collective status of each ethnic minority in the spirit of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights;

4. Solidarity of all political and social forces in establishing truth, freedom, and human dignity.

The Antitotalitarian Democratic Forum in Bucharest, Sector 4, joins similar organizations set up in Bucharest and the counties and calls for the creation of antitotalitarian democratic forums throughout the country and for their unification at the national level.

National Peasants Christian Democratic Party, Bucharest, Sector 4;

National Liberal Party, Bucharest, Sector 4

Aims of National Association of Non-RCP Members

AU1210190890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1803 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 12/10/1990—The emergence on the country's political scene of the National Association of the Romanians Who Were Not RCP [Romanian Communist Party] Members is meant to do justice to those who, for decades on end, preserved their moral integrity, said Mr. Mihail Cristodor, vice-president of the organization, in an interview with daily "DIMINEATA."

The association was founded on February 5, 1990, and has thousands of members both in the country and abroad (Romanian citizens resident in other countries). It aims at eliminating the tensions and confrontations generated by the interests of one party or another, at achieving the peaceful climate necessary to advance towards a real democracy.

Leadership's Methods To Maintain Power Condemned

AU1410212990 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 6 Oct 90 p 1

[B. Mihai article: "The Petals of the Rose"]

[Text] Since December, our country has been shaken by events that have never been part of Romanian life. It is frightening how many events have taken place, events that, with the assistance of a well organized propaganda, in which the mass media and the Securitate played major roles, have succeeded in soiling the soul of the ordinary people.

Starting from the hatred for everything that is not in accordance with the current power, with its wish to dress the old nomenklatura in new clothes, and to reestablish totalitarism in the name of "an original democracy," the current leadership is using the old communist methods.

The calumny of adversaries was and continues to be regarded as the major weapon. The opposition parties, well-known personalities, organizations, associations, as well as young and not so young people have not "escaped" its fire. In the eye of the new power they represent everything that is worst in the world. The historical parties will bring back the bourgeoisie and the great capital. They, together with their leaders, want to sell our country. The protesting apolitical societies and organizations were and continue to be the creation of capitalism, subsidized by Ratiu in order to destabilize the country. Young and not so young people who do not agree with the decisions of the current power and vehemently but in a civilized way protest against the power are considered drugged, hooligans, Iron-Guard members, people without a profession, and peddlers, that is, the dregs of society.

The current leadership used the force of the repressive bodies against all these people and why should we not say it, something that not even Ceausescu did, it pushed against them another social group that had been previously "stimulated."

The oppression would not have been efficient enough without previous disinformation skillfully carried out among those who could not have known the reality. In this respect, a great role was played by the television, the newspapers that belong to the current power, and the local bodies which stopped the truth from getting through. More than that, through half truths or the altered presentation of realities the power wanted—and sometimes even succeeded—in creating an opinion which does not correspond with reality.

In order to acquire credibility, today's leadership did not shun gross falsifications. Penal criminals were presented as members of the opposition. People dressed in miners's clothes were used to look for a safe in the wall—known only to them—inside the headquarters of our party, a safe in which the current president left behind some compromising documents. Certain individuals were presented as receiving "presents" from the opposition.

The result of the elections is also a falsification, in which hatred, calumny, disinformation, and lies were included.

As a matter of fact, the lie has been presented under all these "democratic" forms: hatred, calumny, disinformation, and falsifications. The lie can be felt even today in every action carried out by the state leadership.

Another diabolical form was and continues to be instigation. This was the weapon used against intellectuals, opposition parties, and against the zone free of neocommunism in University Square. And if finally, the Bucharest workers have understood that using this weapon against their own kind ultimately means fighting against their own ideals, it was not the same in the case of the miners. They came in a large number at the call of the president, destroyed, wounded, killed, and allowed themselves to be manipulated to such an extent as to become the blind instruments in the hands of the leadership. Although upon their departure from Bucharest they were warmly congratulated by the "first miner", very soon they will realize that they were bitterly cheated.

What can you expect if the program of the next convention of the Front [National Salvation Front] proposes to: "limit the possibility of political maneuvers and push the opposition aside"; to set up some "active" groups; and to return to the old type of trade union structures.

And one comes to think about the fact that all these perfidious methods of maintaining power is carried out under the symbol of purity and perfection: the rose.

It doesn't seem to matter that this symbol is made of plastic.

Government Defended Against Incompetence Charge

AU1310195990 Bucharest REALITATEA ROMANEASCA in Romanian 4 Oct 90 pp 1, 3

[Mihai Colesiu article: "Stumps"]

[Text] We are the people of the fortress. Because we are free from the fear that somebody will "eavesdrop" and of having to take the consequences, we have gotten used to talking among ourselves—acquaintances and strangers—mainly in the market, in department stores, and everywhere we are displeased with something, and we point at... the government.

There is no vinegar—it is the government's fault!

There are no stockings—it is the government's fault!

If somebody in one of the Mayoralty's departments commits some irregularity—it is the government's fault!

As if the government were to be blamed for all the shortages and faulty things that mar our life, get on our nerves, and make us unable to enjoy this period of freedom and of dignity that we have entered thanks to the triumph of the revolution after so much suffering.

Let us, however, stop for a moment and think it over: In what way are all these small or big problems that hamper our daily tranquility the government's business? If we choose to be reasonable, we can see that the government made and continues to make efforts—certainly there are still things that can be improved in its actions—to draft documents on a number of norms and bills which were submitted for debates to and the approval of the Parliament or are ready to be presented to this forum. These norms include regulations concerning responsibilities and competence at various levels of management and organizing the socioeconomic life. These documents, properly worked out, are meant to enlarge the framework for the implementation of democracy and the democratic management. Thus, the country is on the road of consolidating its status of a legal state in which freedoms, rights, and the duties of each citizen are well defined. As is well known, many of these norms have already been validated, mainly the norms concerning the economic and social activity. Thus, they have to be correctly implemented.

And here is the problem! How do we implement these norms? Who will implement them?

New laws need new people, who are open to the understanding of the social phenomena and are capable of turning with competence, courage, and new initiative toward organizing all activities in accordance with the requirements of the market economy (in the area of productive activity), and in accordance with the requirements of a new social ethics, which are determined by the existence of democracy itself (in the area of social activity). If, at the highest level of the state management, time has chosen such people, unfortunately in the other areas things have not turned out in the same way.

Recently, the prime minister of the government rightfully noted the fact that people who proved to be unable to understand the new course of the Romanian society have been kept in more or less important key jobs. There was talk about "the experience" that these people have gained "throughout the years." This is faulty reasoning. Their "experience" means that they expect somebody else "to think" for them. Isolated in their routine work and scared of any new initiative, they are the real obstacles in the way of implementing norms which are based on renewing principles. Many "clerks," and many "employees" who are called upon to correctly and firmly implement the law, are real "stumps" which hamper our progress on the road toward a new and democratic society. They are the ones who must really be blamed for our misfortunes. And if the government really is guilty of something in all that is happening, then it is exactly its lack of firmness in the actions to renew the whole apparatus of administrative management. Certainly, the government could not descend to the level of the small corrupt and incompetent clerk. The local bodies and at the level of enterprises, the administration councils—who also have to be controlled by the masses of employees—are responsible for replacing those clerks. The force and viability of democracy lie exactly in its capability to ask the one who was entrusted with a responsible job to fulfill his duty, no matter what place he holds in the hierarchy of economic or social activity. In case a person is proved guilty of incompetence or indolence, he must be removed immediately. This is our chance to proceed forward. This is our chance to make the effect of the norms—which are meant to consolidate and develop democracy in Romania—be felt immediately.

* Letter to Roman on 'DER SPIEGEL' Interview

91BA0009A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 29 Sep 90 p 2

["Open Letter to Mr. Petre Roman on his Interview for DER SPIEGEL" by Catalin Mamali; place and date not given]

[Text] The well-known magazine DER SPIEGEL has published an interview with you. Although DER SPIEGEL is known for the high degree of professionalism of its journalists, the seriousness of one of your statements, among other answers featured in the interview that do not jibe with statements you made on other occasions, prompted me to begin by verifying the authenticity of the rendition of your reply. Consequently, I want to ask you: Is it true that in the respective interview you proposed the following idea: Marian Munteanu cannot be viewed as a credible opponent of communist, totalitarian, and neocommunist practices, because in December (before 16-22 December) 1989, he "defended Ceausescu"? What makes your statement serious is both the assertion itself and the reasoning and moral grounds implied.

I am not familiar with the incident to which you referred, but I think that Marian Munteanu is the person best qualified to respond to it publicly. However, the moral problem raised by your statement is the following: can the overall antitotalitarian attitude of a person who obviously contributed to the 16-22 December 1989 movement that brought about the removal of the dictator be credible even if prior to that he supported Ceausescu? The problem is very serious. For a person to be entitled to answer this question for somebody else and accuse others of inconsistency depending on the answer to this question, it is absolutely necessary that he first answer it for himself. In the absence of such an answer, his (real or false) accusation has no moral backing. In your case, the question is: As a member of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] in the organization to which you belonged prior to 22 December 1989, did you vote for, thus indicating your agreement with, reelecting Nicolae Ceausescu as secretary general of the RCP Central Committee at the 14th congress? According to all my information, you voted for (supported), at least implicitely, Ceausescu's reelection at the 14th RCP Congress in November 1989. You did so in the party organization to which you belonged before 22 December 1989, which no doubt also sent a congratulatory telegram to the former dictator on his reelection. So the question you must answer is: Did you vote for Nicolae Ceausescu's reelection as RCP secretary general in the party organization to which you belonged? Did you express any opposition to his reelection?

In order to fulfill the moral condition that entitles me to ask such a question, I will also answer it. In fact, I gave my reply at the time. I did not vote for Nicolae Ceausescu's reelection; in the spring of 1989 I gave what was practically a civil disobedience speech, which incurred, among other things, my ouster from the RCP.

If you didn't have the courage to openly oppose the dictator, on the contrary, you most probably voted for his reelection (i.e., supported him), then how can you accuse others of this type of weakness? In point of fact, like the great majority of the governmental team that you selected, you voted for Ceausescu's reelection within the communist party organization to which you belonged prior to 22 December. Can you give any other answer to this question? I'd like to know. So, if what I say is correct, then you and the great majority of the governmental team voted for another 5 (five) [as published] years of personal dictatorship at the real time of opposition.

I am asking you these things because I had put great faith in your good intentions, your initial declarations, your first decisions, and the way you expressed yourself. Actually, many of your friends who talked to me about you in December, endeavored to persuade me that you were very well suited for a leadership position. While helicopters belonging to the dictator's guard were dropping the last threat leaflets on 22 December, one of these friends was even telling me about the possibility of your appointment as prime minister. At the time I was persuaded by their arguments and I was happy that a man open to democracy, and well educated, was going to have decisionmaking power. I said to myself: This is a man who, although coming from the highest strata of the red bourgeoisie that fully profited from the privileges of this class of the communist system, wants to and can help establish an open society in Romania. Then came the blunders. I told myself and others: This transition situation is very unpredictable, so mistakes are possible. But the mistakes were becoming increasingly numerous and serious. I was stunned to see you making them, and making them with a smile. As if at stake were not serious things, like beatings, street fighting, torture of innocent people (some of them even on hunger strike), and even fatalities. As if what was happening in Romania was happening on a screen, not in reality.

Please answer publicly the questions in this letter. And particularly, please rid yourself of the totalitarian mentality, stereotypes, and techniques, and even of the conditional reflexes that washed over the environment and behavior of the red bourgeoisie. For the benefit of the younger among us, we should perhaps recall the distinguishing traits of the red bourgeoisie: Instead of owning property, it owned and acquired political positions, leading social roles, and statutes that gave it power over others and unlimited access to material goods; in contrast to the classical bourgeoisie that showed and encouraged initiative, the red bourgeoisie inhibited individual personal initiative; the red bourgeoisie blocked the free movement of persons and information for others, but secured free movement abroad and access to foreign information and goods for itself; the red bourgeoisie sacrificed productivity to its desire for control and social manipulation; the red bourgeoisie replaced selection by file-based counterselection; the red bourgeoisie, although it enjoyed a different quality of life, inaccessible to honest workers, functionaries, peasants, and intellectuals, viewed itself as the defender of the economic interests of the workers' class. Mr. Petre Roman, break all your ties with the mentalities of the red bourgeoisie and free yourself of its habits, interests, and tactics. The red bourgeoisie is less than a ghost, because it was a repulsive reality. I am saying this to you because I am convinced that each one of us has a chance to live a crucially reforming inner experience. Each one of us has the power to leave our mistakes behind, on the condition that we recognize them, even if we cannot atone for all of them.

With best feelings, Catalin Mamali
P.S. I will attempt to send this letter to DER SPIEGEL, too.

Trade Union Protests Bill Limiting Rights

AU1710133790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1035 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 17/10/1990—The Presidium of the General Council of the National Free Trade Union Confederation of Romania, learning that the bill on trade unions tries to limit the right to association in unions of numerous socio-professional categories—students, members of handicraft cooperatives, of credit and consumer cooperatives, farmers, employees holding specialized offices in the apparatus of central and local bodies of state power and administration, the civilians in the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and in the units under their subordination a.o. [among others]—"warns" in a protest sent to ROMPRES that such an initiative seriously disregards the realities of the Romanian society and flagrantly violates the provisions of international laws and conventions.

The National Free Trade Union Confederation of Romania considers that the attitude of the government means to yield to those interested in non-existence of strong unions as an element of social balance in all areas where professional activities are performed, and violate union rights and freedoms.

The note of protest also disapproves of the method used by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security of accepting in the joint government-unions commission a draft normative act and of promoting another, with a fundamentally different content, "an inadmissible practice which voids dialogue of its content."

Dijmarescu Explains 1 Nov Currency Devaluation

AU1610194490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1915 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 16/10/1990—The leu will be devalued as of November 1, 1990 to 35 to the dollar from 21 and that will be the only rate of exchange for all commercial and noncommercial operations, for all economic agents.

By this, said Eugen Dijmarescu, minister of state for economic orientation, we open the road to a convertibility of the leu that will be backed by the Organization of Currency Auctions that will set, based on the request-offer relation, a rate of exchange of the leu to the convertible currencies close to the market level.

We plan to introduce, as of January 1, 1991 a gradual, partial convertibility of the leu, the minister said.

Partial, Gradual Conversion Planned

AU1710084090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0757 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 17/10/1990—In connection with several decisions of Romania's Government in its meeting last week, Eugen Dijmarescu, minister of state in charge of economic guidance, told a ROMPRES journalist: "We agreed on a resolution for a price liberalisation programme certainly correlated with a social safety programme, and to use corrections for the national currency rate as against the fluctuations on the international financial market. This programme essentially aims on the strength of Law No. 15/1990 to liberalise the prices of all products involving more than three manufacturers or products, with the prices of all other prices in the economy being set in direct relation to costs.

Since a very large part of the raw materials, energy and other materials required by the national economy are imported, the major change brought by this liberalisation is to reflect the way the enterprise is managed, the true price that the state pays to buy these products on the international market. Therefore, state subsidies will be lowered or cut altogether, the costs being borne by the consumer, which is only natural after all.

The devaluation of the national currency is a measure apt to encourage the stability of prices in the economy, in relation to those on the international market in general, and in the neighbouring countries in particular. The leu will be brought to a 1:35 ratio against the U.S. dollar, down from the current 1:21. That rate of exchange will hold for all deals commercial or noncommercial and will be applicable to all economic agents and entrepreneurs who do business with Romania. We may as well say that this will open the way to a convertibility of the leu that will be supported in a next stage, by virtue of the same Law 15/1990, by auctions at prices in hard currency that will bring on the basis of the demand-offer relationship the rate of exchange of the national currency to freely convertible currencies close to the market rate.

We plan a partial and gradual convertibility of the leu as of 1 January 1991 to set the national economy on a healthy basis. And we plan to start the price reform as of 1 November, as we decided in the government meeting, which will be paralleled by an individual compensation programme and a scheme to bring salaries in line with market prices so as not too seriously [to] depress living standards.

* Eugen Dijmarescu on Economic Priorities

91BA0010A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 29 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Eugen Dijmarescu, minister of state in charge of economic orientation]

[Text]**Inflation**

No precise calculations have yet been made on the level of inflation. Preliminary estimates indicate that the rate of inflation in the first six months of 1990 may be 18 percent higher than in 1989. Still, two aspects should be mentioned. First there is the fact that, with the exception of a small number of categories (prices on the farmers market or the purchase/sale prices of private enterprises and mixed associations), prices have not yet been liberalized, something that creates an apparent price stability. In view of the fact that there is an acute shortage of consummer goods, as well as of industrial products, the fact that the tag price of unavailable products is stable is of no economic significance.

Secondly, we must also mention that powerful inflationist pressures exist in the economy due to the fact that the population is in possession of large amounts of cash from the repayment of social shares, pay rises, the discrepancy between the salary fund and the production, etc. Thus, the excess money volume in the economy is about 250 billion lei (whereas the volume of commodities available is sufficient to cover only about 100 million lei). To preempt the accentuation of the inflationary pressures, in July the government declared a moratorium freezing all pay rises in preparation for a price reform designed to reflect the real value of economic inputs, both from import and from domestic production by reducing to the point of elimination the subsidies that distorted the prices and made it impossible to achieve a balance between demand and supply.

Unemployment

We have no statistic data on unemployment at present. However, the latent unemployment rate can be estimated at about 10 percent of the total labor force. There are differences among the unemployment situation of various work collectives, branches, and regions; in some areas the unemployment is only temporary.

Speaking for the entire economy, it is to be assumed that unemployment will be a lasting phenomenon (in the form of technical and professional unemployment), because of the existence of structural distortions (exacerbated by the transition period) that cannot be resolved in the short term, and the insufficient development of the private sector which, being mostly geared toward trade in an attempt to immediately recover investments, cannot create sufficient jobs before it penetrates deeper into commodity production areas.

Along this line, the government plans to draft a package of social protection measures, including retraining programs, unemployment relief (for which a bill has already been presented in Parliament), etc.

Trade Balance

In contrast to the trade balance surplus of the past years—forced by the policy of exporting at any cost and severe cuts in imports—in the first eight months of this year the trade balance deficit totaled 1,100.4 million rubles and $908.6 million. This situation was caused by the compounded effect of markedly reduced exports (to 51.9 percent per clearing in rubles and 55 percent in convertible currency compared to the first eight months of 1989), failure to achieve the domestic production required to fulfill export contracts worth over 4 billion rubles and dollars, and increased imports, which were needed not only to cover current needs, but also to make up for shortfalls in domestic production. Note that in the first eight months of the past year imports made up 86.9 percent of clearing in rubles and 150.6 percent in convertible currency.

An analysis of the structure of foreign trade in the first eight months of the year shows considerable drops in the export of products of the machine-building, timber, textile and leather, electrical engineering, electronics, fine mechanics, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, chemical and petrochemical, electrical and thermal power, and food industries, and agriculture.

During the period of reference, imports earmarked for production were 70.5 percent in clearing rubles and 82.2 in convertible currency.

Another negative aspect regarding imports are the delays in unloading vessels in the port of Constanta and the shortage of train cars and baggage cars. Consequently, by the end of August, vessels carrying over one million tons of various raw materials, fodder, and sugar were immobilized in port.

In view of this situation, failure to recoup export delays and to deliver the exports scheduled for the immediate future will make it exceedingly difficult to ensure the necessary income to pay for imported energy, raw materials, and consumer goods over the winter, something that will have a serious impact on production and on the people.

Balance of Payments on Current Account

By 31 August 1990 the balance of payments deficit on current account was $1,145,400. In view of the fact that on 31 December 1989 Romania's convertible currency reserves were $1,239,100, while the deficit recorded on 31 August 1990 was about the same, it means that Romania's economy spent close to $2.4 billion net on current imports, without funneling funds particularly to investments apt to generate foreign currency revenues in time. The balance of payments situation is also exacerbated by the fact that about $1 billion due to Romania was not remitted on schedule out of a total of $3.3 billion, of which half is due from Iraq alone.

Also adding to this situation is the fact that we had to pay penalties for not unloading on schedule a big number of vessels stationed in the port of Constanta. Thus, overall penalties amounted to $5.4 million for the first eight months of 1990.

To improve this situation we need measures to set monthly ceilings on imports and not to contract for additional imports unless we have guaranteed exports; measures to encourage exports (especially with COD payment); and measures to use the lines of credit negotiated with various states and commercial banks for investments.

Rate of Exchange of the Leu

At the beginning of February this year we began using a single rate of exchange for the leu, which was initially set at 21 lei per dollar and reviewed on a weekly basis by the National Bank in relation to a basket of currencies.

By the middle of September this year the official rate was 19.88 lei per dollar, which meant a five percent appreciation of the leu in relation to the U.S. dollar. However, the increase in the rate of the leu was not due to developments in the basic economic factors but to the general decline of the dollar; thus, this was a mostly technical appreciation connected to the structure of the national currency basket.

A monetary policy aimed at bringing the official exchange rate closer to an equilibrium rate and at stimulating exports requires a gradual devaluation of the leu, something that can facilitate exports and bring about increases in the domestic production in relation to imports.

Similarly, the need to realign the leu to the currencies of neighboring countries also stems from the need to correlate it with the value relationship between those currencies and the dollar, among other things for the purpose of discouraging speculative currency transactions and having a considerable volume of products taken out of the domestic market and shipped abroad.

Prospects by the End of the Year

The decision of the EEC Ministerial Council of 17-18 September to postpone, for the second time, Romania's inclusion among the countries enjoying economic aid from the Group of the 24 in which the Community acts as a coordinator, shows—aside from its political connotation—that we cannot rely on aid from the international community. Constrained to limit itself to its own resources during this stage of the reform, Romania will at the most be able to capitalize on potential individual foreign investors.

In view of this situation, the economic factors—placed in a clearly inferior situation in comparison to those in other countries in a process of transition to a market economy—can do no more than to resolutely take the enterprises in their own hands since, under the legislative framework that has been established and will be established, pushing back toward centralism and guided allocation of resources, in other words, toward a communist-type planning, is resolutely rejected by the government.

Consequently, the government must press on with the reform, although its socioeconomic cost will indubitably rise simultaneously with the need to introduce a program of structural alignment in the economy, which requires restrictions on the budget and the balance of payments.

Bucharest Student Convention Issues Communique

AU1510181590 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 9 Oct 90 p 2

[Text] The position of the Bucharest Student Convention [BSC] toward the Student Independent National Union [SINU] is the following:

—none of the organizations which are members of the BSC belong to the SINU.

—the only student organization in Bucharest which belongs to the SINU is the Free Trade Union of the Students of the Polytechnical Institute in Bucharest.

—we believe that the way in which representatives of the SINU acted is at variance with the spirit of the student movement in Bucharest.

As early as when the organizations belonging to the BSC were set up, they have had a civic attitude of supporting democracy and defending human rights. This is the fundamental criteria of the student movement in Bucharest.

We believe that the student organizations in this country have been misinformed about the activity of the Bucharest student movement and were artificially drawn into the SINU. (The Bucharest University Student League, the Student League of the Bucharest Polytechnical Institute, the Student League of the Agronomic Institute, the Trade Union of Student of the Economic Institute, the Student Association of the Architecture Institute, the Medical Students' Association, the Student Association of the Bucharest Construction Institute, the Trade Union of the Students of the Academy of Arts, and the Student League of the Theater and Film Academy)—Bucharest, on 5 October 1990

Students' Situation Blamed on Government

AU1610213490 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 7 Oct 90 p 4

[E. Mihaescu article: "Tension and Injustice in Bucharest's University Center"]

[Text] Causing only trouble throughout the country, destabilizing social life primarily through incompetence, reestablishing communism in new forms, and bringing back the Securitate and communist nomenklatura, the National Salvation Front [FSN] and its representatives who are in power—in the Presidency, government, and Parliament—have made sustained and vigorous efforts, ever since January, to push the students to the periphery of society, to humiliate them, and to reduce their—and in fact our whole nation's—concerns solely to ensuring a place to live and a plate of food. These are sinister and very well-known methods in Romania, which have been used by the governments of the FSN, by Mr. Ion Iliescu, and Petre Roman ever since January 1990. The important force of the opposition, more precisely the essential force of the democratic process in Romania, the students—our country's intellectual hope and its young intelligentsia—were subjected to suffering overnight; they went through genuine martyrdom for all these months. The situation of Bucharest's students now, at the beginning of the academic year—especially those at the University, who were the driving force of the "square of hooligans" for several weeks—is part of all these abuses by those in power against the students whose revolution and ideals they have stolen.

At this point, thousands of studious young people are literally stranded in the streets of Bucharest. It is a disgraceful situation not only for the government, but for all of us, for our country. It cannot be tolerated that our best young people are left at the mercy of fate and are viewed by the new totalitarian power as outcasts. These children of ours have come here to learn; therefore, we should guarantee them the best conditions. We must never forget that there is nothing of greater value today than knowledge; this is true throughout the world. It is the inexhaustible source of wealth of any nation. At this point in our country, however, the most valuable young people are struggling for a simple place to sleep in a students' hostel. That it should come to this.... What do the millions of parents in this country say when they see what their children are going through or will be going through?

The current political power in the government has proved to be so incompetent that it has not been able to solve even this trivial question—namely, guaranteeing hostels for students. How then will these technocrats, headed by such individuals as Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman, be able to solve the infinitely more difficult problems in the economy? It is absolutely useless to ask this question anymore. We will experience it before long, if we have not already started to feel it.

There is tension in Romanian universities. There is emotion and injustice. There is abuse and attempts by the totalitarian power to resume former practices of oppression and those of the Securitate. All this is happening against a tense and restless social background and a catastrophic economic situation. On behalf of the students, in the name of justice and democracy, and by supporting the cause and ideals of students—as well as their efforts to manifest themselves, to have their say, and to learn—we assume the duty to inform the public about what is happening in the university world.

Defendant Popescu Denies Involvement in Genocide

AU1110115990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0905 GMT 11 Oct 90

["Defendant Dumitru Popescu (Former Chief Ideologist of the Romanian Communist Party): 'I Admit to Many Political Guilts But Not to Penal Ones'"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 11/10/1990—Speaking of the circumstances in which the facts blamed on him in the bill of indictment proceeded, Dumitru Popescu firmly rejected the accusation of genocide. He denied the content of the declarations made during the penal prosecution. "During the investigation," he alleged, "I was subject to a steady information flow regarding the way how the events proceeded in Timisoara. It was deliberately used by prosecutors in order to induce me to have a certain conviction. Against the background of this general flow of information, the investigators repeatedly demanded that I make inferences instead of having me report facts and circumstances I knew of directly. I thus got into a game of statements and gave the answers the prosecutors wanted me to, and they were the base of the accusations in the bill of indictment meaning that at the December 17, 1989 meeting of the Executive Political Committee I had known that a revolution had started in Timisoara. I unknowingly admitted to the idea of guilt and complied with the prosecutors' game since it was stated positively that the truth was what they maintained. Under the circumstances I came to believe that the reality differed from what Ceausescu said and that made me say we had been lied to on December 17, 1989. As a matter of fact, I am not able, even today, to assess correctly the unfolding of the events in Timisoara, considering that various pieces of information appeared subsequently, regarding certain grades and stages of the events."

"I plead politically guilty," the former RCP [Romanian Communist Party] chief ideologist added," we can draw a bill of indictment for the socialist system in Romania and unfortunately nobody does it. We could discuss freely, not hands in cuffs. We could discuss in the press, we could discuss with the political parties. I admit to many political guilts, but not to penal ones."

Asked by the president of the court of law whether he considered himself also morally guilty, Dumitru Popescu answered. "Not much."

In the October 10 session, the Bucharest Territorial Military Court granted the application to release defendant Ana Muresan from custody, for 90 days, for reasons of health.

Former Securitate Chief Vlad's Trial Resumes

AU1610120990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1106 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 16/10/1990—The Supreme Court—the Military Section—resumed on Monday, 15 October, after more than one month, the trial of reserve Colonel General Iulian Vlad, former ministry secretary of state and head of the State Security Department charged with complicity in genocide.

The defendant is accused of having taken part in the meetings of the Executive Political Committee [PEC] of the CC [Central Committee] of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] of 17 and 22 December 1989 expressly voicing his accord with the decision of using weapons against the demonstrators in Timisoara and other towns.

He is also accused of having given orders and coordinated the activity of the State Security Department, the security troops included, in reprimanding by force the popular revolt in Timisoara in particular.

During the Monday session the court heard another seven witnesses of the prosecution: Colonel Traian Sima, former head of the Timis County Security; Major General Geanu Bucurescu, former deputy minister of the interior; Stefan Andrei and Ioan Totu, ex-members of the Executive Political Committee of the CC of the RCP; Colonel Marin Barbulescu, head of the capital city police; Colonel Ion Goran, head of the Security Inspectorate of Bucharest.

The depositions invalidated the charges against the defendants all the witnesses declaring that General Vlad ordered that the security bodies should not be armed and get involved in the repression of the street demonstrations asking them to limit their activity to gathering information on the evolution of the situation, in Timisoara in particular.[sentence as received]

As for the stand taken by the defendant during the two meetings of the PEC of 17 and 22 December, both Stefan Andrei and Ioan Totu showed that his behaviour did not differ from that of the other participants.

Before the hearing of the witnesses, General Iulian Vlad stated in court, stressing that he assumed entire responsibility, that he and the institution he led were on the side of the revolution, both before its outbreak and throughout its course. He said that there was beyond any doubt that there were political forces, both internal and external, whose interest is that the essential problem posed to the Romanian judiciary—to find out who started the disaster after 22 December when the victory of the revolution was certain—should not be elucidated. [sentence as received] The actions taken after 22 December were artificial, unjustified. Asked to declare if he was in possession of specific data in connection with his statement, the defendant mentioned that immediately after the fall of the dictatorship he worked out a plan concerning the subsequent developments, but its carrying into effect was stopped and followed by his arrest.

The session was adjourned for Tuesday, 16 October, at 9.00 o'clock [0700 GMT] when the hearing of witnesses is to continue.

Ludovic Pleads Not Guilty

AU1610183790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1707 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 16/10/1990—"Given the way and the rhythm at which the December 17, 1989 meeting of the Executive Political Committee proceeded, I could not act in any way to change Ceausescu's decision and I consider that the charge of genocide spelt against me in the bill of indictment is groundless" told the jury defendant Fazekas Ludovic, former member of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] Executive Political Committee.

The defendant denied part of what he had declared during penal prosecution, invoking his emotional condition at that time, and claiming that some of his statements were skipped and so their real significance was changed. He also mentioned, as an excuse, the lack of information in connection with the events in Timisoara, saying that the account presented by Ceausescu in the December 17 meeting, when he had learned of the respective events for the first time, as well as the teleconference that had followed, had not contained data allowing for a correct assessment of their nature.

As for the day of December 22, the defendant stated that as early as the morning of that day, on the arrival at the Headquarters of the former Central Committee of the RCP, he had realized that "the game was lost." Referring to the Executive Political Committee meeting that had been held before the dictator's flight and in which the defendant too, had been named, when Ceausescu had asked for the participants' agreement to continue the fight, Ludovic Fazekas pointed out that as far as he was concerned, he had been asked "Fazekas, are you here?" Which he had only answered "present."

The court will hold the next session on October 18, when defendant Ioan Totu will be examined.

Hearing of Witnesses Continues

AU1610190190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1733 GMT 16 Oct 90

["Justice: Iulian Vlad Trial—the Witnesses' Marathon Goes On"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 16/10/1990—The Supreme Court of Justice—Military Section—continued on October 16 the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution and for the defence in the trial of Reserve General Iulian Vlad, former chief of the State Security Department, who stands charges of abetting genocide, following the reprisal of the demonstrators in Timisoara, Bucharest and other cities during the December revolution. The marathon of witnesses (30 people were examined so far) continued with a number of members of the former CC [Central Committee] of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] Executive Political Committee, as well as three former Securitate officers. The witnesses had to answer two questions: What was General Vlad's stand in the December 17 and 22 meetings of the Executive Political Committee regarding the former dictator's decision that the demonstrators be fired at and whether his stand was of a nature to influence Nicolae Ceausescu's decision against the demonstrators.

Both the witnesses for the prosecution and the witnesses for the defence stressed that General Vlad's stand at the meeting had been of formal approval of the decision that the crowd be fired at, an approval prompted, as stressed by witness Silviu Curticeanu, former member of the Executive Political Committee, by fear. The fear had been caused by the threat with the firing squad for failure to fulfill the dictator's previous order to repress the demonstration in Timisoara. After the December 17 meeting, the same witness said, General Vlad told me that "whatever happens, I cannot order fire." The same was said by Ion Radu, former member of the Executive Political Committee, who showed that after the December 22 meeting, when it had been ordered that the demonstrators in Bucharest be fired at, General Vlad had said he had "ordered that one should not fire" and that he "will renew this order."

Former Securitate Officers Nicolae Andruta Ceausescu, Gheorghe Mortoiu and Gheorghe Rabacel too, provided evidence that General Vlad had absolutely forbidden that the population be fired at.

Witnesses Silviu Curticeanu and Ion Stoian said that defendant Vlad's stand could in no way have induced the [word indistinct] table." [single quotation mark as received] Moreover, Ion Radu said that at the December 22 meeting he tried to induce Nicolae Ceausescu to call off the order that fire be opened in Bucharest, stating that "fire mouths worth one battalion sided with the demonstrators in the Romana Square and a company in the Kisseleff highway sided with the working people."

Keen interest was stirred by Ion Stoian's declaration (silenced after a while by the president of the jury, General Adrian Nitoiu), who, referring to the events in Timisoara, showed that there had been intelligence that important events had been expected to occur in the latter half of December in some localities in Banat and Transylvania. It had been about unusual applications for visas coming from foreign press correspondents, applications for facilities from certain diplomats to go in the same period to the same localities, as well as the arrival of a big number of foreign tourists in Timisoara, Arad, Cluj and Sibiu, who had entered the country violating the accords on the frontier traffic. The session was adjourned.

The witnesses' marathon will continue on October 17.

New Securitate Chief Blamed for Communist Views

AU1710084790 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 7 Oct 90 p 3

[Ioan Surdu article: "On 'Political Power' in the Former Regime and a Founder of the Current Power"]

[Text] We have had enough surprises lately. Every day we discover notorious communists dressed up as fighters for the ideals of the revolution, but who are actually inveterate defenders and supporters of communist totalitarianism and of the most retrograde form of Ceausescu's dictatorship. As early as December, I saw Mr. Virgil Magureanu around the current leaders. At one point I learned that he was a special counselor to Mr. Iliescu in charge of state security questions. Mr. Magureanu was recently appointed chief of the new Securitate, which was established in the wake of the events in Transylvania.

Because this seems to be such an important responsibility, we are asking: "Who is Mr. Virgil Magureanu?"

It was not too difficult for us to find out who Romania's number-one Securitate man is.

Mr. Virgil Magureanu was a professor at the Academy for Communists Activists. He not only supported communism in his works, he also tried to justify its necessity.

In his opinion, communism is a higher system which cannot be compared to any of the preceding systems because of its positive characteristics, and especially because of its infallible concepts. Perusing his work "Political Power," we learn that Mr. Magureanu holds that totalitarianism has nothing in common with communism, which he describes as a "revolutionary" and "humane" system.

Mr. Virgil Magureanu is trying to persuade us that the accusation of totalitarianism, "which some bourgeois authors" ascribe to this professor of the Academy for Communist Activists, is at odds with "the accepted definition of totalitarianism and the actual structures or functions of socialist power."

Although he admits that "the state controls almost all aspects of private life" in a totalitarian system, and governments "do not tolerate the activities of individuals or groups, such as workers unions or youth organizations, which are directly linked to the aims of the state," the professor of Romanian activists denies the fact that the communist state ever carried out such activities.

We, therefore, ask Mr. Magureanu how he terms the phenomena of oppression and repression which claimed so many innocent victims in Romania in the past 45 years?

How does he explain the fact that trade and youth unions, as well as all organizations and associations in our country became the appendix of the dictatorship?

Mr. Magureanu admits that "totalitarian dictators stay in power with the help of the secret police and the propaganda promoted by all means of communication, by eliminating discussions and open criticism, and by broadly using terrorist tactics," but he firmly rejects that this could happen in communism.

For the propagandist Virgil Magureanu, therefore, the Romanian dictator's conduct was not a totalitarian one, but a revolutionary one, just as Ceausescu himself used to emphasize.

By promoting such concepts, was Mr. Magureanu not guilty of hiding the truth and encouraging the repression of thousands upon thousands of innocent people in Romania?

Is it thanks to promoting suc

[Constantin Vranceanu article: "Who is Destabilizing the Country?"]

[Text] During the Sunday [7 October] edition of the "Current Events" television news program, Mr. Cornelius Rosiianu—with a gloomy voice—read a communique according to which, five young people—Hungarian citizens—climbed Avram Iancu's statue in Tirgu Mures and tore down the tricolor flag. Such news, broadcast at a peak hour, generated various feelings among television viewers: astonishment, revolt, bewilderment, and so on. Such news, at that hour, brought hundreds of people into the streets in Tirgu Mures. Luckily, those people quietly returned each to his own home.

How much is true and how much is a lie in the respective peace of news? That is the question that we also asked ourselves. While searching for the answer, we approached Mr. Gheorghe Frunda, a Tirgu Mures deputy of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania. To our great surprise (and your surprise, too, esteemed readers when you read the following lines!) we learned that on Sunday evening, five young people (four Romanian citizens of Hungarian nationality and not Hungarian citizens as it had been broadcast, plus a Romanian girl) sang and danced around the Avram Iancu statue and knocked over some flower pots. According to eye witnesses, nobody touched the statue or the tricolor flag. As a matter of fact they could not have done so since the statue stands on a pedestal that is at least six meters high. Two of the "mischievous ones" were detained by the Military Police and in their first statements they said that they "had thought of climbing the statue...."

From "having thought of..." to actually "climbing" is a huge step, which Romanian Television took with such carelessness that quite simply it has shaken us. Mr. Deputy Frunda and other people of good faith in Tirgu Mures sent a protest to the television yesterday [8 October] (by the time our paper went to print we had not received any information about whether or not it was broadcast) and, at the same time, they turned to the leadership of the Tirgu Mures County Police, in order to clarify the event.

Mr. Deputy Gheorghe Frunda insisted on issuing a protest, also through our paper, against methods of disinformation and intoxication with false information repeatedly used by the television and by certain newspapers. An example in this respect is the case of Petre Fontu, a reporter at Tirgu Mures Radio, who died as a result of violence attributed to Hungarians. The reality is that the person who attacked the reporter was a Romanian named Patru Dragos, currently detained for murder by beating, and whose case is under penal investigation. And a last detail: Up to this very moment, Romanian television has not broadcast a retraction of the wrong information that it broadcast, although it received the corrected text.

Therefore, who is interested in destabilizing the country? Who are the irresponsible persons (because they cannot be called anything else) who broadcast false information on the television network, false information which can bring people out in the street and instigate people to violence? Who is in charge of the department of false information within Romanian Television?

Great Importance Placed on Next Assembly Session

Drnovsek May Speak on Confederation

AU1610143490 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Oct 90 p 1

["Dj.K."-signed report: "Supplementary Report About a Confederation"]

[Text] Belgrade—The three-day session of the two chambers of the SFRY Assembly scheduled for 17-19 October is already the main topic of discussion in the SFRY Assembly. Analysts in the federal parliament predict that there will be serious difficulties in agreeing on the agenda of the joint session of the two chambers. This primarily refers to the documents of the federal government that have still not been agreed upon, namely the economic policy in the areas of finance and the credit-monetary system, and the announced inauguration of Stipe Mesic as a member of the SFRY Presidency from Croatia. However, these are not the only uncertainties concerning this very important session.

As BORBA learned unofficially, it seems that there are also some disagreements within the SFRY Presidency about the program of the session itself. There is no doubt that Dr. Borisav Jovic will address the delegates on the political-security situation in the country and the activities of the SFRY Presidency on overcoming the constitutional crisis. However, according to some indications, the president of the Presidency will not speak about the confederal treaty which was recently proposed by Croatia and Slovenia. For that reason, as we have unofficially learned, there is a possibility that Janez Drnovsek, member of the SFRY Presidency, will submit a supplementary speech on the confederal treaty, as one of the proposals on the future organization of Yugoslavia. Of course, this speech requires a discussion in the SFRY Presidency and an agreement.

According to our information, the federal premier, Ante Markovic, is not prepared to deliver a speech during the three-day session. However, one cannot exclude the possibility of the federal government "surprise" and a presentation of its view on the further course of the economic policy with a special emphasis on 1991 macroeconomic policy.

Session Marked With 'Great Uncertainty'

AU1610162290 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] On the eve of the three-day session of the SFRY Assembly, at which Presidency President Borisav Jovic will speak about the way to overcome the constitutional crisis and about the political-security situation, preparations are being carried out in the Assembly with a view to having this session run in an orderly fashion. Here is a report by Olivija Rusovac:

[Rusovac] The upcoming three-day SFRY Assembly session is marked with a great uncertainty concerning its outcome, although the secretaries of both chambers tried to present to journalists some points that many believe may get complicated.

There are two events that will take place in the Assembly: the expose on the constitutional crisis and security situation that Presidency President Borisav Jovic is going to present at the session of the Federal Chamber tomorrow afternoon and the inauguration of Stipe Mesic as member of the collective head of state at the joint session of the two chambers on Friday afternoon. Croatian delegates demand that the agenda be changed and Stipe Mesic's inauguration be carried out before President Jovic's expose. The point of this maneuver is not only not to have delegates wait for two days, but is in fact the consequence of some delegates' announcement that they will boycott Stipe Mesic's inauguration as Presidency member. The rules of procedure of the assembly chambers do not envisage any possibility of fulfilling this wish of Croatian delegates, which was later joined by delegates from Slovenia as well. The only hope left is that the session of the Federal Chamber, which the delegates of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces can also attend to hear President Jovic's expose, will run properly and that delegates from republics who do not agree with the federal concept of the future setup of Yugoslavia will not walk out.

The Chamber of Republics and Provinces will adopt eight important laws, including the budget, as temporary measures tomorrow. The only points that have been coordinated are the law on (?general guarantee) of the resources allocated for the Dobanovci-Bubanj Potok road section and three ratifications.

There is a tacit agreement in the Assembly not to block documents of international importance, even when the Kosovo Assembly has not given its opinion on them.

The Internal Affairs Committee is in session at the moment and should adopt conclusions on the visit to the Knin region and the conclusions on Kosovo situation that were not adopted before.

Thrust of Jovic's Speech Questioned

LD1610211390 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Excerpts] A three-day session of the SFRY Assembly should open tomorrow. This evening, however, it is uncertain what will happen tomorrow in the Assembly tomorrow. Here is our Belgrade correspondent, Sonja Badel:

The SFRY Presidency president, Borisav Jovic will address the Federal Chamber session tomorrow. The session will be attended by delegates of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces. Jovic will speak about the current political situation in the country, the state of security, and proposals on how to resolve the constitutional crisis. Unfortunately it remains unclear whether the speech and the ensuing discussion will consider just a federal concept or a confederal one as well.

At the SFRY Presidency session—as learned from unofficial sources—the idea advocated by the president prevailed—that only the federal concept be discussed on this occasion. As a result, Janez Drnovsek walked out from the session and, hence, the SFRY Presidency continued to work without a Croat or Slovene representative. Representatives of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia allegedly commented that they do not intend to stay in a four-member federation. In any case, if the Presidency's position is not altered, the SFRY Assembly has little chance of completing its task tomorrow.

The other problem besetting the session is that delegates from Croatia demand that the proclamation of Stipe Mesic, an SFRY Presidency member, be carried out tomorrow, and not, as scheduled, on Friday afternoon. [passage omitted]

The coming day in the SFRY Assembly is full of uncertainty, dangers from further exacerbations and dangers from a complete blockade of the federal parliament.

Session Not Started; Tension Seen

AU1710101790 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0904 GMT 17 Oct 90

[Olivija Rusovac report]

[Text] The predictions that the three-day assembly session will be characterized by tensions and uncertainty are already showing themselves to be correct.

The session of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces should have started at 1000 [0800 GMT] but it is still not known when it will really start.

Meanwhile, the Assembly leadership and members of the government are holding consultations behind closed doors concerning the proposal of the Croatian delegation, which demanded at the session of the chairmen and the president of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces this morning that Stipe Mesic be inaugurated a member of the SFRY Presidency before discussion of the agenda and before the speech by President Jovic and other points, which refer primarily to temporary measures in place of regular measures that have not been adopted for lack of an agreement.

We have learned that the speech of Borisav Jovic—the part referring to the constitutional concept—will be considerably moderated following the session of the SFRY Presidency held last night. It is said that the session was not all that pleasant and that the vice president of the highest (?organ) will not be present in the Assembly. The part of the speech which refers to the political-security situation will be firm.

We hope that the Assembly will find a solution so that we can hear the speech and that the Presidency will be completed with a member from Croatia, and in this way avoid a split, at least in the Assembly.

Croats Want Mesic Named Before Speech

AU1610163790 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Belgrade correspondent Bojan Veselinovic report]

[Text] It has been rumored in the SFRY Assembly since yesterday that (?a delegation) may walk out of the SFRY Assembly session tomorrow. It became clearer today which delegation this is, since we have officially learned that the Croatian Assembly demands that Stipe Mesic be inaugurated as a member of the SFRY Presidency before Borisav Jovic delivers his speech in the assembly and not as late as Friday as was proposed earlier.

After the session of the collective state leaderships last week—whose course has become known, and we know that it is to continue today—there is a realistic possibility that President Jovic will present above all the federal model for a future system of the Yugoslav community, or at least will advocate it. The Croats obviously do not want any part of this, and they have sent a draft declaration to the SFRY Assembly according to which no agreement on future life together would be possible before elections in all parts of Yugoslavia.

As one can hear in the assembly lobbies, the delegates of Croatia are to say this publicly tomorrow, even before Borisav Jovic's speech. They strive to have Mesic proclaimed a member of the SFRY Presidency before Jovic's speech because on Friday, when this act is scheduled to take place, they could find that a quorum is not present, which would mean that Croatia will continue to remain without its representative in the SFRY Presidency.

Considering that only separate sessions will be held tomorrow, and the delegates of the two chambers are supposed to merely listen to Jovic's speech jointly, the interpreters of the assembly rules of procedure insist that this will be no joint session. This procedural detail is important because the offices of the SFRY Assembly have thus ensured that the Croats virtually lack any constitutional way to demand a change in the sequence of the points on the agenda and have thus ruled out any possibility that Jovic's speech to the delegates may have to be canceled because the Croats walked out.

Considering that Jovic is supposed to speak at the request of the Federal Chamber, which numbers 220 delegates and in which decisions are adopted by a majority vote, his speech would be postponed only if at least 111 delegates would oppose it or would fail to attend. The scenario is thus well known. One should only remember the moment when, after the walkout of the Croatian and Slovene delegates from the federal Communist Congress, Slobodan Milosevic said that the congress could proceed. Of course one should remember that the representatives of other republican organizations objected. It may happen tomorrow, too, that Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia will not want to talk about the future constitutional system of Yugoslavia without the presence of the delegates of one of the republics.

With all the possible complications, taking into consideration the rules of procedure, it is more than obvious that the situation is very serious indeed. Tomorrow, the Croatian and the Slovene delegates will therefore have to seriously and clearly state what the assemblies of these two republics avoided saying when they made their official requests to change the timetable of the SFRY Assembly session.

It is not the cost of having to wait from Wednesday until Friday for Stipe Mesic to be inaugurated as Presidency member: the reasons are much more weighty.

'Public Anxiety' Over Session Viewed

LD1610131190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1219 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 16 Oct (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav press on Tuesday [16 October] writes on public anxiety on the eve of a three-day session of the federal parliament at which President of the State Presidency Dr Borisav Jovic will present the body's concept for surmounting the constitutional crisis.

If he sets out only the federal concept of resolving the crisis while bypassing the confederative concept proposed by the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and if there are differences over the introduction of Stipe Mesic as Croatia's representative of the Presidency, a blockade of parliament could ensue, says the Belgrade daily BORBA. This will happen if any dissatisfied republican delegation walks out on the session.

The paper reminds its readers that the Yugoslav Socialist Alliance leadership yesterday objected to Mesic's election by the Croatian parliament and recall of his predicessor Dr Stipe Suvar.

The Zagreb daily VJESNIK also anticipates considerable difficulties if President Jovic comes to parliament with the federal concept only and if there are procedural hitches over Mesic's introduction into the office. In the latter case, says the paper which is published in the capital of Croatia, the republic's parliament has institutional possibilities to send a draft confederal agreement to the federal parliament directly, which however would be taken as the "opening of a second channel of communication with parliament."

If the Yugoslav president Dr Borisav Jovic comes before parliament with the federal concept of Yugoslavia's organization only, this could well be "his last appearance in the role of the legitimate head recognized by all, of the Yugoslav State Presidency," writes the Zagreb weekly DANAS. It warns that to disregard the confederative concept proposed by Slovenia and Croatia would be tantamount to outvoting the two republics, which would be the "final step towards an end of Yugoslavia" and its splitting into a "federal bloc and a confederative counter-bloc."

Presidency Split on Federation, Confederation

AU1610151190 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 11 Oct 90 p 1

[DELO correspondent Janja Klasic report: "Jovic Insists on a Federal Concept Only"]

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Oct—Something happened at the session of the SFRY Presidency today that nobody at all had expected. At a session which from 1000 until 1700 discussed nothing but the confederal and federal systems of future Yugoslavia, about which President Jovic should speak on behalf of the SFRY Presidency in the SFRY Assembly on Wednesday [17 Oct], President Jovic simply changed his mind and proposed that the Presidency should submit only the federal concept, because that is "its" proposal, and Slovenia and Croatia should submit "their" confederal concept.

The understanding until then was quite different. Both the public and the SFRY Assembly delegates have been informed that the two proposals should be discussed on an equal footing: they should both be presented by the SFRY Presidency. However, President of the Presidency Jovic sprung a surprise today, submitting a different proposal, and we have been able to learn that the Presidency faced a deep division. Those attending the session on behalf of Slovenia and Croatia—the session was expanded and attended by the presidents of the republican and provincial presidencies—supported a confederal system, the Serbs and the Montenegrins supported a concept of "modern federation," as they like to call it, but the representatives of Bosnia-Hercegovina and of Macedonia did not like either concept. They think that the confederal concept is too loose, and they reproach the federal one for excessive centralization which they say would be stronger than at present.

Janez Drnovsek, Milan Kucan, and Franjo Tudjman did not agree with the latest Jovic's idea according to which the opinion of the Presidency should be what he himself or Serbia thinks; Bosnia- Hercegovina and Macedonia also dislike such a conduct. The session was also attended by Prime Minister Ante Markovic, who opined that the present moment is not at all suitable for deciding on such fateful questions. He repeated the standpoint of the government to the effect that multiparty elections should first be held everywhere in Yugoslavia, whereupon the legitimate representatives of all the republics and provinces should discuss Yugoslavia's future.

Despite the different opinions, President Jovic advocated the stand that the formal procedure should begin as soon as possible, that one should build on the federal concept, and that the Slovenes and the Croats should again think about it. If they accept it, fine; if they do not, they can leave the state. He even went as far as to contradict himself. In an interview for Belgrade Television some time ago, which was seen by millions of viewers all over the country, he said that the Presidency proposes a referendum in all the republics to show whether people are for a confederation or a federation. Now he and Milosevic were thinking about Slovenia and Croatia holding a referendum if the SFRY Presidency decided on a federal concept.

The Serbian and the Montenegrin sides did not indicate any readiness to bring the two proposals for the future of Yugoslavia closer together. Although Janez Drnovsek again advocated that both concepts should be presented to the Assembly, Jovic insisted that the SFRY Presidency should again suggest that a new federal constitution be drafted (it proposed this for the first time in February this year), and those who are not in favor should secede.

Because of the numerous suggestions, Jovic proposed that the federal concept should be somewhat improved, but the Slovene and the Croatian sides did not think that the same was necessary for the confederal one. No final decision was adopted, and it was only concluded that the final decision should be made at the next session. This session should probably be held on Monday [15 October].

As the second point on the agenda, the Presidency discussed the situation in Kosovo. The session continues and will run late into the night.

Commentary on Assembly Debate on Jovic Speech

*AU1610212090 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
11 Oct 90 p 1*

[Janja Klasinc "Topic of the Day" commentary: "Jovic's Coup d'Etat"]

[Text] Milan Kucan has indignantly deemed what happened at the session of the SFRY Presidency Balkanization. That is true, but it is also true that this time the word should not imply—as it usually does—backwardness and disorganization alone. First of all, one can see something which is in fact a constituent element of Balkanization and that is disorder. Those who caused this disorder are the best at finding their way in the midst of it and are the first to cherish it carefully.

They are not doing it in vain, however. It is known that what would be utopistic in an orderly situation can be most easily achieved in a chaotic situation. If Mihajlo Svabic's words at the Usce meeting of brotherhood and unity held in Belgrade two years ago that we, the Slovenes, are going to leave Yugoslavia seemed to us funny theater, the most recent event involves a much more realistic game. What the head of this frightened state, which is rushing into absurdities, did today, may in any case only aggravate the situation in that state. It is possible to hide one's real intentions when a Presidency session is held behind closed doors and public announcements issued from it are full of empty phrases, such as the one issued yesterday. If one adds to that debate the fact that the federal Assembly apparently naively decided that only the Federal Chamber, and not the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, will decide upon Jovic's report then the scenario is completely clear. Namely, the Federal Chamber makes its decisions by majority vote and the Chamber of Republics and Provinces by consensus. This is therefore the easiest way to reject the confederal proposal by Slovenia and Croatia. On the other hand, by "forgetting" overnight about holding a referendum in all of Yugoslavia and limiting it to the northern parts of the country alone, they would not only avoid any unpleasant surprises when the people declare their real will, particularly in Serbia, but would also more quickly attain the old aim—Serboslavia. In fact, time is very important. In several months this may become completely impossible.

Mesic Believes Confederation Only Viable Option

*AU1610150290 Vienna PROFIL in German
15 Oct 90 p 67*

[Interview with Stipe Mesic by Ernst Schmiederer in Zagreb; date not given: "Miscarriage Yugoslavia"]

[Text] [Schmiederer] You are the designated state president. On 15 May 1991 you are supposed to assume this post. What will Yugoslavia be like then?

[Mesic] There are only two possibilities. In the pessimistic version I will be president of the federation. In the optimistic version I will be the first president of the confederation.

[Schmiederer] And which is the more likely one?

[Mesic] The confederation. Yugoslavia is a miscarriage, which can be kept alive only by means of infusions. This model of a federation is simply outdated.

[Schmiederer] The Serbs stress on every occasion that they will not join in a confederation.

[Mesic] They themselves did everything to make sure that there will not be a federation anymore. They adopted a Constitution, according to which their president, that is, Slobodan Milosevic, is to be commander of the Armed Forces. But this is not possible in a federation. Milosevic always talks about an independent Serbia. With this, however, he means that it also includes Bosnia- Hercegovina and parts of Croatia. But today one cannot simply change the borders. Thus, the confederation remains the only way out.

[Schmiederer] Who will join in this confederation?

[Mesic] Croatia and Slovenia. We believe that Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia will also participate.

[Schmiederer] Not only Milosevic but also Croatian Serbs are talking about changing the borders. Is Yugoslavia facing a civil war?

[Mesic] There will be no civil war. This is only a small militant group, which makes life difficult for us. And we will solve this problem as any other state would solve it. We have tried to find a peaceful solution. But obviously this is not possible there because the Serbs get their instructions from Belgrade.

[Schmiederer] Vladimir Scheks, the deputy Croatian parliamentary president, recently announced that "the armed uprising of the Serbian minority in Croatia will be broken within the next few days." Josip Manolic, the head of the Croatian Government, threatened the Serbs with actions "with a bit rougher means than so far." Is this also your proposal for a solution?

[Mesic] It is very likely that we have to solve the problem with police methods. We know who owns weapons illegally. We have photos as proof. Thus, we will summon these people and start proceedings against them. If they refuse, we will use force.

[Schmiederer] Already in August, when you were still prime minister, you said that Croatia would have 4.5 million volunteers within an hour to defend the country. At that time the situation was not yet so tense. Are you so weak that you have to bark so loudly?

[Mesic] At that time, we were threatened with the invasion of hundreds of thousands of volunteers from Serbia. We responded that we are ready to defend our territory. Our counterthreat was successful, since then no one has again spoken of Serbian volunteers.

[Schmiederer] You have repeatedly come out against the brutal methods that the Serbs use against the Albanians in Kosovo. Now you are on the point of turning Knin into the Croatian Kosovo.

[Mesic] The Albanians are the original people in Kosovo. This is their home. They have a historical right, and they are the majority there. In our case, however the issue is the division of the Croatian territory and no one has a right to do that. We are not in favor of violence. But it will not be permitted that the traffic is closed and railroads interrupted. This has nothing to do with democracy.

[Schmiederer] But a democracy should protect its minorities against the majorities.

[Mesic] The Serbs do not want the same rights as the Croatians, they want more. And, above all, they want Croatian territory. In the places of unrest the Serbs have all the power; the police are in their hands, the directors, the community presidents—all of them are Serbs. Until the victory of democracy 70 percent of the people in the police units in Zagreb were Serbs. The officers' posts in the Yugoslav Army are also staffed in this disproportionate way.

[Schmiederer] In Slovenia, the Army has already indicated that it would be ready to intervene. How will it react to Croatia's leaving the federation?

[Mesic] In Ljubljana it saw that this was wrong. The Army will not have any other choice but to accept the will of the state.

[Schmiederer] If one walks through Zagreb, everywhere one sees the new Croatian flag with the chessboard coat of arms. Can you imagine that a Serb, whose parents were killed by the Ustasha, does not feel very comfortable when he now sees this chessboard pattern everywhere, which was also on the Ustasha flag?

[Mesic] This is the old Croatian flag. There is no reason for anyone to feel disturbed by this flag. Furthermore, there is hardly any flag which was not involved in bloodshed. Every people has bloody periods and positive moments.

[Schmiederer] Now the "Square of the Victims of Fascism" is renamed. Then the Croats will no longer be constantly reminded of the bloody periods.

[Mesic] We prefer to put up a big monument for all victims of totalitarians, for the victims of fascism and the victims of communism. There must be an end to World War II at some time. We finally want to live like any other civilized country.

[Schmiederer] By the way, one can see the flag not only in Croatia. In Bosnia-Hercegovina its sister party, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in Bosnia, also presents itself with the new flag of the Croatian state.

[Mesic] Part of the Croatian People also live in Bosnia-Hercegovina. And this flag is a national flag.

[Schmiederer] Not only that, it is also a state flag. With this you register the claim of the Croatian state to Bosnia-Hercegovina.

[Mesic] The Croats have a right to their symbols. This is just proof of the fact that Croats also live there.

Possible United Serb Democratic Opposition Noted

LD1610050190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1938 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Belgrade, 15 Oct (TANJUG)—The People's Peasant Party [Narodna Seljacka Stranka], the Green Party, and, most likely, the Belgrade branch of the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative [UJDI], will take part in the elections in Serbia. This has been stated by leaders of these parties at a public platform on the elections. At the same time, they have hinted that a democratic coalition will be formed,together with the Liberal Forum [Liberalni Forum], the Vojvodina Forum [Vojvodjanski Forum] and the Belgrade Women's Lobby [Zenski Beogradski Lobi].

The leaders of these six, nonnational democratic parties and associations will decide independently whether to run in or boycott the forthcoming elections. Although they have undoubtedly the regularity of the forthcoming elections, they have nevertheless agreed that efforts should be made to create the climate and institutions without which fair elections are impossible, even more so because—as Ivan Djuric [of the Liberal Forum] stated—multiparty elections provide only a precondition for democracy.

Besides, those believing that the international public will condemn elections in Serbia as illegal just because a few parties will boycott them, are deceiving themselves, Dragan Veselinov [of the People's Peasant Party] added.

The heralded coalition came out this evening in favor of a federation and dialogue with all political forces in the country, including the Kosovo alternative. A dialogue with the latter is necessary so that the rights of the Serbian minority in Kosovo on the one hand, and on the other the Albanian nationality—which is a minority group in Yugoslavia—can be protected.

The occasion, too, was missed to accuse the Serbian Socialist Party [SPS] of having a monoply over media, and above all Belgrade Television. Ivan Djuric asked whether Belgrade Television is prepared to disclose who pays for the Ekspress Politika advertisement running twice daily before and after the daily news program.

70,000 Members in Milosevic's Party in Kosovo

AU1610143790 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Oct 90 p 7

[Unattributed report: "70,000 People Joined the Socialist Party of Serbia in Kosovo"]

[Text] The Socialist Party of Serbia has about 70,000 members in Kosovo-Metohija. Many of them were never members of the League of Communists. There are also many of those who left the League of Communists before the Eighth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia. Among the members of the Socialist Party of Serbia there are more Serbs and Montenegrins than anybody else—about 62,000. Albanians constitute the smallest group. There are 304 of them.

Ethnic Albanian Employees Dismissed in Serbia

LD1610182390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1547 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Excerpt] Pristina, 16 Oct (TANJUG)—Some 1,300 ethnic Albanians employed in the post offices in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia's Kosovo Province have been sacked these days.

As learned in the provincial capital, Pristina, the ethnic-Albanian postmen failed to show up for work for an entire month, and the authorities have qualified their strike as political.

The postmen demand that slightly over 100 of their officials the Serbian republican authorities have suspended for organizing the September 3 strike be reinstated.

The post offices in the province will hold a new competition, open to all, as set out, including those sacked over the strike. [passage omitted]

Tudjman Addresses National Rally in Zagreb

LD1610224390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1932 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Excerpts] Zagreb, 16 Oct (TANJUG)—The return of the monument to Josip Jelacic to the central square in Zagreb is an exceptional event in the life of the Croatian capital city, and indeed of the entire Croatian nation. This was stressed by Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Croatian Republic, speaking at a large national rally in Zagreb tonight. [passage omitted]

"We also decided to change the name of the Square of Victims of Fascism into the Square of Croatian Great Men, for several reasons. If we are to keep the Square of Victims of Fascism, then we should also have to find a matching Square of Victims of Communism, because they are no fewer," Dr. Tudjman said. Besides, he added, we have already adopted a decision to erect a joint monument to all who perished, so that in so doing we can build a spiritual unity in freedom and democracy."

Dr. Tudjman went on to serve the warning that threats are emerging not only to Croatian freedom and democracy, but to the very existence of the Croatian nation in its own homeland. In connection with the problems facing Croatia today, Dr. Tudjman reiterated the essential views of this republic's leadership. "We are appealing to those who organized rebellion in Knin and set up Chetnik divisions and imposed highway terrorism to come to their senses and desist from this barbaric violence, because its consequences will be greater the longer they persist with such acts.

"Let the entire Croatian history, the present-day awareness of the entire Croatian nation, and, in the eyes of the democratic world, the legitimate authority of the Croatian republic be a warning that there cannot be and never will be anti-Croatian and antidemocratic authority on Croatian soil; and in particular a greater Serbia or unitarist Yugoslavia cannot be that authority," Dr. Tudjman stressed.

We appeal once more to reason, and guarantee the Serbs in Croatia all civil and national rights. Our doors are open to all international institutions to monitor adherance to all democratic principles adopted and proclaimed by us, Dr. Tudjman said, stressing that Croatia has become and will remain a member of the free world.

"To Belgrade hegemonists and scenarists, and all those wanting to turn back the wheels of history to the pre-1974 Constitution period, we say: Croatia cannot and will not accept future relations being settled in any other way except as a union of sovereign and truly equal republics. To those deceiving themselves that they could bring to its knees and topple the Republic of Croatia through an armed intervention of voluntary units from

Serbia and Montenegro, or even through an armed intervention by the Yugoslav People's Army, say: This leadership of the Croatian Republic, elected by the overriding will of the Croatian people, and this reawakened nation will not capitulate," Dr. Franjo Tudjman stressed.

The president of the Croatian Republic emphasized: "If we have to die for the freedom, democracy, and sovereignty of Croatia, we will call to our defense not only all organized forces, but the entire Croatian nation, both in the homeland and abroad, and we can rest assured that we will receive help from the entire democratic world," Dr. Tudjman asserted, concluding that the monument to Jelacic is a symbol of the spiritual unity of Croats here and abroad, of the identity, indestructability, strength and courage of the Croatian people, their love for peace, their resoluteness and permanent deep-rooted links with European history and Western civilization.

Railroad Tracks in Knin Said Mined, Blocked

LD1610162190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1456 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Knin, 16 Oct (TANJUG)—The railroad track was mined in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia's northern Dalmatia region between [place name indistinct] and Martin Brod in the night of Monday-Tuesday [15-16 October], the railway authorities' representatives set out in Knin.

Fifty or so meters of tracks have been damaged by dynamite, so that freight and passenger routes from Knin going north were disrupted.

The route toward Zadar continued blocked, while trains in the Knin region depart only during daytime.

This region of Croatia is predominantely inhabited by the Serbs, who continue at intense odds with the Croatian republican authorties, and seek a higher degree of cultural and political autonomy.

The tracks were mined after indications that a large number of Croats from Dalmatia, who travel to the formal ceremony of erecting the monument of civil governor (ban) Jelacic scheduled for 10 pm on Tuesday night in Zagreb, would pass through Knin and other places predominantly populated with Serbs.

Part of the Serbs in Croatia see this as a provocation and pressure of the majority Croatians. According to imcoming reports from Knin and other places, the majority of the travellers avoid this part of Croatia when going to Zagreb.

The Croatian capital was preparing on Tuesday for a grand celebration to re-instate the monument to civil governor (ban) Jelacic, which was built in 1866, and removed by new Yugoslav authorities in 1947.

Ban Jelacic was proclaimed ban of Croatia in 1848. At the time Croatia was part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Croatian people embraced [word indistinct] as a historical figure for which it linked its identity.

Croatia Submits Legislation To Control Defense

LD1610171590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1331 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Zagreb, 16 Oct (TANJUG)—The Croatian Government today submitted to the republic's Assembly a proposal of changes and amendments to the All-People's Defense Law, under which the territorial defense and civil protection will, in practice, be taken over by the republic's authorities.

Under the proposal, more than one-third of the articles from the 1984 All-People's Defense Law will change. The All-People's Defense and Civil Protection Committees will be abolished and the republic's sovereignty enhanced in all areas of the national defense system. A command will be in charge of territorial defense, and in the future its commander will be appointed and dismissed by the Presidency of the Croatian Republic, not by the federal Presidency, as has been the case so far.

Under the proposal, the civil protection headquarters will become part of the defense ministry and their commanders will be appointed by the republic's government.

Beginning next year, the financing the defense system will be altered. There will also be changes in the area of military service and armed forces mobilization. The competence of the republic and the municipalities in this sphere is being worked out in accordance with the federal law.

Wave of Strikes, Protests Hits Macedonian Towns

LD1610110690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0846 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Skopje, 16 Oct (TANJUG)—Macedonia, especially its capital Skopje, is today engulfed in a wave of strikes and protests unprecedented in this republic. The "series" of strikes began yesterday when workers at Skopje's Tito metal factory went on strike, followed by elementary school teachers in Prilep. Both strikes broke out because of the same reason—unpaid personal income. Workers in Kicevo also went on strike because of the Studenica water conflict.

A warning strike will be staged in Skopje today by drivers and employees of the public city transport company—public transport will be halted from 1200 until 1600. Several thousand people from Kicevo will stage a so-called "meeting of truth" in front of the Macedonian Assemby building to prove that they should have priority in using the regional water supply system from which people from Makedonski brod, Krusevo. and Prilep should also get water supplies.

Bosnia Opposes Demand for National Chambers

AU1510173990 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] The Constitutional Commission of Bosnia-Hercegovina rejected the demand of the Serbian Democratic Party that national chambers [nacionalo vece] be set up in the republican Assembly. Ljubomir Nikolic has the details:

[Nikolic] The Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina demanded that the Assembly of this republic alter the constitutional amendment which regulates the founding of the assembly council for questions concerning interethnic relations and equality of peoples and nationalities, and instead of it, introduce three national chambers which would make decisions concerning borders and the state-legal status of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the equal use of languages and alphabets, the position of education and religious communities, and the work of national institutions.

The letter sent to the Assembly states that the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina face two options: to accept this demand proposal or to form a Serbian National Council [Srpsko Nacionalno Vece]. However, not waiting for the decision of the Constitutional Commission and appropriate Assembly bodies, the Serbian Democratic Party founded a Serbian National Council in Banja Luka two days ago. The members of the republican Constitutional Commission therefore concluded that there is no purpose in discussing the demand of this party. The members of the Constitutional Commission also found the demand for setting up national chambers to be an act which would directly lead to the disintegration of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Yugoslavia.

Dr. Nijaz Durakovic holds the view that the decision to form a national council violates the sovereignty of this republic and that it constitutes a prelude to chaos and civil war. Durakovic demanded of state organs that they express their opinion since this was a violation of the existing constitution and laws. It is obvious that the rating of national parties is falling and that they would like to see the elections postponed, Durakovic said.

Muhamed Besic, republican secretary for internal affairs, was even sharper in condemning the founding of the Serbian National Council, who describe this as a part of (?premeditated) scenario linking it to the events in the Knin region. Besic spoke about subversive actions that are transferred from that part of Croatia to Bosnia-Hercegovina, the forming of voluntary units, and the demand which the Serbian Democratic party sent to the SFRY Presidency asking it for the instructions for the self-organization of the Serbian people in this republic.

The participants in the session also mentioned the action of other national parties, the homogenization of the Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sandzak, and Kosovo, and the homogenization of Croats from West Hercegovina and Croatia.

The members of the Constitutional Commission of Bosnia-Hercegovina concluded that this republic is doing its utmost so that the first multiparty elections scheduled for 18 November are held in a democratic way.

Parties React to Council Formation

AU1610173290 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Political parties in the republic have reacted to the decision to form the Serbian National Council of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Central Committee of the League of Communists, the Republican Committee of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], and the Socialist Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina voiced their views today. Here is a report by Ljubomir Nikolic:

[Nikolic] The formation of the Serbian National Council of Bosnia-Hercegovina is an illegal and unconstitutional act. This act is deepening interethnic confrontations and represents an attempt to gradually introduce an extraordinary situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Yugoslavia, it is said in the announcement issued from the session of the Republican Central Committee Presidium. The announcement goes on to say that this act is aimed at suspending democratic processes in this republic and that it may result in the formation of other national councils as parallel organs of power. Some self-appointed leaders and national institutions are being imposed on the people through various means and manipulating them in the name of the entire nation. Such a thing can only be expected from national parties which want to stir up the psychosis of fear and chaos, it is said in the announcement that the Central Committee issued today. Warning about possible unforeseeable consequences, the Central Committee calls on the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim peoples in Bosnia-Hercegovina to link their interests to a life together and not to allow certain forces to push them into an ever greater mutual isolation and confrontation.

At the regular news conference today, Dr. Nijaz Durakovic deemed the behavior of the national parties as hypocrisy, because, in his opinion, they are trying to call the elections into question because they feel that after the initial euphoria and after proclaiming themselves winners too early, their chances and ratings have been falling.

Durakovio said that as early as last March, the League of Communists of Bosnia-Hercegovina—Socialist Democratic Party was ready for elections and that it still wants them to be held in a peaceful and democratic way on 18 November.

Commenting on the formation of the Serbian National Council, the leader of the HDZ of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Stjepan Kljujic, said that his party recognizes legitimate authorities alone and that it is not ready to participate in the sharing of power outside official organs. The HDZ considers the negation of sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina, the joint homeland of everybody living in it, to be unacceptable. He also condemned the recent event in Livno when a Yugoslav flag was set on fire. According to Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE, the act was perpetrated by a group of HDZ storm troopers.

The president of the newly founded Socialist Party of Bosnia- Hercegovina, Rabija Subic, said at a news conference held today, on the eve of the party's promotion in Sarajevo tomorrow, that the gentlemen from the Serbian Democratic Party had hurried into forming the Serbian National Council of Bosnia-Hercegovina. One should have waited for a reply of the legal republican bodies to the Serbian Democratic Party's demand to change a constitutional amendment and only then take measures, Rabija Subic said.

Serbian Council in Bosnia-Hercegovina Condemned

LD1610165990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1506 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 16 Oct (TANJUG)—The leadership of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Hercegovina-Socialist Democratic Party - today sharply condemned the forming of the Serbian National Council in the republic.

The Serbian National Council was formed last week by the Serbian Democratic Party, one of the most influential parties among Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The communists warn that the forming of the council deepens the inter-nationality gap in the republic and breaks up its state unity.

The communist leadership also said that such a "demonstration of national force" is aimed at thwarting the free democratic multi-party elections scheduled for next month.

The population of Bosnia-Hercegovina is mixed - 40 percent are Moslem, 32 percent Serb and 17 percent Croat.

The communists believe that after the Serbian National Council has been formed, the other two nations in the republic could do the same which would further strain the tense inter-nationality relations.

Slovenia Appoints First Representative Abroad

LD1610125390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1035 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Summary] Ljubljana, 16 Oct (TANJUG)—Slovenia's Information Secretariat has announced the appointment of Dr. Lojze Socan as head of the republic's mission in Brussels. Socan will be first official representative of the Republic of Slovenia in a foreign country. Berore his departure to take up his new post, Socan was received by Milan Kucan, president of the Slovene Presidency, and other top officials.

Rugova Concludes Visit to United States, Europe

AU1610182290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13-14 Oct 90 p 12

["S.H."-signed report: "Bolshevik Relapses"]

[Text] Pristina—Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, and a delegation of his party ended their visit to the United States and some European countries which Rugova described as very successful. Rugova said that in addition to contacts and talks with officials in the State Department and the Committee on Hunger, and the chairman of this committee, Tony Hall, it was also assessed that "hunger, poverty, unemployment, and the dismissal of Albanians from their jobs, which is becoming more and more evident in Kosovo" and has assumed worrying proportions in the last few months, is a burning issue.

Commenting on the latest statement issued by the country's Presidency, Rugova said that "it was obvious that the Presidency still finds it difficult to rid itself of the Bolshevik relapses, and that it does not want to resolve problems in Kosovo in a democratic way, but that it advocates violence."